# The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR

## Case

### 1NC---Policy Debate is Aesthetic

#### The imagination and debate over competing words is artistic, playful, and scholarly simultaneously.

**Chia, 96.** (Robert Chia, University of Stirling. “The Problem of Reflexivity in Organizational Research: Towards a Postmodern Science of Organization” Organization, Volume 3, No. 1, February. SAGE Journals. Online.)

One more recent development in organizational theorizing results from taking the problem of reflexivity seriously. Such organizational writers accept that both their own accounts and those generated by others are first and foremost linguistic constructions which operate according to established conventional linguistic codes. Theories of organization are deemed to be self-­justifying 'intelligible narratives' which enable a community of inquirers to arrive at some consensus regarding their social experiences. As Gergen (1992) puts it: If there is one theme that unites most of those confronting the postmodern irony, it is a **certain sense of ludic humility. The view of knowledge‑making as a transcendental pursuit removed from the trivial enthralments of daily life, pristinely rational and transparently virtuous**, becomes so much puffery. We should view these bodies of language we call knowledge in a lighter vein‑as ways of putting things together, some pretty and others petty. (Gergen, 1992: 215) **Hence, 'irony', 'self‑reflection' and 'playful seriousness' replace the rational quest for 'certain' or even 'partially true' knowledge of an external organizational reality. For these 'meta­reflexive' theorists, both the bodyof‑knowledge claims in organization theory and their own claims are to be understood in a lighter vein as artistically crafted pieces of work in their own right. Theories generated mirror the concerns and preoccupations of the theorists themselves and do not, as such, claim any absolute, groun­ded connexion with a reality beyond. Such writers would argue that these crafted pieces of 'linguistic web' contribute to the making of our organizational reality.**

### 1NC---Kroker Wrong

#### Kroker’s thesis is wrong and they devolve into the same humanistic principles he criticizes

James **Steinhoff 16**, The University of Western Ontario, “Exits to the Posthuman Future,” Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2016, p. 533-536

In Exits to the Posthuman Future (2014), Arthur Kroker deploys a mutant strain of Marshall McLuhan’s (McLuhan and McLuhan 1988) medium theory to paint a dark picture of high-technology capitalist societies. At its most dire points this book appears to be an affirmation of Friedrich Nietzsche (1964) and Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) theses that God is dead and meaning is impossible. Advanced technology is the primary cause of this condition, which is the posthuman era. Kroker contends that previous conceptions of the posthuman were misguidedly optimistic and that the posthuman must be grasped as a state of total indeterminacy in which a literally living technology dominates human agency. Yet, there is a tension. Throughout the text there are moments of tangible hope for a traditionally humanistic future and, perplexingly, the book closes with an explicit call to recover the social and ethical values lost in the ravages of capitalism. In the end, it is hard to say what this book is intended to do. Kroker’s dark posthumanist prognosis stands starkly juxtaposed with his latent humanism. Arthur Kroker is a postmodernist Canadian theorist who has been studying the intersections of technology and culture since the mid-1980s. This new book consists of several essays comprised of original material and new versions of previously presented material. It is wide-ranging in topic, roving from drone warfare to Obama’s political rhetoric to media theory. In a high-speed and prolix style that recalls William Gibson’s cyberpunk fiction and the work of McLuhan and Paul Virilio, Kroker sets out a way of thinking about contemporary high-technological society' that follows the McLuhanian insistence on the constant and unavoidable influence of media on humans—but inverts it. The theoretical linchpin of this text is the “dark tetrad” (p. 25), Kroker’s inversion of McLuhan’s four laws of media. McLuhan asserted that all media have four effects on individuals and societies: to enhance something, to obsolesce something, to retrieve something that was previously obsolesced, and to intensify something to the point of its reversal (McLuhan & McLuhan, 4988). Kroker presents another side to the tetrad, which he describes, following Jacques Derrida (2006), as “hauntological” (p. 193). The dark tetrad describes disappearance instead of enhancement, substitution instead of obsolescence, abandonment instead of retrieval, and stasis instead of reversal (Kroker, 2014). These four functions describe the actions of media from a non-anthropomorphic standpoint. This dehumanization of McLuhan is necessary, Kroker asserts, because a fundamental feature of the posthuman era is that technology has “in the most literal sense ... now come alive” (p. 28). Yet Kroker’s main interest here is not the autonomous artificial intelligences of transhumanist speculation, nor is it the academic posthumanisms of Katherine Hayles (2008) or Donna Harraway (2000). Kroker’s posthuman age is “that historical moment when the power of technology turns back on itself, effectively undermining traditional concepts such as subjectivity, privacy, and bounded consciousness in order to render all things truly uncertain and unknowable” (p. 7). It is a “dystopian phase of information technology” in which “the informatics of domination has appropriated the resistance spirit of the borderlands” (p. 96). Kroker argues that the permeable human/machine boundaries of Hayles and Hanaway have been superseded by7 all-encompassing machinic control. Kroker’s posthuman is thus a dark time for beings that still think of themselves as human. It is also a dark time because it is quite literally haunted. Kroker holds that: “the essence of the posthuman axiomatic inheres in the fact that technology now eagerly seeks out that which was previously marginalized as simultaneously ways of mobilizing itself as it effectively recodes every aspect of social and nonsocial existence” (p. 6). This is the hauntological aspect of media: that which was previously marginalized is resurrected by technologies to serve as their contents and reasons for being with no logic discernable to humans. The result is the bewildering posthuman era, which Kroker adumbrates using the concepts of acceleration, drift, and crash. Acceleration will be familiar to readers of other postmodernist technology theorists, such as Virilio, and needs little elaboration. Crash depicts the collision between accelerated technologies and traditional human qualities. Drift is Kroker’s most compelling contribution to thinking the posthuman. Drift describes the perturbations of a society no longer directed by human intention, but by myriad, incremental, and unpredictable mutations in the codes that underlie molar reality. Code drift “is the spectral destiny of the story of technology,” (p. 50) but it is also “nothing new,” (p. 52) in that human evolution is a history of sampling errors. The posthuman era is described as one of “drift culture” in that the randomness and non-teleological nature of the molecular realm takes over the molar. The dark tetrad is thus to be understood as a schematic of how code drift rearranges the world without intention or consciousness. Code drift converts humans to “data flesh” that fully absorbs the primary modernist disavowal—the sense of the absurd in all the great referentials—as its key conditions of possibility” (p. 53). Drift culture is the technological proof of existentialism. Kroker is quite brief on suggesting how we ought to proceed with social life in the drifting absurdity of the posthuman era. He devotes only a four-page epilogue to the question of what is to be done now. Not surprisingly, given the existentialist tone of the work, he advocates an aesthetic comportment toward the posthuman. Specifically, he endorses an aesthetics based on Jean-Frangois Lyotard’s (2011) notion of the “figural” or adiscursive gestalt—presumably adapting it to grasp the adiscursivity of ubiquitous code: “Art of this (posthuman) order recodes the question of aesthetics by the creation of a mode of perception that fully opens to the discontinuous, tire fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal” (Kroker 2014, P-197)- This call for extreme openness evokes Nietzsche’s Dionysian mode of being, in which destruction and creation possess equal valence, but Kroker quickly qualifies this, asserting that since: the posthuman condition has revealed decadence ... as the basic ontology of late capitalism, the point of a figural art that would “harden, worsen, accelerate decadence” would be precisely the reverse, that is to say, it would draw into a greater visibility those intangible, but very real, impulses to social solidarity and ethical probity that haunt the order of the real. (p. 198) This foray into the supposedly posthuman ends with a call for the reinstatement of the most humanistic of principles. The idea seems to be that the novel form of living in the posthuman era is analogous to the collective yearnings of the “spirit of ’68.”

#### AND, it’s biologically impossible---the thing that makes humans not chimpanzees is instrumental rationality <<< – they’ll assert that this argument naturalizes our model of thinking BUT that’s not a bad thing since we’re right – it’s their burden to prove efficacy in the short-term or the case obviously outweighs >>>

Søren Riis 11, Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” 2-8-2011

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.

#### Kroker is wrong – doesn’t understand biotechnology, doesn’t understand his own philosophy, and ignores that the will to technology is inevitable

Glynn 19 (Andrew Glynn PhD – Doctorate in Philsophy and meta-physician, “Arthur Kroker’s “The Will to Technology”, Dasein42, 13 February 2019, <https://dasein42.medium.com/arthur-krokers-the-will-to-technology-97057aab9f7d>, MG)

Kroker is correct that the science most prevalent in the 20th century is that of biology rather than physics, and the most controversial technology therefore bio-technology. Kroker, like much of the public **not actually versed** in the technology part of bio-technology, jumps to the assumption that the small successes (such as bio-engineering bacteria to produce insulin) indicate that large scale human bio-engineering is ‘just around the corner’. The reality is **far different** — having just completed a short stint at a firm involved with Google in producing a genome variant search engine that meets all the security and identity management requirements that each genetic database owner puts on their data, we’re **not even at the point** where a reasonably simple search for a given genome variant can be accomplished.

Biology itself is in much the same state as physics in 1900 when Planck first called for a quantum theory — there’s a strong sense that our past biology is overly simplistic, but not a clear path forward.

The human genome project has taught us plenty of things, but the most important of those is that most genes or gene combinations are interpreted dynamically in some way based on the environment, and since we know **neither the meaning of most of the genetic code, nor how the interpreter works**, and we have no Rosetta Stone to give us a clue to either, bio-engineering at the human level is going to remain relatively simplistic for some time. We’re not in the bionic age quite yet, though Kroker appears to believe we are. There are genes that map directly to phenotypes, such as eye colour, but that appears to be largely true only in phenotypes that are relatively unimportant, again such as eye colour, which makes little difference to anyone other than cosmeticians.

I won’t go into the number of more important predictions made by Heidegger in particular that **Kroker is apparently completely oblivious to**, despite many of them having already come to pass in the short time since his death in 1976, or in danger of coming to pass imminently. However omissions such as the identity of the ‘last god’; the ‘thin wall’ that separates our pure imagination (as in dreams) with our experience of reality; and the notion of Being as change are somewhat unforgivable. Of course, that takes us back to the omission of Hegel and the light Hegel’s work shines on the three thinkers Kroker does deal with.

Kroker seems to miss that for Heidegger technology is a ‘destining’, i.e. a dispensation of Being itself (and in some senses the most overt manifestation of Being in postmodern times), and therefore **not something to be either for or against**, but something one needs to discover a “free relation” to. This destining subverts the title of the work itself, in that technology as a dispensation of Being has nothing to do with will in Nietzsche’s sense, where will to power reverts almost immediately to will to will, since power is only the ability to will more.

He also skims over the important notion of the ontological transparency of technology, i.e. given an iPhone, nearly **anyone can see almost immediately how it could be better**, how it doesn’t (yet) quite substitute for the essence of technology, though we do use specific technological artifacts of that kind in substitution for technology as a whole in our daily speech without thinking much if anything about it. The same cannot be said when we look at a tree or a horse, for instance.

The book is written in a fast-paced style apparently intended to get average readers interested in the work of these thinkers and how it both affects and is affected by events in the world since their work was written. In some ways it works, in others it seems to cause Kroker to skim over some of the **most crucial concepts**.

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### 1NC---Improvement Good

#### Productivity is good for global quality of life and reducing structural violence—they’re reductionist.

Iacono ‘16, Corey Iacono is a student at the University of Rhode Island studying Pharmaceutical Science and Economics, “How Capitalism and Globalization Have Made the World a Better Place,” Quillette, January 16, 2016, <http://quillette.com/2016/01/16/how-capitalism-and-globalization-have-made-the-world-a-better-place>, msm

Just kidding, that’s not what happened at all. In fact, as the world has become more capitalist and more globalized, the quality of life for the average person, and especially for the average poor person, has increased substantially. In 1990, 37% of the global population lived on less than $1.90 per day. By 2012, that number had been reduced to 12.8%, and in 2015 it was under 10%. The source of this progress isn’t a massive wealth redistribution program; it’s massive wealth creation — that is, economic growth. Economists David Dollar and Aart Kraay found that, in a global sample of over 100 countries, changes in the income growth of the bottom 40% of the world’s income earners are highly correlated with economic growth rates. On the other hand, changes in inequality contributed relatively little to changes in social welfare of the poor over the last few decades. There is good reason to believe that the expansion of free trade, facilitated by international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have had a considerable impact in accelerating the economic development of developing countries. In the 1990s GATT facilitated reforms which moved 125 countries towards freer trade by reducing the burden of government imposed trade barriers like tariffs. This was the first serious attempt at trade reform for most developing countries at the time, and arguably presents a unique natural experiment on the economic effects of trade reform. In fact, a paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), specifically examined how trade reforms facilitated by GATT affected the economic development of the reforming countries. In the paper, the authors compared the trends in economic growth before and after trade reform in the reforming countries. Then they compared those results to trends in economic growth of a control group of countries which didn’t undergo trade reform. What they found was very encouraging for proponents of free trade. Prior to reform, the economic development of reformers and non-reformers was practically identical, but after reform, the economic development of reforming countries accelerated while non-reforming countries saw their economies stagnate and decline. The results suggest that the reforms towards freer trade lead to an increase in income per capita of around 20% in the long-run, an effect so large that it almost certainly had a positive and non-trivial impact on poverty reduction. Similarly, other research has shown that more free market trade policies result in lower rates of extreme poverty and child mortality in developing countries. There are other benefits as well. One study on trade reform in Indonesia found that reductions of import tariffs led to an increase in disposable income among poor households, which allowed them to pull their children out of the labor force, leading to “a strong decline” in the incidence of child labor. Unfortunately, many activists have reflexively taken up the cause of opposing the expansion of global capitalism, for a number of reasons. Western anti-sweatshop activists, for example, will often argue in favor of government imposed barriers to trade with poor countries because their working conditions are terrible in comparison to those in developed Western nations. In their view, western consumers should not be promoting a cycle of capitalist exploitation by buying products made in Vietnamese sweat-shops. But satisfactory working conditions aren’t the natural state of mankind; they are a consequence of decades of economic development. Erecting barriers to trade with poor countries is surely a large impediment to their development, in fact, research suggests that existing developed world tariffs depress economic growth rates in the developing world by 0.6 to 1.6 percent per person, a considerably large effect. Moreover, the sweat-shops which produce clothing for Westerners are often much better than alternative forms of domestic employment. In poor countries like Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam, the apparel industry consistently pays more than most other domestic industries. According to research by economist Ben Powell, in poor countries “most sweatshop jobs provide an above average standard of living for their workers.” Notably, a paper published in the Journal of Development Economics found that the expansion of the garments industry in Bangladesh lead to an increase in employment and income among young women, giving them the means to finance their own education. Remarkably the authors found that, “the demand for education generated through manufacturing growth appears to have a much larger effect on female educational attainment compared to a large-scale government conditional cash transfer program to encourage female schooling.” Foreign investment is also more desirable than opponents of capitalism and globalization give it credit for. The conventional wisdom among activists in wealthy countries is that multinational corporations exploit poor workers in third world countries for cheap labor, profiting off people working in sweatshop conditions. It should come as a surprise to the individuals who hold this view to learn that 85% of people in developing countries believe that foreign companies building factories in their countries is a good thing, according to Pew Research. In fact, for all the talk of exploitative multinational corporations, research shows that, in general, these corporations provide higher wages and better working conditions than domestic employers in developing countries. Additionally, when multinational corporations build factories in poor countries, it raises the demand for low-skilled workers, resulting in higher wages for local workers. Consistent with this fact, recent empirical evidence demonstrates that investment by foreign companies in developing countries reduces both poverty and income inequality by raising the incomes of low-skilled workers. Foreign investment can also make people in relatively low-income countries better off by providing better or more inexpensive products. A recent analysis published by the NBER found that foreign retailers like Wal-Mart greatly reduce the cost of living for both the rich and poor in Mexico, making everyone along the income distribution better off. Global capitalism is by no means a perfect phenomenon. Many businesses do have questionable labor practices that are worthy of contempt. And free market policies may in many instances lead to socially undesirable outcomes, sometimes on a large scale. However, the one-dimensional, automatic denunciation of capitalism and the accompanying refusal to give it any credit for its successes — as social media activists have done — reflects an uncompromising, and quite frankly ignorant worldview. It is one in which capitalism is always bad, no matter what the evidence tells us.

### 1NC---Tech Debates Good

#### Having debates over technology better prepares us to deal with it through technological literacy

Dakers 6 (John R. Dakers – Professor of the Philosophy of Technology at the Technology University of Delft, “Towards a Philosophy for Technology Education”, Springer Link, 2006, <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403983053_11>, MG)

Heidegger (1962) and Feenberg, in his critical theory (2003), suggest that a synthesis between these opposing polarities of rules versus interpretation is **possible**. Both argue that, in association with the instrumental role a technology may have, we must also give consideration to the **essence of the technology** in terms of its social and cultural implications. Out of this emerges a synthesis that leads to an anamorphosis in technology education. In other words, the technologies that we simply accept as presented are often distortions of the truth, much as the lettering used in road markings appears to be elongated and distorted from the point of view of a pedestrian. However, the same markings when viewed from a driver’s point of view, seen head on and from a different perspective, appear, as a result of foreshortening, to be perfectly in proportion. This is deliberate on the part of the designers, but significantly, very few of us, drivers or pedestrians, are actually aware of this. It is only by repositioning ourselves that we may begin to see a different perspective, and this may, in turn, serve to transform our previously distorted values by illuminating and clarifying the **controlling logic of the technologically mediated world** we inhabit (Dakers, 2005a). A technological literacy in which the dialectics of “calculation versus meditation, objectification versus art, ‘world’ versus ‘earth’, identity versus difference” (Kroker, 2004: 38) are explored is therefore a crucial part of a learner’s technological development.

Technology education in this synthesis should have a “relationship” with industry, but not a subservient one, not one that is simply in the service of industry. Critical **debate about technology** and the role that industry has in its development **must be encouraged**. These debates must engage with global issues relating the sustainable development of technology, methods and patterns of consumption, and their relationship to ecological sustainability. Technology is not neutral, and its proliferation in terms of mass production, if not challenged, threatens the democratic process.

Technology education in the twenty-first century can therefore **no longer be programmed instruction** with behavioral objectives that set out a “divide and conquer” approach to learning. The vocational and academic polarities in terms of technology education must “dissolve into reciprocity, each constituting the other” (Grumet, 1992: 31). **Discourse regarding the very essence of technology**, the way technology affects our cultural development and our participation in a global society, **must become embedded into technology education**. We must learn to interpret the world of technology for ourselves, and we can only do that through the engagement of discourse about technology. In order to do this, we urgently need to develop a new philosophy for technology education that has at its center the development of a **technological literacy**.

### 2NC---Tech Debates Good

#### Attempts to manage technological problems are inevitable and good – they tend to a fragile working order WITHOUT falling into a strictly managerial approach. That uniquely lets us recognize complexity and accept insecurity

Nordmann, Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University, ‘18

(Alfred, “Four Horsemen and a Rotten Apple. On the Technological Rationality of Nuclear Security,” in *Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie: Arbeit und Spiel*, pg. 279 – 294)

The apple is rotting. During the times of the Cold War, the precarious equilibrium of strategic threats had its own working order. It could be trusted and, in fact, had to be trusted in many ways. The weapons were carefully monitored, subject to permanent surveillance from many points of view. They were closely watched through the eyes of one's own strategists, technicians and engineers, military personnel, local opposition forces, but also through the eyes of friends and foes, international agencies and monitoring groups. Everyone was attending to the weapons for different, perhaps conflicting reasons, and yet the many observations were maintained in a relation of mutual support. The weapons themselves became fixated and paralyzed at their center of attention.

When the so-called »four horsemen« (Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn) and political leaders like Barack Obama have called for a world without nuclear arms, it is because they are worried about the break-down of this working order.24 In their view, the current modes of monitoring, proliferation, negotiation, and sanctioning represent a deviation from the Cold War rationality of deterrence with its system of mutual checks and balances. Accordingly, they call for adequate ways of controlling material flows, of regulating access, of instituting transparency and accountability. Their question is a technical question: Given the half-life of plutonium and given the volatility of systems of government in many parts of the world, how does one institute a robust international system of arms-control? Thus, they worry only secondarily whether the weapons might get into the wrong hands, politically speaking and in the short term. They pose primarily a question from within a technologically advanced, economically and politically robust knowledge society — aside from the United States, who can be counted upon to reliably provide the necessary know-how in the long term? Who can take responsibility for the management of what was once and is no longer a denumerable, firmly circumscribed set of nuclear things?

This point can be further developed by briefly considering three other aspects of the current state of debate: First, as Christopher Daase has pointed out, the extension into the future of the nuclear privilege of weapon states in the NPT becomes questionable when this privilege no longer serves to maintain a taboo in times of strategic conflict but when it somewhat arrogantly declares whose hands are the good hands such that they can be entrusted to carry out a managerial process. Inclusion and exclusion can be justified more easily on the criterion of the possession of nuclear weapons, it becomes contestable if the criterion is the cultural competence of handling with due diligence and care a dangerous and globally endangering commodity.25 Second, this may prove to be the reason why some of the non-nuclear states like Norway, Austria, Mexico are seizing the moment to claim that, if anyone, they are best suited to frame the question or redefine the terms of the debate. They wish to bring the humanitarian consequences to the fore and thus the mishandling of the bomb, irrespective of a balance of power or terror.26 Finally, when the question is one of maintaining or recreating a safe working order for a dangerous technology and when the arms race is taking place between knowledge societies and their claims that the technology is with them in good hands, the general technical capabilities of these societies become increasingly important. The responsibility of diplomats and negotiators in the political and military sphere to create conditions for global security is shifting to the maintenance, broadly speaking, of a safety culture in civil society.

If this diagnosis is correct, the rules of the game have changed as has the rationale for inclusion and exclusion in the club of nuclear-weapon states, and the definition of the community of responsible actors. The global challenge is defined not as preserving peace or security in an age of ideological conflict and competing national interests. Instead, the challenge is one of tending to a working order of nuclear safety and safeguards. Issues of proliferation and disarmament, transparency and control now appear in the collective consciousness as analogous to the global threat of climate change. Both put national and stakeholder interests into a managerial mode. The Earth and the Bomb need to be handled with care — grounded in the perhaps illusory hope that in good hands, with a technical mindset, and attunement to the complexity of affairs, the challenge can be met and the danger contained.

Hazardous Waste

At this point it may appear as if I wanted to recommend or valorize an engineering approach that abstains from moral and political judgement but brings to the table the requisite understanding for maintaining, modulating, recreating a working order or technological system. This is not the case. I am arguing merely that one need to take seriously the different modes of conceiving the problems that are in need of solution — not only because the definition of a problem entails a conception of its solution and the reasoning processes adequate to it. If only for heuristic purposes we should attend to the implications of a shift from the logic of warfare and deterrence to a logic of attunement and trust — attunement to a working order and trust in the good hands of technical expertise. In conclusion, here are some of these implications, briefly stated.

First of all, the acquisition of working knowledge and the ability to maintain and modulate a working order does nothing to justify technocratic approaches or to en-throne the expertise of managers and engineers. As the case of the klu(d)ge served to remind us, deviations from strategic rationality coincide with deviations from top-down engineering or rational design. The situations in which working knowledge comes to the fore are highly ambivalent, whether it is the challenge of maintaining a rotten apple or of managing material flows in an ageing nuclear arsenal. In these situations, rational decision making is of the kind where a security update is scheduled to the operating system of a computer and users wonder a bit nervously whether it is really such a good idea to install the update. Not only the readers of Charles Per-row's Normal Accidents will wonder whether the security updates might increase the complexity, perhaps instability, perhaps insecurity of the operating system.27 And of course, with the end of the Cold War, the operating system of nuclear security has been changed, prompting us to ask anew what are the conditions for stability and security.

### 1NC---Aesthetics Fails

#### Aesthetics doesn’t solve anything but attempting to endorse it both reentrenches capitalism and enables racialized capitalist oppression

Bromberg 13 (Svenja Bromberg PhD - social theorist and philosopher with expertise in French and German thought from the 19th to the 21st century, “THE ANTI-POLITICAL AESTHETICS OF OBJECTS AND WORLDS BEYOND”, MetaMute, 25 July 2013, <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond>, MG)

There is at first a very material sense in which its advocates justify the turn to objects. We are at a point where our faith in the powers of the subject to critique and subvert reality, as grounded in Enlightenment theory, **has been truly defeated**, not least by capitalism’s now much discussed ability to demand precisely subjective – emotional or affective – investments in its exploitative machinery.[5](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote5sym) Thus, it is not only the fact that ‘**subjects are always already subjected’**, which we have learned from Foucault, Butler and other poststructuralists.[6](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote6sym) But if capitalism wants us to be ever more alive, happy and truly engaged in shaping our own lives on the basis of the endless possibilities this world has to offer, then the critique offered by vitalist theories, aesthetic modes such as Bourriaud’s ‘**relational aesthetics’** and more critical forms of emancipated spectatorship against an objectifying and alienating capitalist reality **appear assimilated and defused**.[7](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote7sym) As Diedrich Diederichsen outlines in a recent e-flux article, it is precisely what was still antithetical to the Fordist assembly line – different modes of dreaming ‘dangerously’ or living authentic or alternative lives – that seems to have become part of the post-Fordist ‘imperative to produce a perfect self as a perfect thing’.[8](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote8sym) Smiles or grins, day-dreams and ways of being that could formerly help alleviate or escape the alienated existence of the labourer have themselves become reified as part of the **requisite service we are compelled to provide**.[9](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote9sym) Diederichsen describes a sense, similar to the German theatre director René Pollesch in his play *Love is Colder than Capital* in which **all relations have become toxic and emotions have been rendered cold objects for capital.**[10](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote10sym) Thus, the primary concern seems to be with oppressive, exploitative and reified capitalist social relations and how to break out of them – but the solutions we’re confronted with from the diverse strands of the ‘new materialisms’ no longer lie in the critique of these relations, but rather in a nonrelational and un-dialectical gesture that posits the world of matter against the man-made disaster of a neoliberal existence.[11](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote11sym)

The search for what Diederichsen calls ‘de-reification’ ventures towards that which evades representation, which is not rendered object *qua* instrumental reason but *qua* its own force, the dark, the mystic, the animate but soul-less – something that is more truly cold and yet not cold at all. This line of argument, however – which is echoed in Hito Steyerl’s emphatic call for us to finally accept the death of the subject and embrace the forces of construction and destruction, of violence and the possibility stored within things – problematically **sidelines the classed, racialised and gendered oppressions of capitalist reality.** Within this, masses of people have never been granted any ‘subject status’ in the first place and are, instead, rendered mere objects or even superfluous, because not productive, for capital. From the point of view of these relations, the move towards accepting or even embracing objectification as in itself emancipatory can be **nothing more than a bad joke.**

This sentiment, which shares its focus with the new materialisms, tends to uphold a mind-body dualism in which the subject is associated with the mind and the bad effects of Enlightenment rationalism, whereas the physical body with its pre-cognitive responses and movements is often, and rather miraculously, able to maintain a certain independence from worldly subjections. Even if there is an investment in overcoming this dualism and a certain caution against glorifying ‘nature’ as the unchanging outside of the human world to be called upon when attempts to elevate culture fail, the new materialisms’ emphasis on pre-cognitive affects, feelings and touch in the realm of the natural, or as moments of ‘matter receiving form’, **cannot escape the body’s prioritisation.****[12](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote12sym)** This tendency towards an ‘aesthetics through embodiment’[13](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote13sym), which finds its theoretical anchor in Brian Massumi’s work and other thinkers in the field of Affect Studies, is still very much entangled with the human body and its ability to be drawn into new relational and animate fields through or as part of an artwork.[14](https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/anti-political-aesthetics-objects-and-worlds-beyond" \l "sdfootnote14sym)

### 2NC---Aesthetics Fails

#### Aesthetics as a method is dead in the 21**st** century

Zubatov 19 (Alexander Zubatov - practicing attorney specializing in general commercial litigation, “Politics vs. Aesthetics: Why Great Art Cannot Conform to Our Political Views”, Aero Magazine, 26 July 2019, <https://areomagazine.com/2019/07/26/politics-vs-aesthetics-why-great-art-cannot-conform-to-our-political-views/>, MG)

The Aesthetic Achieves Lift-Off and Comes Back Down with a Thud

This exalted vision of the purity and autonomy of art, in which the artist is a creative visionary, a Promethean hero, gave rise to the Romantic sensibility of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—and to much that followed. It informs Swinburne’s bold pronouncement, “Art for Art’s sake first of all, and afterwards the rest shall be added to her … but from the man who falls to artistic work with a moral purpose shall be taken away even that which he has”; the Russian formalists’ elevation of the self-referential patterns of aesthetic form as art’s singular guiding light; and even Carl Jung’s vision of the artist as the expression of the highest truths of our collective unconscious, “the unwitting mouthpiece of the psychic secrets of his time.”

This reverential tradition led to the canonization of aesthetic works as academic literature departments took shape in the late nineteenth century. These masterpieces, T. S. Eliot writes in his 1919 essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” are monuments in an imaginary library and “form an ideal order among themselves.” By Eliot’s time, Shiner tells us, art and culture—and their accompanying norms of manners and refinement—had become a great dividing line, replacing an earlier divide between the large mass of common folk and a tiny hereditary aristocracy:

The emergence of new art institutions like art museums, literary reviews and secular concerts led to the use of cultural choices to mark social ascension, and a consequent withdrawal of art from lower-class culture, so that whereas in 1500, popular culture was everyone’s culture, by 1800, the clergy, nobility, merchants and professional men and their wives had **abandoned popular culture to the lower classes** …

By the late nineteenth century, the kind of multilevel culture with which we are now familiar began to emerge. One could identify a person’s social class in part by what papers or books they read, what music they listened to, what plays they saw, what sort of pictures they preferred.

But this is becoming less and less true today; art and culture have **ceased to serve** as the dividing line between the elites and the unschooled, unwashed masses. Art lost that status when, as I argue here, the vaguely literate but entirely uncultivated post-war techno-financial elite **replaced the old literary intelligentsia**, whereupon literature and other hallmarks of high culture began to undergo a first gradual and then more rapid rot on the vine. Marxist and Marx-inspired class prejudice, together with Dadaism and postmodernism, leveled the distinctions between high and low, avant-garde and kitsch, originality and banality and ultimately between art and everything else, resulting in profound and sweeping biases against perceived elites and difficult elite culture. Ultimately, conventional aesthetic merit ceased to matter.

But banal or low art differs fundamentally from high art: it **lacks the visionary gleam**; it can only **reflect society back to itself**. Such art could no longer be credibly thought to **fulfill anything like the transformative**, redemptive function attributed to art by Schiller and his followers. The special status of the great artist, the creative genius, the echo of divinity, quickly fell away, to be replaced by market values, which equate genius with worldly success and relegate the true geniuses toiling in obscurity to the realm of oddball quackery, making them figures of ridicule. And woe be to those effete intellectuals and elitist critics that still dare abide by the traditional distinction between high and low and speak ill of comics, comic book films, sitcoms, reality TV, pop music, hip hop and so on.

### 1NC---Tech Good

#### Only by enveloping every conversation and reinstating the will to technology in all can AI be developed correctly

Bell 20 (Genevieve Bell – Distinguished Professor and Violet McKenzie Chair at the Australian National University, “Why we need a cybernetic future”, Australian National University, 14 November 2020, <https://cybernetics.anu.edu.au/2020/11/14/why-we-need-cybernetic-future/>, MG)

Our possible futures

So why is this story important to engineering and its possible futures? Well, because right now we are living in a time when the power of computing seems limitless. We are still gobsmacked by the volume of data generated every day. Our conversations are **still about what to do with all that** computing power and all that data. Right now, governments, universities and companies are all competing to take advantage of recent and forthcoming innovations. And everyone is worrying for the future, and also wondering about it.

I believe engineers and engineering offer us a way to navigate that future. But to do that successfully, we will need to change and adapt. An historical analysis of cybernetics and the Macy Conferences reveal that the early conversations were characterised by a systems approach to how society **should integrate and develop artificial intelligence**, focusing on how humanity might be enhanced. Economic benefit was a secondary consideration, in stark contrast to how AI applications are positioned and employed in the majority cases today. This lesson tells us about innovation and impact on society, and about the need to keep everyone in the loop. Not just the technical loop, but the societal one, too.

The good news is that engineering has always been about precisely this. The whole history of engineering is about a body of knowledge that grew up around the need to keep humans safe as technical systems achieved increasing degrees of scale and scope. So really, engineers have never been more relevant or more necessary. Some 200 years ago, the rise of trains and railways required engineers to help ensure steam engines could get to scale safely; we need engineers and their allies to help bring artificial intelligence safely to scale.

It takes a village

The world is moving at the speed of light towards a **more technologised state**. We can call it the digital revolution, the fourth industrial revolution, or the computer age (if you’re of a certain vintage).

I imagine this is a future where **artificial intelligence goes to scale**. I am not talking generalised intelligence and singularity. I’m talking about that time in between, where AI engines are sophisticated enough to get put into lots of machines and autonomous systems, and into the world around us. And start — inevitably imperfectly — making decisions that affect people’s lives. That is a very complex future.

If we translate the skills we have today onto that future, **we come up short**. We have lawyers who are trying to regulate configurations of technologies they don’t understand. We have computer programmers who are coding algorithms for machines they are not sure how will act in response to algorithmic output. And we have engineering teams trying to put autonomous vehicles on roads who don’t understand the social and political context of transport.

I believe that the world needs a new way of thinking to tackle these coming challenges. I think the answer lies with a re-imagining of **cybernetics** and re-capturing the systems theory core of that nascent conversation. This new body of knowledge would be more closely tied to Wiener’s notion of cybernetics, which, for all its madness, can be re-interpreted for the 21st century in ways that we desperately need.

The practitioners in the new field will have to be able to ask the right questions. They will integrate scientific insights across disciplines examining intelligence, including computer science, systems theory, psychology, anthropology, the law and so on. And they must use them in a practical decision-making framework that will assist them to design, build, scale, manage, regulate and decommission cyber-physical systems (autonomous systems super-charged by AI and the Internet of Things).

When we build, every step of the way is a decision with real-world impact. We must equip our engineers with the skills they need to bring in diverse voices and make good decisions at every point. **We need thinkers who see the whole**. Genuine, society-wide innovation is different to making gadgets. It is hard work. And **it is better with more voices than fewer**. It is part luck, part hubris. A willingness to fail a little, to be reborn as something else. It is also persistence and purpose.

I hope we are up for the challenge!

#### AI solves every existential threat and inevitable death – leads to immortality

Tzimas 21 (Themistoklis Tzimas PhD - post- doc researcher in international law at the University of Macedonia and assistant professor at the Law School of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, “Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective”, Law Governance and Technology Series Volume 46, 30 July 2021, <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-78585-7_7#DOI>, MG)

However, we need to consider the expectations as well. The positive side focuses on the so-called friendly AI, meaning AI which **will benefit and not harm humans**, thanks to its advanced intelligence.23

AI bears the promise of significantly enhancing human life on various aspects, beginning from the already existing, narrow applications. The enhanced automation24 in the industry and the shift to autonomy,25 the take—over by AI of tasks even at the service sector which can be considered as “tedious”—i.e. in the banking sector—**climate** and weather forecasting, **disaster response**,26 the potentially **better cooperation** among different actors in complicated matters such as in matters of information, geopolitics and international relations, logistics, resources ex.27

The realization of the positive expectations depends up to some extent upon the complementarity or not, of AI with human intelligence. However, what friendly AI will bring in our societies constitutes a matter of debate, given our lack of unanimous approach on what should be considered as beneficial and therefore friendly to humans—as is analyzed in the next chapter.

Friendly AI for example bears the prospect of freeing us from hard labor or even further from unwanted labor; of generating further economic growth; of dealing in unbiased, speedy, effective and cheaper ways with sectors such as policing, justice, health, **environmental crisis, natural disasters**, education, governance, defense and several more of them which necessitate decision-making, with the involvement of sophisticated intelligence.

The synergies between human intelligence and AI “promise” the enhancement of humans in most of their aspects. Such synergies may remain external—humans using AI as external to themselves, in terms of analysis, forecasts, decision—making and in general as a type of assistant28 or may evolve into the merging of the two forms of intelligence either temporarily or permanently.

The second profoundly enters humanity, existentially—speaking, into uncharted waters. Elon Musk argues in favor of “having some sort of merger of biological intelligence and machine intelligence” and his company “Neuralink” aims at implanting chips in human brain. Musk argues that through this way humans will keep artificial intelligence under control.29 The proposition is that of “mind design”, with humans playing the role that God had according to theologies.30

While the temptation is strong—exceeding human mind’s capacities, far beyond what nature “created”, by acquiring the capacity for example to connect directly to the cyberspace or to break the barriers of biology31—the risks are significant too: what if a microchip malfunction? Will such a brain be usurped or become captive to malfunctioning AI?

The merging of the two intelligences is most likely to evolve initially by invoking medical reasons, instead of human enhancement. But the merging of the two will most likely continue, as after all the limits between healing and enhancement are most often blurry. This development will give rise, as is analyzed below, to significant questions and issues, the most of crucial of which is the setting of a threshold for the prevalence of the human aspect of intelligence over the artificial one.

Human nature is historically improved, enhanced, healed and now, potentially even re-designed in the future.32 Can a “medical science” endorsing such a goal be ethically acceptable and if yes, under what conditions, when, for whom and by what means? The answers are more difficult than it seems. As the World Health Organization—WHO—provides in its constitution, “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. 33

Therefore, why discourage science which aims at human-enhancement, even reaching the levels of post-humanism?34 Or if restrictions are to be imposed on human enhancement, on what ethics and laws will they be justified? How ethically acceptable is it to prohibit or delay technological evolution, which among several other magnificent achievements, promises to **treat death as a disease and cure it,** by reducing soul to self, self to mind, and mind to brain, which will then be preserved as a “softwarized” program in a hardware other than the human body?35

After all, “According to the strong artificial intelligence program there is no fundamental difference between computers and brains: a computer is different machinery than a person in terms of speed and memory capacity.” 36

While such a scientific development and the ones leading potentially to it will be undoubtedly, groundbreaking technologically-speaking, is it actually—ethicallyspeaking—as ambivalent as it may sound or is it already justified by our well— rooted human-centrism?37

Secular humanism may have very well outdated religious beliefs about afterlife in the area of science but has not diminished **the hope for immortality**; on the contrary, science, implicitly or explicitly predicts that matter can in various ways surpass death, albeit by means which belong in the realm of scientific proof, instead of that of metaphysical belief.38

If this is the philosophical case, **the quest for immortality becomes ethically acceptable**; it can be considered as embedded both in the existential anxiety of humans, as well as in the human-centrism of secular philosophical and political victory over the dei-centric approach to the world and to our existence.

From another perspective of course and for the not that distant philosophical reasons, the quest for immortality becomes ethically ambiguous or even unacceptable.39 By seeking endless life we may miss all these that make life worth living in the framework of finiteness. As the gerontologist Paul Hayflick cautioned “Given the possibility that you could replace all your parts, including your brain, then you lose your self-identity, your self-recognition. You lose who you are! You are who you are because of your memory.” 40

In other words, once we begin to integrate the two types of intelligence, within ourselves, until when and how we will be sure that it is human intelligence that guides us, instead of the AI? And if we are not guided completely or—even further—at all by human intelligence but on the contrary we are guided by AI which we have embodied and which is trained by our human intelligence, will we be remaining humans or we will have evolved to some type of meta-human or transhumant species, being different persons as well?41

AI promises tor threatens to offer a solution by breaking down our consciousness into small “particles” of information—simplistically speaking—which can then be “software-ized” and therefore “uploaded” into different forms of physical or non-physical existence.

Diane Ackerman states that “The brain is silent, the brain is dark, the brain tastes nothing, the brain hears nothing. All it receives are electrical impulses--not the sumptuous chocolate melting sweetly, not the oboe solo like the flight of a bird, not the pastel pink and lavender sunset over the coral reef--only impulses.” 42 Therefore, all that is needed—although it is of course much more complicated than we can imagine—is a way to code and reproduce such impulses.

Even if we consider that without death, we will no more be humans but something else, why should we remain humans once technologies allow us be something “more”, in the sense of an enhanced version of “being”? Why are we to remain bound by biological evolution if we can re-design it and our future form of existence?

Why not try to achieve the major breakthrough, the anticipated or hoped digitalization of the human mind, which **promises immortality** of consciousness via the cyberspace or artificial bodies: the uploading of our consciousness so that it can live on forever, turning **death into an optional condition**.43

Either through an artificial body or emulation-a living, conscious avatar—we hope—or fear—that **the domain of immortality will be within reach**. It is the prospect of a “substrate-independent minds,” in which human and machine consciousness will merge, transcending biological limits of time, space and memory” that fascinates us.44

#### Using technical data and information to drive policymaking is good

Reiter 15—Professor of Political Science at Emory University [Dan, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” *War on the Rocks*, 27 Aug, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>, accessed 11 Jan 2017]

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants.

This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective.

A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome.

Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians?

Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings.

Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies.

Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations.

Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions.

Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

#### Unsustainability claims are suspect because our brains are wired for techno-pessimism – digital synchronicity can fix racism embedded in cybernetics thru human ingenuity and make the world materially better

Reinhart 18 (Will Rinehart is Director of Technology and Innovation Policy at the American Action Forum, where he specializes in telecommunication, Internet, and data policy, with a focus on emerging technologies and innovation. Rinehart previously worked at TechFreedom, where he was a Research Fellow. He was also previously the Director of Operations at the International Center for Law & Economics. In Defense of Techno-optimism. 10-10-2018. <https://techliberation.com/2018/10/10/in-defense-of-techno-optimism/> //shree)

Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore. Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems. But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism. In the shadow of a year of bad news, it helpful to remember that Facebook and Google and Reddit and Twitter also support humane conversations. Most people aren’t going online to talk about politics and if you are, then you are rare. These sites are places where families and friends can connect. They offer a space of solace – like when chronic pain sufferers find others on Facebook, or when widows vent, rage, laugh and cry without judgement through the Hot Young Widows Club. Let’s also not forget that Reddit, while sometimes a place of rage and spite, is also where a weight lifter with cerebral palsy can become a hero and where those with addiction can find healing. And in the hardest to reach places in Canada, in Iqaluit, people say that “Amazon Prime has done more toward elevating the standard of living of my family than any territorial or federal program. Full stop. Period” Three-fourths of Americans say major technology companies’ products and services have been more good than bad for them personally. But when it comes to the whole of society, they are more skeptical about technology bringing benefits. Here is how I read that disparity: Most of us think that we have benefited from technology, but we worry about where it is taking the human collective. That is an understandable worry, but one that shouldn’t hobble us to inaction. Nor is technology making us stupid. Indeed, quite the opposite is happening. Technology use in those aged 50 and above seems to have caused them to be cognitively younger than their parents to the tune of 4 to 8 years. While the use of Google does seem to reduce our ability to recall information, studies find that it has boosted other kinds of memory, like retrieving information. Why remember a fact when you can remember where it is located? Concerned how audiobooks might be affecting people, Beth Rogowsky, an associate professor of education, compared them to physical reading and was surprised to find “no significant differences in comprehension between reading, listening, or reading and listening simultaneously.” Cyberbullying and excessive use might make parents worry, but NIH supported work found that “Heavy use of the Internet and video gaming may be more a symptom of mental health problems than a cause. Moderate use of the Internet, especially for acquiring information, is most supportive of healthy development.” Don’t worry. The kids are going to be alright. And yes, there is a lot we still need to fix. There is cruelty, racism, sexism, and poverty of all kinds embedded in our technological systems. But the best way to handle these issues is through the application of human ingenuity. Human ingenuity begets technology in all of its varieties. When Scott Alexander over at Star Slate Codex recently looked at 52 startups being groomed by startup incubator Y Combinator, he rightly pointed out that many of them were working for the betterment of all: Thirteen of them had an altruistic or international development focus, including Neema, an app to help poor people without access to banks gain financial services; Kangpe, online health services for people in Africa without access to doctors; Credy, a peer-to-peer lending service in India; Clear Genetics, an automated genetic counseling tool for at-risk parents; and Dost Education, helping to teach literacy skills in India via a $1/month course. Twelve of them seemed like really exciting cutting-edge technology, including CBAS, which describes itself as “human bionics plug-and-play”; Solugen, which has a way to manufacture hydrogen peroxide from plant sugars; AON3D, which makes 3D printers for industrial uses; Indee, a new genetic engineering system; Alem Health, applying AI to radiology, and of course the obligatory drone delivery startup. Eighteen of them seemed like boring meat-and-potatoes companies aimed at businesses that need enterprise data solution software application package analytics targeting management something something something “the cloud”. As for the other companies, they were the kind of niche products that Silicon Valley has come to be criticized for supporting. Perhaps the Valley deserves some criticism, but perhaps it deserves more credit than it’s been receiving as-of-late. Contemporary tech criticism displays a kind of anti-nostalgia. Instead of being reverent for the past, anxiety for the future abounds. In these visions, the future is imagined as a strange, foreign land, beset with problems. And yet, to quote that old adage, tomorrow is the visitor that is always coming but never arrives. The future never arrives because we are assembling it today. We need to work diligently together to piece together a better world. But if we constantly live in fear of what comes next, that future won’t be built. Optimism needn’t be pollyannaish. It only needs to be hopeful of a better world.

### 2NC---Tech Good

#### Conversations are uniquely key towards making the AI cybernetic world possible

Bell 20 (Genevieve Bell – Distinguished Professor and Violet McKenzie Chair at the Australian National University, “Why we need a cybernetic future”, Australian National University, 14 November 2020, <https://cybernetics.anu.edu.au/2020/11/14/why-we-need-cybernetic-future/>, MG)

Making cybernetics real, however, required **more** than just a name. It required **conversations**, champions, and **framing questions** in such a way as to reveal the edges of the cybernetics potential. From 1946 to 1953 a series of conferences took place to try to do just that. Created and curated by anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, in collaboration with Wiener, these conferences, later known as the Macy cybernetics conferences, took place in New York. And the participants were strikingly diverse — there were mathematicians and philosophers, physicists and psychologists, anthropologists and historians, hailing from North America including Mexico, Europe and Asia. They were at different points in their careers and they had different lived experiences. What Mead, Bateson and Wiener knew was that building something new like this was not a task for one scientific discipline. It could, in fact, only be built in the intersections between fields and existing ideas.

Cybernetics or AI?

In 1953 the Macy Conferences came to an end but the conversations didn’t. And in 1956, 10 years after Wiener had coined the term cybernetics, a new term would come to take its place: “artificial intelligence”. This, too, was born at a conference of sorts, the Dartmouth Summer Research Project. The proposal for the project stated that:

“The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a **machine can be made to simulate it.”**

The future was being built, again, but this time with fewer voices, and fewer questions. This group, it seemed, already knew the answers — make a machine that can think like a human. Indeed, many ideas were lost in the transition from cybernetics to artificial intelligence, such as the idea of dynamic systems that included technology, people and ecology; the idea of feedback; and the idea that the world you were making should be subject to critical inquiry.

The thing about ideas, though, is that **they move, grow and adapt**. Your ideas will always end up in someone else’s hands and, when they do, you hope you gave them enough grace and enough shape to hold up. Mary Catherine Bateson, daughter of Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, wrote of the moment cybernetics gave way to artificial intelligence:

“The tragedy of the cybernetic revolution, which had two phases, the computer science side and the systems theory side, has been the neglect of the systems theory side of it. We chose marketable gadgets in preference to a **deeper understanding of the world we live in.”**

#### Extinction outweighs – any risk is a reason to err neg

Seth D. Baum and Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184, thanks Eyan

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### 2NC---Tech Good---Warming AO

#### A.I. Critical to mitigating the impact of Climate Change--- Leads to new technology and predicts harmful weather to mitigate escalation.

Bernard Marr 18, 2-21-2018, Bernard Marr is a best-selling author & keynote speaker on business, technology and big data. His new book is Data Strategy.,"The Amazing Ways We Can Use AI To Tackle Climate Change," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/21/the-amazing-ways-we-can-use-ai-to-tackle-climate-change/#7c27122f4a35

While there are still some on the earth who claim climate change is a farce, the majority of us believe we need to throw everything possible into slowing down or solving the problem. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are two tools in our climate-change-halting toolbox. The more we utilize AI and machine learning technology to help us understand our current reality, predict future weather events and create new products and services to minimize our human impact our chances of improving and saving lives, creating a healthier world and making businesses more efficient, the better chance we have to stall or even reverse the climate change trajectory we’re on. Here are just a few of the ways AI and machine learning are helping us tackle climate change. Machines can analyze the flood of data that is generated every day from sensors, gauges and monitors to spot patterns quickly and automatically. By looking at data about the changing conditions of the world’s land surfaces that is gathered by NASA and aggregated at Landsat, it provides a very accurate picture of how the world is changing. The more accurate we’re able to be at the current status of our climate, the better our climate models will be. This information can be used to identify our biggest vulnerabilities and risk zones. This knowledge from climate scientists can be shared with decision-makers so they know how to respond to the impact of climate change—severe weather such as hurricanes, rising sea levels and higher temperatures. Artificial intelligence and deep learning can help climate researchers and innovators test out their theories and solutions about how to reduce air pollution and other climate-friendly innovations. One example of this is the Green Horizon Project from IBM that analyzes environmental data and predicts pollution as well as tests “what-if” scenarios that involve pollution-reducing tactics. By using the information provided by machine learning algorithms, Google was able to cut the amount of energy it used at its data centers by 15%. Similar insights can help other companies reduce their carbon footprint. While businesses and manufacturing might contribute significantly to greenhouse gas levels, it’s still imperative that each citizen commits to reducing their impact as well. The easier we make green initiatives for each person, the higher the adoption rate and the more progress we make to save the environment. Artificial intelligence and machine learning innovations can help create products and services that make it easier to take care of our planet. There are several consumer-facing AI devices such as smart thermostats (which could save up to 15% on cooling annually for each household) and irrigation systems (which could save up to 8,800 gallons of water per home per year) that help conserve resources. Everyone doing their part over time will add up. The damage to human lives and property can be reduced if there are earlier warning signs of a catastrophic weather event. There has been significant progress in using machine-learning algorithms that were trained on data from other extreme weather events to identify tropical cyclones and atmospheric rivers. The earlier warning that governments and citizens can get about severe weather, the better they are able to respond and protect themselves. Machines are also being deployed to assess the strengths of models that are used to investigate climate change by reviewing the dozens of them that are in use and extracting intelligence from them. They also help predict how long a storm will last and its severity. Since machines can’t tell you “how” it arrived at its prediction or decisions, most climate professionals don’t feel comfortable relying on only what the machines suggest will happen, but use machine insight along with their own professional analysis to complement one another. Climate change is a gargantuan problem and its complexity is exacerbated by the many people and players involved from divergent worldwide government entities to profit-driven corporations and individuals who aren’t always open to change. Therefore, the faster and smarter we can become through the use of AI and machine learning the higher our probability of success to at least slow down the damage caused by climate change.

#### Extinction.

Dr. Yew-Kwang Ng 19, Winsemius Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technological University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, PhD in Economics from Sydney University, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism”, Global Policy, Volume 10, Number 2, May 2019, pp. 258–266

Catastrophic climate change

Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non-linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7

A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including:

• the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming;

• the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and

• higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming.

Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’.

The threat of sea-level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet-bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could ... expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low.

While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] ... to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.

### 1NC---AT: Will to Technology

#### They also link, which demonstrates the alt’s futility---the structure of their argument, the process through which it was written and the context in which they are articulating it in pursuit of the ballot obviously technologize communicative thought---AND their ability to dismiss this by saying sure, but self-awareness and reflexivity inoculates us is precisely why we the perm solves

James Tully 6, “Communication and Imperialism,” CTheory, 2-22-2006, http://ctheory.net/communication-and-imperialism/

Arthur Kroker suggests that the genetic engineering of the “codes” of life in humans and other organic resources, at one end, and the monitoring, surveillance and precision targeting of the global population in space-based network warfare through full spectrum global dominance at the other, represent the two extremes of this way of being in the world (legitimated in terms of “openness” of scientific inquiry and “security” of individuals and the species). Here life itself is pictured as both a network and an object of manipulation and control by informational technologies. Human nature and the environment are absorbed into culture, and so culture/nature is pictured as a kind of standing reserve of manipulable networks. [21] [22] This is not a form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that a person bears in one particular role among many. It is a communicative habitus that communicators tend to operate within at work and leisure, on the home computer, the cell phone, the wireless laptop, and the BlackBerry. When networkers put these more interactive modes of communication down, they tend to turn to the technology of the communication of “affects”: radio, television, movies and videos. As a result, this worldview and skill set is carried into other areas of life, either colonizing them or disregarding them if they are inaccessible through the network technology. The form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity of network communicators is not an ideology or a worldview in the traditional sense. It is rather the opposite: a mode of being that is skilled in and accustomed to “worldviewing” — surfing through, interacting with and negotiating a kaleidoscope of shifting ideologies and worldviews. Secular modernists, western scientists, indigenous peoples, neo-liberals, non-governmental organizations, anti-globalization activists, hyper-globalisers, deep ecologists, apocalyptic religious fundamentalists in the Bush administration and Bin Laden terrorist networks are all at home in this habitat. Yet, it is not a neutral, all-inclusive medium of communication. It substantially modifies the pre-network forms of subjectivity it includes, transforming them into contingent and malleable worldviews, civilizations, codes, programs, and “scapes”, yet, paradoxically, placing beyond question its own background horizon of disclosure of the world as a complex system of contingent and programmable networks. This taken-for-granted form of subjectification tends to come with the network and goes without saying. It is the characteristic form of subjectivity of network imperialism. We are just beginning to study and make explicit the tacit ways communication networks are re-organizing human subjectivity. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and other critical sociologists of network communication and control argue that the net brings with it, in tandem with programmability, other taken-for-granted ways of organizing and imagining experience, privileging certain forms of communication, communicative rationality, knowledge, problem solving, cooperation and competition, and production and consumption, and discounting or excluding others.[23] Finally, although this is a powerful new form of subjectivity and social ordering, it is one form among many that we bear as modern subjects, and we are not passive recipients of it (as we will see in section 3).

### 1nc---AT: Future Military Tech

#### No impact to future military tech – it’s non-unique and inevitable – but, testing and safeguards solve.

Ackerman, 15—senior writer for IEEE Spectrum’s award-winning robotics blog, Automaton (Evan, “We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why,” <https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/we-should-not-ban-killer-robots>, dml)

The problem with this argument is that no letter, UN declaration, or even a formal ban ratified by multiple nations is going to prevent people from being able to build autonomous, weaponized robots. The barriers keeping people from developing this kind of system are just too low. Consider the “armed quadcopters.” Today you can buy a smartphone-controlled quadrotor for US $300 at Toys R Us. Just imagine what you’ll be able to buy tomorrow. This technology exists. It’s improving all the time. There’s simply too much commercial value in creating quadcopters (and other robots) that have longer endurance, more autonomy, bigger payloads, and everything else that you’d also want in a military system. And at this point, it’s entirely possible that small commercial quadcopters are just as advanced as (and way cheaper than) small military quadcopters, anyway. We’re not going to stop that research, though, because everybody wants delivery drones (among other things). Generally speaking, technology itself is not inherently good or bad: it’s what we choose to do with it that’s good or bad, and you can’t just cover your eyes and start screaming “STOP!!!” if you see something sinister on the horizon when there’s so much simultaneous potential for positive progress.

What we really need, then, is a way of making autonomous armed robots ethical, because we’re not going to be able to prevent them from existing. In fact, the most significant assumption that this letter makes is that armed autonomous robots are inherently more likely to cause unintended destruction and death than armed autonomous humans are. This may or may not be the case right now, and either way, I genuinely believe that it won’t be the case in the future, perhaps the very near future. I think that it will be possible for robots to be as good (or better) at identifying hostile enemy combatants as humans, since there are rules that can be followed (called Rules of Engagement, for an example see page 27 of this) to determine whether or not using force is justified. For example, does your target have a weapon? Is that weapon pointed at you? Has the weapon been fired? Have you been hit? These are all things that a robot can determine using any number of sensors that currently exist.

It’s worth noting that Rules of Engagement generally allow for engagement in the event of an imminent attack. In other words, if a hostile target has a weapon and that weapon is pointed at you, you can engage before the weapon is fired rather than after in the interests of self-protection. Robots could be even more cautious than this: you could program them to not engage a hostile target with deadly force unless they confirm with whatever level of certainty that you want that the target is actively engaging them already. Since robots aren’t alive and don’t have emotions and don’t get tired or stressed or distracted, it’s possible for them to just sit there, under fire, until all necessary criteria for engagement are met. Humans can’t do this.

The argument against this is that a robot autonomously making a decision to engage a target with deadly force, no matter how certain the robot may be, is dangerous and unethical. It is dangerous, and it may be unethical, as well. However, is it any more dangerous or unethical than asking a human to do the same thing? The real question that we should be asking is this: Could autonomous armed robots perform better than armed humans in combat, resulting in fewer casualties (combatant or non-combatant) on both sides? I believe so, which doesn’t really matter, but so do people who are actually working on this stuff, which does.

In 2009, Ronald C. Arkin, Patrick Ulam, and Brittany Duncan published a paper entitled “An Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System,” which was about how to program an armed, autonomous robot to act within the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement. h+ Magazine interviewed Arkin on the subject (read the whole thing here), and here’s what he said:

h+: Some researchers assert that no robots or AI systems will be able to discriminate between a combatant and an innocent, that this sensing ability currently just does not exist. Do you think this is just a short-term technology limitation? What such technological assumptions do you make in the design of your ethical governor?

RA: I agree this discrimination technology does not effectively exist today, nor is it intended that these systems should be fielded in current conflicts. These are for the so-called war after next, and the DoD would need to conduct extensive additional research in order to develop the accompanying technology to support the proof-of-concept work I have developed. But I don’t believe there is any fundamental scientific limitation to achieving the goal of these machines being able to discriminate better than humans can in the fog of war, again in tightly specified situations. This is the benchmark that I use, rather than perfection. But if that standard is achieved, it can succeed in reducing noncombatant casualties and thus is a goal worth pursuing in my estimation.

One way to think about this is like autonomous cars. Expecting an autonomous car to keep you safe 100 percent of the time is unrealistic. But, if an autonomous car is (say) 5 percent more likely to keep you safe than if you were driving yourself, you’d still be much better off letting it take over. Autonomous cars, by the way, will likely be much safer than that, and it’s entirely possible that autonomous armed robots will be, too. And if autonomous armed robots really do have at least the potential reduce casualties, aren’t we then ethically obligated to develop them?

If there are any doubts about how effective or ethical these systems might be, just test them exhaustively. Deploy them, load them up with blanks, and watch how they do. Will they screw up sometimes? Of course they will, both during testing and after. But setting aside the point above about relative effectiveness, the big advantage of robots is that their behavior is traceable and they learn programmatically: if one robot does something wrong, it’s possible to trace the chain of decisions that it made (decisions programmed into it by a human, by the way) to find out what happened. Once the error is located, it can be resolved, and you can be confident that the robot will not make that same mistake again. Furthermore, you can update every other robot at the same time. This is not something we can do with humans.

I do agree that there is a potential risk with autonomous weapons of making it easier to decide to use force. But, that’s been true ever since someone realized that they could throw a rock at someone else instead of walking up and punching them. There’s been continual development of technologies that allow us to engage our enemies while minimizing our own risk, and what with the ballistic and cruise missiles that we’ve had for the last half century, we’ve got that pretty well figured out. If you want to argue that autonomous drones or armed ground robots will lower the bar even farther, then okay, but it’s a pretty low bar as is. And fundamentally, you’re then placing the blame on technology, not the people deciding how to use the technology.

And that’s the point that I keep coming back to on this: blaming technology for the decisions that we make involving it is at best counterproductive and at worst nonsensical. Any technology can be used for evil, and many technologies that were developed to kill people are now responsible for some of our greatest achievements, from harnessing nuclear power to riding a ballistic missile into space. If you want to make the argument that this is really about the decision to use the technology, not the technology itself, then that’s awesome. I’m totally with you. But banning the technology is not going to solve the problem if the problem is the willingness of humans to use technology for evil: we’d need a much bigger petition for that.

#### Increasing informatization of war net reduces violence---alternative’s worse

Thomas **Rid 13**, THOMAS RID is a Reader in War Studies at King’s College London, 12-1-2013, "Cyberwar and Peace," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-10-15/cyberwar-and-peace

Cyberwar Is Coming!” declared the title of a seminal 1993 article by the RAND Corporation analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who argued that the nascent Internet would fundamentally transform warfare. The idea seemed fanciful at the time, and it took more than a decade for members of the U.S. national security establishment to catch on. But once they did, a chorus of voices resounded in the mass media, proclaiming the dawn of the era of cyberwar and warning of its terrifying potential. In February 2011, then CIA Director Leon Panetta warned Congress that “the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyberattack.” And in late 2012, Mike McConnell, who had served as director of national intelligence under President George W. Bush, warned darkly that the United States could not “wait for the cyber equivalent of the collapse of the World Trade Centers.” Yet the hype about everything “cyber” has obscured three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb the future. Indeed, rather than heralding a new era of violent conflict, so far the cyber-era has been defined by the opposite trend: a computer-enabled assault on political violence. Cyberattacks diminish rather than accentuate political violence by making it easier for states, groups, and individuals to engage in two kinds of aggression that do not rise to the level of war: sabotage and espionage. Weaponized computer code and computer-based sabotage operations make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly and physically harming human operators and managers. Computer-assisted attacks make it possible to steal data without placing operatives in dangerous environments, thus reducing the level of personal and political risk. These developments represent important changes in the nature of political violence, but they also highlight limitations inherent in cyberweapons that greatly curtail the utility of cyberattacks. Those limitations seem to make it difficult to use cyberweapons for anything other than one-off, hard-to-repeat sabotage operations of questionable strategic value that might even prove counterproductive. And cyber-espionage often requires improving traditional spycraft techniques and relying even more heavily on human intelligence. Taken together, these factors call into question the very idea that computer-assisted attacks will usher in a profoundly new era. THE THIN CASE FOR CYBERWAR One reason discussions about cyberwar have become disconnected from reality is that many commentators fail to grapple with a basic question: What counts as warfare? Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, still offers the most concise answer to that question. Clausewitz identified three main criteria that any aggressive or defensive action must meet in order to qualify as an act of war. First, and most simply, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have some kind of political goal or intention. For that reason, acts of war must be attributable to one side at some point during a confrontation. No known cyberattack has met all three of those criteria; indeed, very few have met even one. Consider three incidents that today’s Cassandras frequently point to as evidence that warfare has entered a new era. The first of these, a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, would count as the most violent cyberattack to date -- if it actually happened. According to a 2004 book by Thomas Reed, who was serving as a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council at the time of the alleged incident, a covert U.S. operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that the CIA managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigged valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that, according to Reed, the U.S. Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device. But aside from Reed’s account, there is hardly any evidence to prove that any such thing happened, and plenty of reasons to doubt that it did. After Reed published his book, Vasily Pchelintsev, who was reportedly the KGB head of the region when the explosion was supposed to have taken place, denied the story. He surmised that Reed might have been referring to a harmless explosion that happened not in June but on a warm April day that year, caused by pipes shifting in the thawing ground of the tundra. Moreover, no Soviet media reports from 1982 confirm that Reed’s explosion took place, although the Soviet media regularly reported on accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. What’s more, given the technologies available to the United States at that time, it would have been very difficult to hide malicious software of the kind Reed describes from its Soviet users. Another incident often related by promoters of the concept of cyberwar occurred in Estonia in 2007. After Estonian authorities decided to move a Soviet-era memorial to Russian soldiers who died in World War II from the center of Tallinn to the city’s outskirts, outraged Russian-speaking Estonians launched violent riots that threatened to paralyze the city. The riots were accompanied by cyber-assaults, which began as crude disruptions but became more sophisticated after a few days, culminating in a “denial of service” attack. Hackers hijacked up to 85,000 computers and used them to overwhelm 58 Estonian websites, including that of the country’s largest bank, which the attacks rendered useless for a few hours. Estonia’s defense minister and the country’s top diplomat pointed their fingers at the Kremlin, but they were unable to muster any evidence. For its part, the Russian government denied any involvement. In the wake of the incident, Estonia’s prime minister, Andrus Ansip, likened the attack to an act of war. “What’s the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?” he asked. It was a rhetorical question, but the answer is important: unlike a naval blockade, the disruption of websites is not violent -- indeed, not even potentially violent. The choice of targets also seemed unconnected to the presumed tactical objective of forcing the government to reverse its decision on the memorial. And unlike a naval blockade, the attacks remained anonymous, without political backing, and thus unattributable. A year later, a third major event entered the cyber-Cassandras’ repertoire. In August 2008, the Georgian army attacked separatists in the province of South Ossetia. Russia backed the separatists and responded militarily. The prior month, in what might have been the first time that an independent cyberattack was launched in coordination with a conventional military operation, unknown attackers had begun a campaign of cyber-sabotage, defacing prominent Georgian websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and launching denial-of-service attacks against the websites of Georgia’s parliament, its largest commercial bank, and Georgian news outlets. The Georgian government blamed the Kremlin, just as the Estonians had done. But Russia again denied sponsoring the attacks, and a NATO investigation later found “no conclusive proof” of who had carried them out. The attack set off increasingly familiar alarm bells within American media and the U.S. national security establishment. “The July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar,” an article in The New York Times declared. Richard Clarke, a former White House cybersecurity czar, warned that the worst was yet to come: the Georgian attack did not “begin to reveal what the Russian military and intelligence agencies could do if they were truly on the attack in cyberspace.” Yet the actual effects of these nonviolent events were quite mild. The main damage they caused was to the Georgian government’s ability to communicate internationally, thus preventing it from getting out its message at a critical moment. But even if the attackers intended this effect, it proved short-lived: within four days after military confrontations had begun in earnest, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had set up an account on Google’s blog-hosting service. This move helped the government keep open a channel to the public and the news media. What the Internet took away, the Internet returned. ISTOCK.COM / -ANTONIO- Overblown: keyboard as grenade. IN CODE WE TRUST? Perhaps the strongest evidence presented by advocates of the concept of cyberwar is the Stuxnet operation launched against Iran by the United States and Israel. Stuxnet, part of a set of attacks known as Operation Olympic Games, was a sophisticated multiyear campaign to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz by inserting a harmful computer worm into the software that ran the facility’s centrifuges, causing them to overload. American and Israeli developers started designing the project as early as 2005, and it launched in 2007, growing more sophisticated until its discovery in 2010. The attack was groundbreaking in several ways. The developers built highly target-specific intelligence into the code, enabling the Stuxnet software to make autonomous decisions in its target environment. Most important, Stuxnet represented the first and only physically destructive cyberattack launched by one state (or, in this case, two states) against another. Yet even cyberattacks that cause damage do so only indirectly. As an agent of violence, computer code faces a very basic limit: it does not have its own force or energy. Instead, any cyberattack with the goal of material destruction or harming human life must utilize the force or energy embedded in its target: for example, shutting down an air traffic control system and causing trains or planes to crash or disrupting a power plant and sparking an explosion. Yet besides Stuxnet, there is no proof that anyone has ever successfully launched a major attack of this sort. Lethal cyberattacks, while certainly possible, remain the stuff of fiction: none has ever killed or even injured a single human being. Thanks to its lack of direct physical impact, code-induced violence also has less emotional impact. It would be difficult for a cyberattack to produce the level of fear that coordinated campaigns of terrorism or conventional military operations produce. Owing to their invisibility, cyberweapons also lack the symbolic power of traditional ones. Displays of weaponry, such as the elaborate military parades put on by China and North Korea, sometimes represent nothing more than nationalist pageantry. But revealing one’s arsenal can also serve tactical and strategic ends, as when countries deploy aircraft carriers to demonstrate their readiness to use force or carry out operations designed to intimidate the enemy, such as using military aircraft to conduct deliberately low flyovers. Indeed, displaying weapons systems and threatening to use them can prove more cost-efficient than their actual use. But cyberweapons are hard to brandish. Perhaps the most crucial limitation of violence in cyberspace is its almost entirely destructive quality: unlike traditional political violence, which can maintain trust in institutions and states as well as undermine it, violence in cyberspace can do only the latter. Any established political order comes with a certain degree of inherent violence; consolidated states, after all, survive only if they maintain monopolies on the legitimate use of force. By encouraging trust in the ability of state institutions to protect property and safeguard citizens, this inherent violence buttresses a state’s power and allows the state to establish the rule of law. But cyber-violence lacks this ability, since it does little or nothing to build up trust in institutions; indeed, it is very difficult to imagine how cyberattacks could be used to enforce rules or laws, either domestically or internationally. Digital surveillance presents a more complicated picture. In democracies, intelligence agencies tread a thin line between providing security and eroding public trust in the state, as demonstrated by the recent controversy over the U.S. National Security Agency’s data-collection practices. In authoritarian countries, digital surveillance can assist the state’s coercive use of force, but it cannot replace it. Such limitations, however, should not lead anyone to dismiss the corrosive potential of cyberattacks. Indeed, such assaults can undermine social trust in a more direct way than traditional political violence. Cyberattacks are more precise; they do not necessarily undermine the state’s monopoly of force in a wholesale fashion. Instead, they can be tailored to attack specific companies or public-sector organizations and used to undermine those groups’ authority selectively. Stuxnet provides a good example of this dynamic. Putting aside the question of whether the attack was an act of war, its primary intention was to undermine the trust of the Iranian scientists in their systems and in themselves and the trust of the Iranian regime in its ability to build nuclear weapons. The original intention was to cause physical damage to as many Iranian centrifuges as possible. But the American and Israeli attackers knew that the physical effect could be exploited to unleash a much more damaging psychological effect. “The intent was that the failures should make them feel they were stupid, which is what happened,” an American participant told The New York Times. The Americans and the Israelis hoped that once a few machines failed, the Iranian engineers would shut down more machines because they distrusted their own technology or indeed their own skills. At the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna, rumors circulated that the Iranians had lost so much confidence in their own systems and instruments that the management of the Natanz facility took the extraordinary step of assigning engineers to sit in the plant and radio back what they saw to confirm the instrument readings. “They overreacted,” one of the attackers revealed to David Sanger of The New York Times, “and that delayed them even more.” The Iranians also began to assign blame internally, pointing fingers at one another and even firing some personnel. DIGITAL UNDERGROUND Damaging though it may have been, Stuxnet, along with the cyber-scuffles in Estonia and Georgia, represents not a new form of warfare but something more akin to other, less lethal forms of aggression: sabotage and espionage. Unlike acts of war, these political crimes, which are often committed by nonstate actors, need not be violent to work. And although saboteurs and spies do act politically, they often seek to avoid attribution, unlike those who launch acts of war. For those reasons, the cyber-era has been a boon for political crime. Consider sabotage. Before the computer age, saboteurs had trouble calibrating and controlling the effects of their actions. Sabotage had to target physical property and relied on physical violence, which often proves unpredictable. During postal and railway strikes in France in 1909 and 1910, for instance, saboteurs cut signal wires and tore down telegraph posts. Destroying property risked running afoul of public opinion, and the tactic ultimately divided the workers. The strikes themselves, as a form of sabotage, also ran the risk of leading to unpredictable violence: indeed, labor demonstrations often intensified into riots, making it easier for opponents to portray the strikers as uncompromising radicals. It is much easier for saboteurs to avoid counterproductive side effects in the age of computer-assisted attacks, which can contain violence and generally avoid it altogether. Cyberattacks can maliciously affect software and business processes without interfering with physical industrial processes, remaining nonviolent but sometimes still causing greater damage than a traditional assault. A 2012 attack against the computer network of the oil company Saudi Aramco illustrates this potential. The attack physically harmed neither hardware nor humans. Yet by allegedly erasing the hard disks of some 30,000 computers, the attackers likely did much more monetary damage to Saudi Aramco than they could have through an act of traditional sabotage against machinery in one of the company’s plants. The oil giant reportedly had to hire six specialized computer security firms to help with its forensic investigation and post-attack cleanup. Despite such potential, it is also important to remember the inherent limitations of computer-assisted political crime and to note that human agents remain critical in the age of digital violence. Even Stuxnet, the most successful example of cyber-sabotage, demonstrates this fact. For the United States and Israel, the “holy grail,” in the words of one of the attack’s architects, was getting a piece of malicious software into the control system at Natanz. The Americans and Israelis needed fine-grained data from inside the Iranian plant to develop their weaponized code. The problem was that the control system was protected by an air gap: it was not connected to the Internet or even internal networks. As a result, the attackers had to deliver the malicious code via a removable hard drive such as a USB flash drive -- delivered by a human hand. To make this happen, U.S. intelligence operatives first obtained a list of the people who were visiting the targeted plant to work on its computer equipment and who could carry the payload there. “We had to find an unwitting person on the Iranian side of the house who could jump the gap,” one planner later told Sanger. The list of possible carriers included engineers from the German company Siemens, who were helping their Iranian colleagues maintain the control system -- work that required the Siemens engineers to bring portable computers into the plant. Precisely how the U.S.-Israeli team managed to exploit this vulnerability remains unknown. Suffice it to say that although “Siemens had no idea they were a carrier,” in the words of one U.S. official quoted by Sanger, “it turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn’t think much about the thumb drive in their hand.” SAFETY IN ONES AND ZEROS If cyberattacks reduce the amount of violence inherent in conflict, and if they often take the form of sabotage or espionage, then many officials and commentators who have been warning about the dawn of cyberwar have been ringing false alarms. Digital violence does have implications for ethics and for national security strategy, however. Weaponized code, or cyberattacks more generally, can achieve goals that used to require conventional force. The most sophisticated cyberattacks are highly targeted, and cyberweapons are unlikely to cause collateral damage in the same way conventional weapons do. Therefore, in many situations, the use of computers would be ethically preferable to the use of conventional weapons: a cyberattack might be less violent, less traumatizing, and more limited.

#### No offense: norms

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3.4 The Failure of Cyber Deterrence? The potency of cyber deterrence is difficult to judge. This is partly because there exists no consensus on what constitutes an act of sufficient cyber aggression. Therefore, it is not entirely clear what is to be deterred. Where exactly the threshold for response should be will be discussed in section three of this paper. For now, we can state that low-level nuisance attacks are a daily occurrence. For example, U.S. military networks are probed and scanned millions of times each day (Work 2015, 1). Similarly, acts of cyber espionage are reasonably common. However, what is also evident is the lack of major cyber attacks. For a while, Stuxnet, Wiper, Shamoon and Bronze Soldier appeared to signal the rise of cyber attack as a potent new instrument of policy. However, medium to large-scale attacks have essentially dried-up. Indeed, reflecting the empirical evidence, and marking a shift in tone, in his September 2015 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, talked down the possibility of an ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’. Instead, he focused on ongoing ‘low-to-moderate’ level threats (Clapper 2015, 2). What does this all tell us? Is deterrence working? If one considers low-to-moderate threats as deterrable, then the answer would seem to be no. From this perspective, and according to some policy makers, deterrence is already failing. In a 2015 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Chairman John McCain was scathing in his assessment: ‘Our adversaries view our response ... as timid and ineffectual. Put simply, the problem is a lack of deterrence. The administration has not demonstrated to our adversaries that the consequence of continued cyber attacks against us outweigh the benefit.’ (Takala 2015) However, if we take the view that cyber deterrence should really concern itself only with large-scale attacks, the picture is more positive. Indeed, Valeriano and Maness (2015) have identified considerable levels of restraint in state cyber behaviour. This could be due to a lack of confidence in the strategic utility of cyber attack. It may also reflect the development of norms against aggressive forms of cyber behaviour and the efficacy of deterrence. Indeed, norms increasingly form part of ‘complex deterrence’, within which military and non-military elements operate together. In cyberspace, although a settled understanding of universal rules of behaviour is still lacking, norms appear to be crystalising around acceptable forms of intrusion rather than a blanket non-use position (Stevens 2012, 25). This may explain the continuance of lowlevel probes whilst large attacks have trailed off.

#### It causes a net reduction in violence

**Nayyar et al 17**, Hira Nayyar, Samuel Wakerley, Pritha Banerjee, Boboi Rahedi, Student Conversations about Professional Responsibilities of the Engineer @ The University of Sheffield, “THE ETHICS OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY: SHOULD WE EXPECT BAE SYSTEMS TO CARE?”, https://prestudentconversation.wordpress.com/2017/04/07/group-2/

BAE Systems engages in sales of advanced weaponry to the United Kingdom’s allies globally, directly contributing to the 7,665 airstrikes that have hit Syria in the last two years. Is it ethically accountable for the UK to be a leading power in creating advanced weaponry when it gives rise to unfavorable impacts on human life? Or are the net benefits of weapons as deterrents and economic stimuli a force for good? This article aims to create discussion around BAE Systems’ role as a weapons manufacturer and its impact around the world. Weapons as deterrents “There is, in the world in which we all live, the principle of speaking softly but carrying a big stick – and that very often encourages people to negotiate” argued Sir Roger Carr at the recent BAE Systems annual general meeting – “we try and provide our people, our government, our allies with the very best weapons, the very best sticks they can have, to encourage peace.” Applying ethics of care principles to the business of warmongering is useless in the realm of engineering, rather, one must take a pragmatic view of the ethical cycle. The question of whether BAE Systems conducts its advanced weaponry business ethically is grounded by the principle that conflict will always exist; as such, it is human nature for distrust to fester. Hence, a case can be made that to cease the supply of advanced weaponry to responsible nations would in fact not be principled martyrdom, but ethical suicide. As Carr points out, advanced weaponry can often prove a very effective deterrent to conflict in the first place – but furthermore, as an influential western arms dealer, BAE Systems also has the opportunity to minimize collateral damage in war zones. The supply of advanced weaponry with high levels of precision allows for targeted airstrikes that eliminate the specific threat to life posed by the target, with a minimal loss of civilian life. Now contrast this with the alternative of withdrawing supply. Undoubtedly, unprincipled arms distributors would step into cover the gap in the market, supplying less precise weaponry. The most recent major example of aging, unguided weaponry being supplied to a war zone is Russian support of President Assad’s disputed and morally reprehensible regime in Syria – which has since caused a humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. Permitting the growth of such regressive means of conflict (potentially including the rise of chemical weaponry) is the alternative to BAE supplying advanced weaponry, and so abandoning western influence on the global arms market can only lead one way – to a greater disregard for international humanitarian law. In any case, **this cannot be considered a morally acceptable action** – and so by default, if nothing else, the alternative of BAE Systems supplying sophisticated weaponry must be considered ethical. Such rationality illustrates why ethics of care fails to provide an acceptable moral solution in this case. Utilitarianism and regulation of the arms market From a utilitarian viewpoint, the sustainment of powerful weaponry enables a country to defend its people and provide assistance in foreign conflicts where there is a suffering population. Doing so arguably protects a majority of people. Furthermore, with the FTSE 100 index about to suffer from Brexit uncertainty, the nation’s industrial future is at risk. BAE System’s economic contribution is critical for jobs in turbulent times. The UK defence industry employs 300,000 people, supplies 10 per cent of the country’s manufacturing and engineering jobs, and has a turnover of £35bn through 9,000 different companies. BAE Systems has a pivotal role in ensuring the UK economy’s prosperous future by being the real driver of the next skills generation: promoting STEM subject pathways, through which graduates get into engineering. Additionally, as a result of the profits from the manufacture and sale of arms, BAE Systems provides a backbone of technical support to other market sectors – for example building solutions for other industries such as transport; including the digital transformation of the UK rail network. There are a number of key international weapons regulations, whereby some governments have very robust arms trade control systems in place, but other governments are fuelling the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms by having weak control systems or none at all. BAE Systems ensures risks like this are minimised by implementing an Arms Trade Treaty that reduces and prevents excessive conflict, via making it difficult for armed groups that commit human rights abuses to acquire a ready flow of arms. The treaty provides an important framework for well-regulated defence trade and the reduction of illegal arms sales around the world. Money should be invested in diplomacy instead of fuelling war and destruction. BAE Systems deals with numerous countries which do not rank favorably on the human freedom index. The sale of advanced weaponry demonstrates, solely, an archaic form of diplomacy which is not apt for the modern world, where conflict is rife and human life is priceless. Arms do not have to be the prime medium through which diplomacy is navigated. The UK should explore other avenues; China for all its prowess utilizes Pandas as a bargaining tool to advance their agenda with other world powers. Joseph Nye, named this “Soft Power”. By using civilian instruments of national security such as strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction – relationships are built on the exchange of culture and knowledge as opposed to exploiting their perceived insecurity. BAE Systems could incorporate promotion of this moral intellectualism into their budget, where exchange of intelligence and civic action lead to stronger mutual relationships developing without the transfer of arms. Destruction created by the weaponry not only physically affects those that are targeted but also creates a long-term drop in quality of life for citizens. Millions of civilians have fled Syria due to the destruction of their homes and lack of basic amenities. Around two million people struggle to find clean water in Aleppo, as airstrikes have been targeted the water infrastructure of the city and this has cut civilian access to clean drinking water. Furthermore, refugee camps such as those in Za’atari camp in Jordan contain only temporary solutions for progressively longer-term issues such as maternity centres and wash blocks. This is the environment the next generation are being born into and are therefore starting life with an inherent ~~handicap~~. BAE Systems could adopt an ethics of care framework which would allow them to reconsider and understand the severity of the consequences of their actions; principally selling such weapons. There is no foolproof way of determining the end user of advanced weaponry, or of usage intentions – but by not producing such weaponry, BAE Systems could avoid any risk of misuse.

## Settler Colonialism K

### 1NC---Shell

#### Deleuze’s lines of flight run through the graveyard of the native – rhizomatic movement disavows indigenous claims to the land and history.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa\_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

Taking a cue from Simpson and Tuck and Yang, I turn to Tuck’s 2010 critique of Deleuze’s notion of “desire” as an example of the theoretical practice of refusal, which Simpson wonders about and which Tuck and Yang elaborated on in 2014. Eve Tuck’s 2010 article “Breaking Up with Deleuze” refuses Deleuze’s understanding and imposition of his definition of desire for Native studies and Native resurgence in particular. Tuck refuses the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic due to its totalizing moves and specifically its evasion and refusal of Native and alternative notions of refusal that emerge from Native struggles for survival.24 For Tuck, paying attention to “the continuity of ancestors,” or genealogies, in Native and in all modes of knowledge production is imperative. For Indigenous and Native studies, it reverses the erasure enacted by continental European and settler- colonial theory, which uses a tradition of ongoing genocide to annihilate Native thinkers and subsequently their epistemologies and theories. Prior to Byrd’s indictment of Deleuzoguattarian laudatory accounts of America’s terrain of “Indians without Ancestry,” Tuck reroutes us back to ancestral and genealogical thinking as a way of asserting Indigenous presence and its epistemological systems and traditions, devoid of Cartesian boundary- making impulses and desires. Tuck’s work also prepares us in 2010 for the critique that Byrd levies in 2011, which exposes the traditions, roots, and genealogies of Western poststructuralist theory. Such theory created the conditions of possibility and emergence for Deleuzoguattarian genocidal forms of rhizomatic and nonrepresentational thought. Black Caribbean feminist Michelle V. Rowley argues we need to especially attend to a theory’s “politics and conditions of emergence.”25 In other words, we need to consider on whose backs or through whose blood a theory developed and then circulated while hiding its own violence. Jodi Byrd in particular attends to the colonialist, genocidal, and therefore humanist impulses of the rhizome in her book Transit of Empire.26 What is particularly instructive is the way that Byrd operationalizes her critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s first chapter, “Rhizome,” in their tome A Thousand Plateaus.27 Byrd’s deconstruction, or picking apart, of the poststructuralist and nonsubject- and nonobject- related Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatics are a masterful (and frankly thuggish and rude) demonstration of refusing to adapt or “repair” colonial epistemologies and geographies. Byrd’s refusal is a moment that further helps one distinguish between the works of postcolonial and decolonial studies. Byrd performs an outright refusal that short circuits the colonial and postcolonial comportments of politesse, which allow genocidal Western thought to continue uninterrupted. Byrd’s interrogation of the “colonial nostalgia” latent in poststructural and nonrepresentational forms of thought like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome is an explicit example of how the violence of white nonrepresentational theory creates an immediate space of impasse for Indigenous, decolonial, Black, and abolitionist intellectual traditions. As Byrd argues, the Deleuzian and Guattarian rhizome assumes its errant, untraceable, and de/reterritorializing path through Native genocide. The rhizome obtains its metaphorical and theoretical elasticity from the discursive genocide of Indigenous peoples. The territory of maneuver or ground that the rhizome gains its bearing on is unwittingly or perhaps indifferently anchored in the disavowal of the Indigenous ancestral claims, history, presence, and ongoing relationship with the land in North America. Deleuze and Guattari covet the free- range and bloody movements in the West, described as a land of “Indians without Ancestry” primarily because they do not have to contend with the presence of Indigenous peoples and their prior relationships (ancestors) to the land and space through which they move and clear as nomads. There are no existing people to which Deleuze and Guattari have to be accountable. Therefore, their own and others’ self- actualizing, free- form whiteness can proceed unimpeded. The rhizomatic West— terra nullius— is without a people, history, or a cosmology to navigate. Byrd’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s reproduction or transit of the “Indian” in their book A Thousand Plateaus limns some of the methods in which colonialism and modes of conquest are enacted on behalf of the self-actualization of white subjects who produce nonrepresentational theory. In fact, Byrd argues that the “Indian is the ontological prior through which poststructuralism functions.”28 Byrd traces the appearance or deployment of the Indian as a simulation or “present absent” in Jacques Derrida’s and then Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which creates space for the white subject and the unending frontier. Byrd also argues that nonrepresentational theory heralded as a liberatory path beyond the subject is colonialist. Byrd indicts Deleuze and Guattari’s use of Leslie Fiedler’s work in order to invoke the American West and the Indian as exceptional cases that inspire rhizomatic movement through the notion of an ever- receding frontier.29 It is colonialist on (at least) two accounts: in its need to render the Indian already and inevitably (ontologically) dead as “it” has no ancestors or living community to whom one needs to be accountable; and in its invocation of the vanishing “Indian,” which opens up the possibility of an “ever- receding frontier” and inspiration for the metaphor of the rhizome. This logic and mode of conquistador thought undergirds the Deleuzian and Guattarian ethos of experimental and rhizomatic lines of flight. Their nonrepresentational theory of lines of flight are only possible as a form of white self-actualizing posthumanism due to the death of Indigenous peoples and their excision from the Earth/land. White posthumanism and its flows and lines of flight are made possible through Native death.

#### Lines of flight are colonial imaginings that require a structural opposition to indigeneity, giving geospatial birth to the ‘line’ itself

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa\_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

If Byrd’s refusal is a first- order engagement and argument, then Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s interrogation of the spatial vocabularies of the human and colonialism is a second- order analysis and practice of refusal, one that reroutes us and makes us ask new questions. As Smith has argued in her classic work Decolonizing Methodologies, “there is a very specific spatial vocabulary of colonialism which can be assembled around three concepts: (1) the line, (2) the centre, and (3) the outside.”33 The Deleuzian and Guattarian line of flight then also emerges from the colonial spatial imaginings of the colonizer. Within Western ideas and philosophical conceptions of temporality and spatiality, like Deleuze and Guattari’s line, time and space have been categorized and imagined as entities that can be measured. In Smith’s account, “Space came to be seen as consisting of lines which were either parallel or elliptical.”34 Rather than escaping the reterritorializing capture of colonial and state power, Deleuzian and Guattarian “lines of flight” coalesce with the line’s emergence as a way to map “territory, to survey land, to establish boundaries, and mark the limits of colonial power.”35 While not intended to mark boundaries or colonize Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the line of flight, rhizomatic and violent movements to produce a land of Indigenous peoples without ancestors continues rather than ruptures colonial violence.36 As Deleuze and Guattari attempt to move away from an “I” or “a subject,” through the use of nonrepresentational and nomadic “lines of flight,” they successfully resurrect the human through the geo- epistemology of the “line.” Within humanist cognitive frames, lines emerge in response to chaos. The line, which seeks to separate “order” from “chaos,” falls into formation with what Sylvia Wynter identifies as “the structural oppositions” that order humanist thought.37 Even the “line of flight” establishes a linear/nonlinear structural opposition that demarcates the “order” of the invisible white “self ” in opposition to the “chaotic” realm of the dead Indigenous and Black “nonbeing.” The line in all of its Deleuzian and Guattarian “molar, molecular, and nomadic” iterations is a humanist geospatial and epistemic configuration. The molar lines that make smooth space do so through the clearing of Indigenous peoples (clear to smooth) in order to produce a colonial grid of order. Deleuze and Guattari even fret over the potential susceptibility of the molecular (a more supple and ambiguous line not so prone to segmentation and rigidity) and the liberatory line of flight to become susceptible to the pull of the state. In A Thousand Plateaus, one can sense the anxiety they have about the molecular and nomadic line of flight. There is one last problem, the most anguishing one, concerning the dangers specific to each line. There is not much to say about the danger confronting the first [molar line], for the chances are slim that its rigidification will fail. There is not much to say about the ambiguity of the second [molecular line]. But why is the line of flight, even aside from the danger it runs of reverting to one of the other two lines, imbued with such singular despair in spite of its message of joy, as if at the very moment things are coming to a resolution its undertaking were threatened by something reaching down to its core, by a death, a demolition?38 The “something” that is reaching down and can be found in its core are the very traces of the human. Humanist secular thought that emerged from the fifteenth- century conquest and enslavement of Native and Black peoples produced the geometry of the line. The line is a way or an episteme used by the human to distinguish self from the other and produce the very structural oppositions that Sylvia Wynter names as essential to the human and its various genres. Smith’s deconstruction of the geo- epistemologies of “the center, the line,” and the “outside” poses questions and prods Western critical theory in ways that Western theory has yet to do itself, particularly about its subjectless and more specifically nonrepresentational moves. In addition to Wynter’s structural oppositions, it is also productive to think about how Wynter’s “beyond” has us contend with the underlying epistemes that make the human possible. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson’s engagement with Wynter’s “beyond” also interrogates the call to transcend the human. In a recent GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Jackson asks what it means when Black life is asked to make this transcendent move.39 Finally, I more carefully consider the work of Amber Jamilla Musser, who makes room for Deleuze and Guattari’s influence while being skeptical of and drawing attention to the specific ways that affect, sensation, and other nonrepresentational theories end up hailing and producing subjects even as they try and avoid systems of representation. GETTING ON AND BEYOND Throughout Sylvia Wynter’s body of work, particularly the portion that Greg Thomas calls the “beyond” work,40 Wynter attends to the epistemic, aesthetic, performative, and moral technologies such as structural oppositions, which are needed in order to write the human as an exclusive mode of being. Sylvia Wynter is concerned with getting rid of the epistemic systems and orders of knowledge (e.g., biological determinism, economic rationalization, performances, and epistemes) that make the very emergence of exclusionary categories like the human possible. Without getting rid of these systems or artifacts, even if the category of the human is eliminated from language, it will be replaced with something else as long as biological determinism, economic rationalization, oppositions, and lines continue to order and govern thought. The problem with the human is its scaffolding, not the category itself. The emergence of the human and specifically the overrepresentation of the human as man depends on the continual reproduction of and sometimes destruction of oppositional frames— in order to replace a structural oppositional with another. Wynter contends that “all founding oppositions . . . express the fact that humans as organized orders not only struggle against the opposing “chaos,” but have need of it as well, not only destroying but also continually creating it.”41 Over the course of Wynter’s work, there is a protracted discussion about the usefulness of the opposition “order/chaos” as a primary ordering force, which has persisted throughout time yet makes adjustments to what it posits as abject difference or the chaotic outside of man at any given moment. Within the secular human’s mode of man, the ordered self, culture, or “we” needs the chaotic, not- us, or them in the Negro and the Indian in order to know itself as culture— Logos, Reason— and therefore as human. The human as man, in its ordered, rational, gendered, sexed, European, bourgeois form, needs chaos in order to secure a self, even as what is human changes. While the human as man may become elastic and more diverse (as proletariat and woman), it still requires an outside. It still requires chaos, even if those who were previously a part of the realm of chaos enter into the zone of order. It is within this lineated orbit of chaos and order that even nonrepresentational poststructuralist theories retain the trace of the human as a narrow ordering line of the self (even in subjectless guise). The line is but one geo- epistemology of white posthumanist thought. The Deleuzoguattarian “lines of flight,” even as a nomadic line though supposedly not attached to a self or a subject, carry the specter and trace of the human in the ordering and disciplining colonial lines of flight of conquest. As Wynter argues, there are often reversals of the order and hierarchies of structural oppositions; the reversals fail to actually overcome and annihilate the need and desire for structural opposition as an actual order of knowledge.42 While “natural man” may prevail over ecclesiastical, clergical, or theological man, natural or rational man still needs to create himself as the center or norm in relation to those who lack rationality and reason (the Black and Native). Similarly, poststructuralist theory may prevail over structuralist narratives that center the self or the “I”; however, the impulse to kill and create the Indian without ancestors alongside crafting a new self- annihilating posthumanist subject is still part of the order of knowledge of structural opposition. The selfless, subjectless, posthuman still persists as the realm of life because of the annihilation of Indigenous and Black life. Within critical theories, Black and Native people are rendered structuralist (or modernist and dead) as white self- actualizing subjects disguise themselves as rhizomatic movements that transcend representation and the human. Epistemes such as the line segregate the chaotic realm of death (Black and Native) from the poststructuralist realm of life (white transcendence) through structural opposition marked with blood. The line is a humanist geo- form and geo- episteme, which makes the kinds of segmentation that structural oppositions are based on possible.43 Humans must perceive and come to some social or human agreement that lines even exist in the social (cultural) and natural world. Even in Deleuze and Guattari’s ideal scenario in which lines are drawn and (re)drawn again outside the state’s mandates, someone (as a subject) must still render them as an outside to something.

#### The 1AC is a performance of white fluidity – their forwarding of “becoming” is a ruse of subjectlessness that allows Settler’s to rescue settler futurity at the expense of genocide.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa\_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

Poststructuralist traditions that attempt to transcend identity actually function as a ruse of subjectlessness. In fact, queer subjectlessness and nonrepresentational rhizomes are an expression of a posthumanism that resuscitates normative subjects through the death of Black and Indigenous peoples. Continental theory has not typically had the stomach for sustaining an investigation of the kind of unspeakable violence that enabled the Marxist worker, queer, and affective subjectless discourses (one can only strive for subjectlessness if you possess it) to exist. The erasure of the (white) body-as- subject- as- ontology has been more effective in covering the bloody trail of white/human- self- actualization than it has been at successfully offering a way around and beyond the entrapments of liberal humanism. According to Amber Jamilla Musser, even in its postidentitarian and subjectless modes, continental theories’ transgressive moves (affective, sensational, masochistic) tend to reinstantiate the white male (sometimes queer) subject that it hopes to overcome.44 While not throwing away affect theory in Sensational Flesh, Musser scrutinizes white queer theory’s moves toward subjectless, futurelessnes, and masochism as gestures that actually recover and reify a subject (often white male gay) as they seek to annihilate the subject. Because of this, Musser refuses to read sensations like masochism in an exceptional vein. She explains, “I seek to reinvigorate these other ways of reading masochism, particularly because reading it as exceptional reifies norms of whiteness and masculinity and suppresses other modes of reading power, agency, and experience.”45 As Musser suspects, those who claim a radical subjectless must do so through the abjection of others. Men who claim masochism must become like (or reify) the position of the feminine-as- debased other without a self in order to then occupy this position of subjectlessness. A fixing of an abject position through the (female, Black, Indigenous) body of the other must occur; then, an evacuation of the other’s body must take place in order for the embalming of or supplanting of the body with the white normative male figure. While Musser does not entirely refuse Deleuze and Guattari’s nonrepresentational gesture, she does practice a kind of detached and suspicious read of the forms of violence that can be enacted in white moves beyond the human. Musser treats queer theories’ evangelists of loss and futurelessness, Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman, as nonexceptional and even potentially dangerous to subjects who inhabit the abject spaces that white bourgeois men try to occupy. In the 2015 GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Zakiyyah Iman Jackson reiterated the suspicion that posthumanism is a ruse for white human ascendency. Similar to Musser, Jackson knows that there is often a subject lurking within the bowels or lines of nonrepresentational discourse. Jackson indicts posthumanist calls to move to the “beyond” for reproducing a false and dishonest European transcendentalism. Thus a call for movement in the direction of the “beyond,” issued in a manner that suggests that this call is without location, and therefore with the appearance of incognizance regarding its situated claims and internal limits, returns us to a Eurocentric transcendentalism long challenged.46 Jackson argues that a call for movement beyond always happens from a very specific place. The posthumanist’s horn often blows from a place situated securely within the folds of humanity. This is a very different place than the space of nonbeing from which Black and Indigenous peoples moan, sing, or speak. Native feminist refusal and Black feminist abolitionist skepticism function as intervening comportments, dispositions, and modes of critique that expose the violent and unself- conscious ways that Western theory attempts to move beyond the human through the annihilation of the Other. Because the crafting of the human is a process of relations, specifically the relations of negation, then moving beyond the violence of the human is also a relational process. Transcendence is a relational process of accountability. White subjects cannot transcend identity (e.g., whiteness, queerness), the subject (self- writing and autonomy), or the human (self- actualization) without ending Native genocide and anti- Black racism. Identities, subjects, and the human as they are currently configured come into formation through processes of negation. If there is no plan to enable Black and Indigenous life, then there is no transcending the violence of the human. The scholarship of Native/Indigenous and Black feminists force continental theory to come outside itself and gaze on the way even the various attempts of nonrepresentational theory to annihilate the self actually end up reinventing the subject and the human through new forms of violent invention. This article argues that both refusal and skepticism can work in tandem and interrupt the performance of white innocence through less- than- effective attempts to evade representation that jettison the garb of the human without abolishing the need for Black and Indigenous death.47

#### The affirmative’s free flowingness and multiplicity places indigeneity as a transient quality – “becoming” reduces the native to a colonial reverent, but never as a milieu from which becoming emerges.

Byrd 11 [Jodi A. Byrd (Chickasaw) is assistant professor of American Indian studies and English at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign.; “The Transit of Empire”; pp. 17-21; 2011; https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-transit-of-empire#:~:text=Jodi%20Byrd's%20book%20The%20Transit,the%20larger%20project%20of%20decolonization.]//eleanor

The Indian—as a threshold of past and future, regimes of signs, alea, becoming, and death—combats mechanisms of interpretation through an asignifying disruption that stops, alters, and redirects flow. This stopping of the world of signification is the same as Derrida’s “tattooed ~~savage~~” at the beginning of deconstruction. The Indian sign is the field through which poststructuralism makes its intervention, and as a result, this paradigmatic and pathological Indianness cannot be circumvented as a colonialist trace. In fact, this colonialist trace is exactly why “the Indian” is so disruptive to flow and to experimentation. Every time flow or a line of flight approaches, touches, or encounters Indianness, it also confronts the colonialist project that has made that flow possible. The choice is to either confront that colonialism or to deflect it. And not being prepared to disrupt the logics of settler colonialism necessary for the terra nullius through which to wander, the entire system either freezes or reboots. It seems slightly ironic, then, that many who pick up Deleuze and Guattari’s work use language similar to “Experiment, don’t signify and interpret!” to describe the possibilities of reframing the world through affect and affective relationships that move toward the states of enchantment, ecstasy, and the everyday. Brian Massumi’s cultivation of deviation and contagion to foster radicalism at the crossroads between science, humanities, and cultural studies contains similar Castanedian staccato imperatives: “Let it. Then reconnect it to other concepts, drawn from other systems, until a whole new system of connection starts to form. Then, take another example. See what happens. Follow the new growth. You end up with many buds. Incipient systems.”⁶⁶ In a gesture towards “a thousand tiny races” in which he provides an alternative future for race to that of Paul Gilroy’s After Race, Arun Saldanha writes, “Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated, its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic.”⁶⁷ Jasbir Puar’s delineation of the biopolitics of the now in Terrorist Assemblages depends on A cacophony of informational flows, energetic intensities, bodies, and practices that undermine coherent identity and even queer anti-identity narratives . . . assemblages allow for complicities of privilege and the production of new normativities even as they cannot anticipate spaces and moments of resistance, resistance that is not primarily characterized by oppositional stances, but includes frictional forces, discomfiting encounters, and spurts of unsynchronized delinquency.⁶⁸ Each of these cultural studies moments flow from the phrase “Experiment, don’t signify and interpret!” that functions as a call for transformational new worlds of relation and relationship that move us toward a joyously cacophonic multiplicity and away from the lived colonial conditions of indigeneity within the postcolonizing settler society.⁶⁹ This Deleuzian and Guattarian motif, even if it acknowledges all the divergent discourses that come into race, gender, sexual, and class assemblages, smoothes once again into uncultivated wilderness that allows any trajectory or cultivation to enter it, but not arise from it. By extension, and even if one cannot access how these evocations of “the Indian” function within the plateaus opened by Deleuze and Guattari, “the Indian” serves as an errant return of the repressed that spreads along its own line of infection once the theory is taken up.⁷⁰ For example, Jasbir Puar, by restricting her analysis to the biopolitics of the post-9/11 coming out of U.S. empire as “an event in the Deleuzian sense, privileging lines of flight, an assemblage of spatial and temporal intensities, coming together, dispersing, reconverg- ing,” can discuss as sui generis the monster-terrorist-~~fag~~ that emerges in the twenty-first century as a new phenomenon, despite the Wanted posters in New York the week after 9/11 that compared Osama bin Laden to Geronimo.⁷¹ Additionally, Puar discusses Jessica Lynch as a “heroic girlnext-door” in conversation with a “depraved, cigarette-toting, dark-haired, pregnant and unmarried, racialized” Lynndie England at Abu Ghraib. Puar does not even acknowledge Hopi Lori Piestewa, reportedly the first American Indian woman to die in combat while fighting for the United States. Piestewa died in the same attack in which Jessica Lynch was captured, and her absence is a telling amnesia within Puar’s discussion of how “nostalgically mourning the loss of the liberal feminist subject” converges “white liberal feminists and white gay men” and “unwittingly reorganizes the Abu Ghraib tragedy around their desires” through the now racialized body of the no longer white Lynndie England.⁷² Piestewa’s absence is yet another deferral that vanishes the violences done to indigenous women, and those same indigenous soldiers’ cathexis of U.S. nationalism and imperialism that signals an indigenationalism compatriot to the homonationalism that Puar defines as “the arrangements of U.S. sexual exceptionalisms [marked] explicitly in relation to the nation” that demobilize queer identities by normativizing certain bodies but not others within the enfranchisements of the state.⁷³ To phrase this slightly differently, the Indian is simultaneously, multiply, a colonial, imperial referent that continues to produce knowledge about the indigenous as “primitive” and “savage” otherness within poststructuralist and postcolonial theory and philosophy. As a philosophical sign, the Indian is the transit, the field through which presignifying polyvocality is re/introduced into the signifying regime, and signs begin to proliferate through a series of becomings—becoming-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-Indian, becoming-multiplicity—that serves all regimes of signs. And the Indian is a ghost in the system, an errant or virus that disrupts the virtual flows by stopping them, redirecting them, or revealing them to be what they are and will have been all along: colonialist. The Indian, then, is a Deleuzian event within poststructuralism: “To the extent that events are actualized in us,” Deleuze writes, “they wait for us and invite us in.”⁷⁴ For Derrida, as he grieved and mourned the loss of his friend and colleague, and saw in that loss the passing of a generation of thought, the event in Deleuze’s work becomes the Event, death, the paradox of humorous conformity of a leaping in place, an apotheosis of will. “‘It is in this sense that Amor fati is one with the struggle of free men,’” Derrida quotes from Deleuze.⁷⁵ Nietzsche’s love of fate, the invitation inherent in the will of the event opposes the ressentiment of resignation to become the point “at which war is waged against war, the wound would be the living trace of all wounds, and death turned on itself would be willed against all death.”⁷⁶ On the threshold, then, of “the necessity with the aleatory, chaos and the untimely” that is both the work of Derrida’s mourning of Deleuze and the haksuba of Southeastern cosmologies that Choctaw scholar LeAnne Howe defines in her work as headache, chaos, the collision of Upper and Lower Worlds initiated by colonialism, the Indian wills against the signifying system.⁷⁷ That the Indian represents the violent slamming of worlds in what might otherwise be fluidity and flow helps us frame the problem within a U.S. empire, with ties to Enlightenment liberalism, that continues to transit itself globally along lines put to flight by “the Indian without ancestry” that makes everyone its progeny. It is untimely as a site of the death of signification. That haksuba can additionally mean “to be stunned with noise, confused, deafened” signals the degree to which cacophony, whether joyous or colonialist, hinges upon the disruptions caused when “the Indian” collides with the racial, gendered, classed, and sexed normativities of an imperialism that has arisen out of an ongoing settler colonialism.⁷⁸ The Southeastern cosmologies of the Chickasaw and Choctaw imagine worlds with relational spirals and a center that does not so much hold as stretches, links, and ties everything within to worlds that look in all directions. It is an ontology that privileges balance, but understands that we are constant movement and exist simultaneously among Upper and Lower Worlds, this world and the next. In her poem “The Place the Musician Became a Bear,” Mvskoke poet and musician Joy Harjo sings about how Southeastern Indians have always known “where to go to become ourselves again in the human comedy. / It’s the how that baffles, the saxophone can complicate things.”⁷⁹ Harjo reminds us that there is always a prior “becoming-human” within Southeastern worlds that links us to the complications and improvisations of stars, spirals, and jazz. Much of the scholarship on U.S. imperialism and its possible postcoloniality sees it as enough to challenge the wilderness as anything but vacant; to list the annihilation of indigenous nations, cultures, and languages in a chain of –isms; and then still to relegate American Indians to the site of the already-doneness that begins to linger as unwelcome guest to the future. This last is particularly relevant to understanding how the United States propagates itself as empire transhemispherically and transoceanically, not just through whiteness, but through the continued settling and colonizing of indigenous peoples’ lands, histories, identities, and very lives that implicate all arrivants and settlers regardless of their own experiences of race, class, gender, colonial, and imperial oppressions. My point in tracing the Deleuzian wilderness and the Indian deferred is to detail the ways in which “the Indian” is put to flight within Western philosophical traditions in order to understand how the United States transits itself globally as an imperial project. As Derrida and Deleuze are evoked within affect theories, the “Indian” and “tattooed ~~savages~~” remain as traces. Any assemblage that arises from such horizons becomes a colonialist one, and it is the work of indigenous critical theory both to rearticulate indigenous phenomenologies and to provide (alter)native interpretative strategies through which to apprehend the colonialist nostalgias that continue to shape affective liberal democracy’s investment in state sovereignty as a source of violence, remedy, memory, and grievability.

#### Embracing “fluidity” and “flux” pathologizes tribal notions of fixed relationships to land and place.

Grande 2K [Sandy Grande is associate professor and Chair of the Education Department at Connecticut College.; “American Indian Geographies of Identity and Power: At the Crossroads of Indígena and Mestizaje”; Harvard Educational Review; https://meridian.allenpress.com/her/article-abstract/70/4/467/31773/American-Indian-Geographies-of-Identity-and-Power?redirectedFrom=fulltext]//eleanor

The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essen- tialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples: federal agencies have in- voked the language offluid or unstable identities as the rationale for disman- tling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whitestream America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices, history, and literature; and Whitestream academics have now em- ployed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centu- ries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democ- racy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities. In addition, the undercurrent of fluidity and sense of displacedness that permeates, if not defines, mestizaje runs contrary to American Indian sensi- bilities of connection to place, land, and the Earth itself. Consider, for exam- ple, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter Mc- Laren: The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope — a liminal space, an intimation of the anti-structure, Of What lives in the in-between zone of undecided-ability — in which one can work toward a praxis of redemp- tion.... A sense of atopy has always bccn with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling ofliving in germinal formlessness.... I cannot find words to express what this border identity means to me. All I have are what Gcorgres Bastille (1988) calls mots glissants (slippery words). (1997, pp. 13—14) McLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a "praxis of redemption." As he perceives it, the very possi- bility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the "liminal" spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybrid- ities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, McLaren perceives the fostering of a "resplendent placelessness" itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society. While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains rooted in historical place and the sacred connection to land. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity: Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment. Instead of denying this di- mension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form Of our lives.... Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and prac- tices because they represent the presence of the sacred in Our lives. They prop- crly inform us that we are not larger than nature and that we have responsibili- ties to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278, 281) Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian sub- jectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country. For instance, I be- lieve there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora's box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as a invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access to public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separa- tion between church and state. All of this is to point out that the critical pro- ject of mestizaje continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U. S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjec- riviry — and liberation for that matter — is conceived of as inherently rights- based as opposed to land-based. To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision — a time, place, and space free of the compul- sions Of Whitestream, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a \*liberated" self, American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sov- ereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land. Thus, to a large degree, the seemingly liberatory constructs of fluidity, mobility, and trans- gression are perceived not only as the language of critical subjectivity, but also as part of the fundamental lexicon Of Western imperialism. Deloria (1999) writes: Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred With the destruction Of ceremonial life (associated with the loss of land) and the failure or inability of white society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant State Of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247). In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive mestizaje func- tions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "demo- cratic" Whitestream. The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the in- tegration of Indigenous communities into the national mestizo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992) , the myth of mestiza- je has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American gov- ernmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation- state through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") ele- ments into the mainstream. Thus, What Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continents' long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo. While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of mestizaje (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cul- tural chauvinism), I argue that any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American Indianness will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life. Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly "new" cultural democracy based upon the radical mes- tizaje will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, as the physical and metaphysical borders of the post- modern world become increasingly fluid, the desire of American Indian communities to protect geographic borders and employ "essentialist" tactics also increases. Though such tactics may be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sover- eignty, Native resources, and Native lands. The tensions described above indicate the dire need for an Indigenous, revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations (border patrolling) and also encour- ages the building of coalitions and political solidarity (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997) , who admon- ish educators to develop a concept of and difference as political mobili- zation rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authen- ticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples.

#### The affirmative is a settler move to innocence par excellence – pedagogical projects of critical enlightenment through research and knowledge production do not translate into action but rather serve as a diversion that attempt to displace settler culpability without giving up land or power.

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is an award-winning Unangax̂ scholar in the field of Indigenous studies and educational research. Tuck is the associate professor of critical race and indigenous studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto; K. Wayne Yang is Professor in the Ethnic Studies department at University of California San Diego; “Decolonization is not a metaphor”; Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, Vol. 1, No.1; 2012; https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf]//eleanor

Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”

Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in no small part as a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right turn away from Fanon’s work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire’s paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: “those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side” (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering.

Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become ‘subjects’ who then proceed to work on the ‘objects’ of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire’s theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato’s Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness.

By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated. These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37)

Audre Lorde’s words provide a sharp contrast to Plato’s sight-centric image of liberation: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, “first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt.

Freire’s philosophies have encouraged educators to use “colonization” as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, “internal colonization” reduces to “mental colonization”, logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one’s mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions:

The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32)

Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire’s question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. “What is colonization?” must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the ‘natural world’, and ‘civilization’. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.

To agree on what [decolonization] is not: neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny... (Cesaire, 2000, p. 32) We deliberately extend Cesaire’s words above to assert what decolonization is not. It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping’ the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a metonym for social justice.

We don’t intend to discourage those who have dedicated careers and lives to teaching themselves and others to be critically conscious of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, xenophobia, and settler colonialism. We are asking them/you to consider how the pursuit of critical consciousness, the pursuit of social justice through a critical enlightenment, can also be settler moves to innocence - diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.

Anna Jacobs’ 2009 Master’s thesis explores the possibilities for what she calls white harm reduction models. Harm reduction models attempt to reduce the harm or risk of specific practices. Jacobs identifies white supremacy as a public health issue that is at the root of most other public health issues. The goal of white harm reduction models, Jacobs says, is to reduce the harm that white supremacy has had on white people, and the deep harm it has caused non-white people over generations. Learning from Jacobs’ analysis, we understand the curricular pedagogical project of critical consciousness as settler harm reduction, crucial in the resuscitation of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies. (Settler) harm reduction is intended only as a stopgap. As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization.

#### Vote negative for an ethic of incommensurability.

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego; “Decolonization is not a metaphor”; Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society; 2012; <https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf>]//eleanor

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework.

We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36).

To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

when you take away the punctuation

he says of

lines lifted from the documents about

military-occupied land

its acreage and location

you take away its finality

opening the possibility of other futures

-Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet

(as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

### Link – Postmodernism

#### White postmodernism resuscitates liberal humanism.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa\_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, selfabnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, identity is already taken up in this discussion. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. While reparative readings and “working with what is productive” about Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is certainly a part of the Native feminist scholarly tradition, this article focuses on the underexamined ways that Native feminists refuse to entertain certain logics and foundations that actually structure Deleuzoguattarian thought.8 Further, I discuss “decolonial refusal” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self- )professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions. In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self- critique and self- correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other.9 Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self- perpetuating and self- referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these blind spots.10 Wynter understands that one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself. I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self- critique and self- correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self- annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies. Like Wynter, the field of Black studies has consistently made the liberal human an object of study and scrutiny, particularly the nefarious manner in which it violently produces Black existence as other than and at times nonhuman. Wynter’s empirical method of tracking the internal epistemic crises and revolutions of Europe from the outside has functioned as a model for one way that Black studies can unfurl a critique of the human as well as Western modes of thought. I use the terms “misanthropy” and “misandry” in this article to evoke how Black studies has remained attentive to, wary about, and deeply distrustful of the human condition, humankind, and the humanas- man/men in the case of Black “feminists.” Both Black studies’ distrust of the “human” and Black feminism’s distrust of humanism in its version as man/men (which at times seeks to incorporate Black men) relentlessly scrutinize how the category of the human and in this case the “posthuman” reproduce Black death. I link misandry (skepticism of humankind- as- man) to the kind of skepticism and “hermeneutics of suspicion” that Black feminist scholars like Wynter, Jackson, and Musser at times apply to their reading and engagement with revisions to or expansions of the category of the human, posthuman discourses, and nonrepresentational theory. In this article, I connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the university. For example, Wynter assumes a critically disinterested posture as she gazes empirically on and examines intra- European epistemic shifts over time. Paget Henry has described Wynter as an anthropologist of the Occident, as Europe becomes an object of study rather than the center of thought and humanity.11 Throughout the body of Wynter’s work, she seems to be more interested in drawing our attention to the capacity of European orders of knowledge to shift over time— or their fragility— than in celebrating the progress that European systems of knowledge have claimed to make. Wynter’s tracking is just a tracking and not a celebration of the progress narrative that Western civilization tells about itself and its capacity to define, refine, and recognize new kinds of humanity over time. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human. As Zakiyyah Iman Jackson has argued, It has largely gone unnoticed by posthumanists that their queries into ontology often find their homologous (even anticipatory) appearance in decolonial philosophies that confront slavery and colonialism’s inextricability from the Enlightenment humanism they are trying to displace. Perhaps this foresight on the part of decolonial theory is rather unsurprising considering that exigencies of race have crucially anticipated and shaped discourses governing the non- human (animal, technology, object, and plant).12 A crucial point that Jackson emphasizes is that Black and Indigenous studies, particularly decolonial studies, has already grappled with and anticipated the late twentieth- century impulses inspired by Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman to annihilate the self and jettison the future. Indigenous and Black “sex” (as activity, reproduction, pleasure, world- building, and not- human sexuality) are already subsumed by death. For some reason, white critical theory cannot seem to fathom that self- annihilation is something white people need to figure out by themselves. In other words, “they can have that.”13

### 2NC – AT: Permutation

#### Erasure DA – the perm tries to make a slight adjustment and put natives at the center of Deleuzian thought – this sanitizes genocide and demands outright refusal.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa\_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

Because of this, Byrd haltingly stops the reader’s momentum as she critiques Deleuzoguattarian and poststructuralist tendencies that often emerge in postcolonial work. Rather than allow the preemptive rejoinder that white and some postcolonial scholars use, such as “I know that theorist X did not consider race or was racist, but he enables us to do XYZ with his work,”30 Byrd instead cuts off Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics at the path. As Byrd anticipates that following Deleuze and Guattari will end in genocide, she allows the reader the time and space to let this reality sink in and consider a different route than the normative impulse and course of action that is to repair Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Byrd’s work slows us down and brings us to a point of impasse and a resting place where one can slow down, stop, and make a choice to stay put or move forward with the dismissive, whimsical, white conceit that tolerates Native death. Byrd’s refusal allows the reader to feel the violent puncture of the nonrepresentational gash that it tries to disavow. Byrd gives her reader the space and time to say, “Yes, I understand your attempt to evade signification and thus representation but it is not compelling enough for me to overlook the reality that it requires Native genocide.” The way that Byrd’s and others’ decolonial work brings these kinds of tensions and violence to a head enables us to make other kinds of analytic and conceptual choices. The reader is allowed to think and then say, “If this line of thought requires Indigenous death, why even venture down it? What could one possibly repair or salvage of it?” PARSING OUT THE “POST” FROM THE “DE” OF COLONIALIT Y Byrd’s work, which is often postcolonial and has cited Jasbir Puar’s appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari as an example, seeks out opportunities to repair and reclaim Western modes of critique such as feminism, queer, and nonrepresentational theories. Postcolonial work (as well as white settlercolonial studies) often goes along with the linearity and temporality of white equivocations that attempt to excuse how the feminist, the queer (nonsubject), and Deleuzoguattarian lines of connectivity function as parasitic forms of situated knowledge and epistemes. This kind of acquiescence makes the epistemic revolutions internal to white European humanity possible and seem natural as they dehumanize and kill Indigenous and Black people.31 Byrd’s indictment of Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics refuses and cuts off the colonial and postcolonial equivocations, sanitization of affects, and speed and pace of the rhizomatic and nomadic line. As an example of how the protocols, codes of conduct, and politesse of postcolonial “business as usual” unfold in the university, I reflect on my encounters as a student and now professor in the graduate classroom, reading scholarly texts, listening, and taking part in scholarly critique and the collegial repartee that occurs at academic conferences. Within these scenarios, I have observed the decorum of supposedly “engaged and rigorous” critique proceed in the following ways. Often postcolonial interventions into colonial or critical theory travel through phases, stages of progression, and levels of engagement with continental philosophy. First, in order to demonstrate your scholarly due diligence, capacity for rigor, and abstraction, you must learn and rehearse the origins of and become fluent in the language, idioms, and grammar of Deleuze and Guattari or whichever white scholar is in fashion. Second, you must figuratively inhabit and empathize with the white scholar’s very personal and particular existential and ethical questions (even if you cannot relate to her particular kind of situatedness or experience). It is often in graduate seminars where you have been asked— and we have been trained as faculty— to have you think about what it must have been like to be Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, or Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in the moment in which they lived. Imagine the trials and tribulations of being a European bourgeois male maverick in the academy and civil society. In other words, you must internalize and perform this worldview as if it applies to you. After you internalize and perform, the third thing that you are allowed but by no means required to do is list the problems with this theory or worldview. Once you have identified the problems, even irreconcilable ones, you are encouraged to make an intervention or slight adjustment to the discourse or theory by asserting that you will now put Indigenous or Black life at the center of this body of thought. The challenge or intervention usually reads as “what if we put Native or Black studies at the center of Deleuzoguattarian thought?” Although we may become disillusioned with and challenge a metanarrative, we are rarely encouraged to do what Eve Tuck does when she “Break[s] Up with Deleuze.” We are often prevented from getting to this stage of exasperation or justified disgust because we are not allowed to stop, look at, and more importantly feel the violence of Western turns in critical theory. Because of academic respectability politics that impose a kind of bourgeois politesse on all “communicative acts,” be they in person or in writing, it is impolite and more importantly irrational to be rendered devastated, enraged, ~~mute, or immobile~~ by the violent terms on which continental theory proceeds. One must tolerate that Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatic movements require Indigenous genocide. In fact, it is a necessary evil in order for the West to model the kind of unfettered nomadic movement that Deleuze and Guattari privilege. The neoliberal temporality of productivity also requires that scholars keep moving unaffected in the midst of the violence. In fact, one is required to work through and repair or do damage control for Deleuze and Guattari. This is what a “good scholar” does: puts Black or Native studies at the center of rhizomes rather than contesting the very terms in which lines of flight become epistemic entities. But how do we perform or act otherwise in the face of this kind of violence?

#### Settler move to innocence DA – voting neg is necessary to produce settler discomfort – anything less allows for settler recuperation.

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego; “Decolonization is not a metaphor”; Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society; 2012; <https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf>]//eleanor

We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve. In her 1998 Master’s thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.8 She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms ‘moves to innocence,’ or “strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination” (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of, ‘the race to innocence’, “the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (p. 335). Mawhinney’s thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an absence of experience of oppressive power relations (p. 100). This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, “I don’t experience the problems you do, so I don’t think about it,” and “tell me what to do, you’re the experts here” (p. 103). “The commonsense appeal of such statements,” Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to “utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations” (ibid.). In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we call ‘settler moves to innocence’. Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

## Feminist Cyborg K

### 1NC---Shell

#### The more robotic we become the better – only as we reincarnate as the cyborg can feminism be uplifted

Haraway 85 (Donna Haraway - American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s”, Australian Feminism Studies, Pages 1-4, 1985, MG)

A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is **lived social relations**, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction. The international women's movements have constructed 'women's experience', as well as uncovered or discovered this crucial collective object. This experience is a fiction and fact of the most crucial, political kind. Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The **cyborg** is a **matter of fiction and lived experience** that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over **life and death**, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion.

Contemporary science fiction is full of cyborgs — creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted. Modern medicine is also full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine, each conceived as coded devices, in an intimacy and with a power that was not generated in the history of sexuality. Cyborg 'sex' restores some of the lovely replicative baroque of ferns and invertebrates (such nice organic prophylactics against heterosexism). Cyborg replication is **uncoupled** from organic reproduction. Modern production seems like a dream of cyborg colonization of work, a dream that makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy, coded by C3 I, command-controlcommunication-intelligence, an $84 billion item in 1984's U.S. defence budget. I am making an argument for the **cyborg as a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality** and as an imaginative resource suggesting some very fruitful couplings. Foucault's biopolitics is a flaccid premonition of cyborg politics, a very open field.

By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, **we are all chimeras**, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. **The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics**. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical transformation. In the traditions of 'Western' science and politics — the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for the production of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other — the relation between organism and machine has been a border war. The stakesin the border war have been the territories of production, reproduction, and imagination. This essay is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility'^ their construction. It is also an effort to contribute to socialist-feminist culture and theory in a post-modernist, non-naturalist mode and in the Utopian tradition of imagining a world without gender, which is perhaps a world without genesis, but maybe also a world without end. **The cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history.**

The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-Oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense; a 'final' irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the 'West's' escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space. An origin story in the 'Western', humanist sense depends on the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss and terror, represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans must separate, the task of individual development and of history, the twin potent myths inscribed most powerfully for us in psychoanalysis and Marxism. Hilary Klein has argued that both Marxism and psychoanalysis, in their concepts of labor and of individuation and gender formation, depend on the plot of original unity out of which difference must be produced and enlisted in a drama of escalating domination of woman/nature. The cyborg **skips the step of original unity**, **of identification with nature** in the Western sense. This is its illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion of its teleology as star wars.

The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is **oppositional**, Utopian, and completely without innocence. No longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg defines a technological polis based partly on a revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. The relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world. Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein's monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a restoration of the garden; i.e., through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos. The cyborg **does not dream of community** on the model of the organic family, this time without the Oedipal project. The cyborg **would not recognize the Garden of Eden**; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust. Perhaps that is why I want to see if cyborgs can subvert the apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust in the manic compulsion to name the Enemy. Cyborgs are not reverent; they do not re-member the cosmos. They are wary of holism, but needy for connection — they seem to have a natural feel for united front politics, but without the vanguard party. The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that **they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism**, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often **exceedingly unfaithful to their origins**. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.

#### Refusing to succumb to a cyborg world is complicit in the masculine orgy of war – they had their chance to unify and they didn’t, attempting to have them unify now fractures us all

Haraway 85 (Donna Haraway - American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s”, Australian Feminism Studies, Pages 7-9, 1985, MG)

So my cyborg myth is about **transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities** which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work. One of my premises is that most American socialists and feminists see deepened dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine, idealism and materialism in the social practices, symbolic formulations, and physical artifacts associated with 'high technology' and scientific culture. From One-Dimensional Man to The Death of Nature,6 the analytic resources developed by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance. Another of my premises is that the need for unity of people trying to resist worldwide intensification of domination has never been more acute. But a slightly perverse shift of perspective might better enable us to **contest for meanings**, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in **technologically-mediated** societies.

From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star War apocalypse waged in the name of defense, about the final **appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist orgy of war**.7 From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. Single vision produces worse illusions than double vision or many-headed monsters. Cyborg unities are monstrous and illegitimate; in our present political circumstances, we could hardly hope for more potent myths for resistance and recouping. I like to imagine LAG, the Livermore Action Group, as a kind of **cyborg society**, dedicated to realistically converting the laboratories that most fiercely embody and spew out the tools of technological apocalypse, and committed to building a political form that actually manages to hold together witches, engineers, elders, perverts, Christians, mothers, and Leninists long enough to disarm the state. Fission Impossible is the name of the affinity group in my town. (Affinity: related not by blood but by choice, the appeal of one chemical nuclear group for another, avidity.)

Fractured identities

It has become difficult to name one's feminism by a single adjective — or even to insist in every circumstance upon the noun. **Consciousness of exclusion through naming is acute**. Identities seem contradictory, partial, and strategic. With the hard-won recognition of their social and historical constitution, gender, race, and class cannot provide the basis for belief in 'essential' unity. There is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds women. There is not even such a **state as 'being' female,** itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices. Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievementforced on us by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism. And who counts as 'us' in my own rhetoric? Which identities are available to ground such a potent political myth called 'us', and what could motivate enlistment in this collectivity? Painful fragmentation among feminists (not to mention among women) along every possible fault line has made the concept of woman elusive, an excuse for the matrix of women's dominations of each other. For me — and for many who share a similar historical location in white, professional middle class, female, radical, North American, mid-adult bodies — the sources of a crisis in political identity are **legion**. The recent history for much of the U.S. left and U.S. feminism has been a response to this kind of crisis by endless splitting and searches for a new essential unity. But there has also been a growing recognition of another response through coalition — affinity, not identity.8

#### Thus, you should vote negative to become the Cyborg – control isn’t cybernetic, it’s aesthetic and oriented against women

Haraway 85 (Donna Haraway - American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s”, Australian Feminism Studies, Pages 17-19, 1985, MG)

One should expect control strategies to concentrate on **boundary conditions and interfaces**, on rates of flow across boundaries — and **not on the integrity of natural objects**. 'Integrity' or 'sincerity' of the Western self gives way to decision procedures and expert systems. For example, co**ntrol strategies applied to women's capacitie**s to give birth to new human beings will be developed in the languages of population control and maximization of goal achievement for individual decision-makers. Control strategies will be formulated in terms of rates, costs of constraints, degrees of freedom. Human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic, statistical. **No objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves**; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in a common language. Exchange in this world transcends the universal translation effected by capitalist markets that Marx analyzed so well. The privileged pathology affecting all kinds of components in this universe is stress — communications breakdown.16 The cyborg is not subject to Foucault's biopolitics; the **cyborg simulates politics**, a much more potent field of operations.

This kind of analysis of scientific and cultural objects of knowledge which have appeared historically since World War II prepares us to notice some important inadequacies in feminist analysis which has proceeded as if the organic, hierarchical dualisms ordering discourse in 'the West' since Aristotle still ruled. They have been **cannibalized**, or as Zoe Sofia (Sofoulis) might put it, they have been **'techno-digested'**. The dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized are all in question ideologically. The actual situation of women is their integration/exploitation into a world system of production/ reproduction and communication called the informatics of domination. The home, workplace, market, public arena, the body itself — all can be dispersed and interfaced in nearly infinite, polymorphous ways, with large consequences for women and others — consequences that themselves are very different for different people and which make potent oppositional international movements difficult to imagine and essential for survival. One important route for reconstructing socialist-feminist politics is through theory and practice addressed to the social relations of science and technology, including crucially the systems of myth and meanings structuring our imaginations. The cyborg is a kind of **disassembled and reassembled**, post-modern collective and personal self. **This is the self feminists must code.**

Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies. These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women worldwide. Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as formalizations, i.e., as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings. The boundary is permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and tool mutually constitute each other.

Furthermore, communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common move — the translation of the world into a **problem of coding**, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all **heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly**, reassembly, investment, and exchange.

In communications sciences, the translation of the world into a problem in coding can be illustrated by looking at cybernetic (feedback controlled) systems theories applied to telephone technology, computer design, weapons deployment, or data base construction and maintenance. In each case, solution to the key questions rests on a theory of **language and control**; the key operation is determining the rates, directions, and probabilities of flow of a quantity called information. The world is subdivided by boundaries differentially permeable to information. Information is just that kind of quantifiable element (unit, basis of unity) which allows universal translation, and so unhindered instrumental power (called effective communication). The biggest threat to such power is **interruption of communication**. Any system breakdown is a function of stress. The fundamentals of this technology can be condensed into the metaphor C3 I, command-control-communicationintelligence, the military's symbol for its operations theory.

### L – Dualisms

#### Drawing dualisms between the “natural” and the “robotic”, the “flawed” vs the “perfect”, and the “self” vs the “controlled” solely work to reproduce women under masculine autonomy and enable domination of the Other

Haraway 85 (Donna Haraway - American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s”, Australian Feminism Studies, Pages 32-34, 1985, MG)

This is not just literary deconstruction, but liminal transformation. Every story that begins with original innocence and privileges the return to wholeness imagines the drama of life to be individuation, separation, the birth of the self, the tragedy of autonomy, the fall into writing, alienation; i.e., war, tempered by imaginary respite in the bosom of the Other. These plots are ruled by a **reproductive politics** — rebirth without flaw, **perfection**, abstraction. In this plot women are imagined either better or worse off, but all agree they have **less selfhood, weaker individuation, more fusion to the oral,** to Mother, **less at stake in masculine autonomy**. But there is another route to having less at stake in masculine autonomy, a route that does not pass through Woman, Primitive, Zero, the Mirror Stage and its imaginary. It passes through women and other present-tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideological resources of victimization so as to have a real life. These cyborgs are the people who refuse to disappear on cue, no matter how many times a 'Western' commentator remarks on **the sad passing of another primitive, another organic group done in by 'Western' technology**, by writing.33 These real-life cyborgs, e.g., the Southeast Asian village women workers in Japanese and U.S. electronics firms described by Aiwa Ong, are actively rewriting the texts of their bodies and societies. **Survival is the stakes** in this play of readings. \*

To recapitulate, certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the logics and practices of **domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, animals** — in short, domination of all constituted as others, whose task is to mirror the self. Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body, **culture/nature**, male/female, **civilized/primitive**, reality/ appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/ passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man. The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the service of the other; the other is the one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of domination, which gives the lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many.

High-tech culture challenges these dualisms in intriguing ways. It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and what body in machines that resolve into coding practices. Insofar as we know ourselves in both formal discourse (e.g., biology) and in daily practice (e.g., the homework economy in the integrated circuit), we find ourselves to be **cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, chimeras**. Biological organisms have become biotic systems, communications devices like others. There is no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of machine and organism, of technical and organic.

One consequence is that our sense of **connection to our tools is heightened**. The trance state experienced by many computer users has become a staple of science-fiction film and cultural jokes. Perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices. Anne McCaffrey's The Ship Who Sang explored the consciousness of a cyborg, hybrid of girl's brain and complex machinery, formed after the birth of a severely handicapped child. Gender, sexuality, embodiment, skill: all were reconstituted in the story. Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin? From the seventeenth century till now, machines could be animated — given ghostly souls to make them speak or move or to account for their orderly development and mental capacities. Or organisms could be mechanized — reduced to body understood as resource of mind. These machine/organism relationships are obsolete, unnecessary. For us, in imagination and in other practice, machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves. **We don't need organic holism** to give impermeable wholeness, the total woman and her feminist variants (mutants?). Let me conclude this point by a very partial reading of the logic of the cyborg monsters of my second group of texts, feminist science fiction.

The cyborgs populating feminist science fiction make very **problematic** **the statuses of man or woman,** human, artifact, member of a race, individual identity, or body. Katie King clarifies how pleasure in reading these fictions is not largely based on identification. Students facing Joanna Russ for the first time, students who have learned to take modernist writers like James Joyce or Virginia Woolf without flinching, do not know what to make of The Adventures of Alyx or The Female Man, where characters refuse the reader's search for innocent wholeness while granting the wish for heroic quests, exuberant eroticism, and serious politics. The Female Man is the story of four versions of one genotype, all of whom meet, but even taken together do not make a whole, resolve the dilemmas of violent moral action, nor remove the growing scandal of gender. The feminist science fiction of Samuel Delany, especially Tales of Neveryon, mocks stories of origin by redoing the neolithic revolution, replaying the founding moves of Western civilization to subvert their plausibility. James Tiptree, Jr., an author whose fiction was regarded as particularly manly until her 'true' gender was revealed, tells tales of reproduction based on non-mammalian technologies like alternation of generations or male brood pouches and male nurturing. John Varley constructs a supreme cyborg in his archfeminist exploration of Gaea, a mad goddess-planet-trickster-old woman-technological device on whose surface an extraordinary array of post-cyborg symbioses are spawned. Octavia Butler writes of an African sorceress pitting her powers of transformation against the genetic manipulations of her rival {Wild Seed), of time warps that bring a modern U.S. black woman into slavery where her actions in relation to her white master-ancestor determine the possibility of her own birth (Kindred), and of the illegitimate insights into identity and community of an adopted cross-species child who came to know the enemy as self (Survivor).

### 2NC---AT: Permutation

#### The perm fails – it’s imperialist and totalizes feminist analysis – inclusion of the affirmative saves oppression, while the alt intentionally loses out on it

Haraway 85 (Donna Haraway - American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s”, Australian Feminism Studies, Pages 26-28, 1985, MG)

The only way to characterize the informatics of domination is as a massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of subsistence networks for the most vulnerable. Since much of this picture interweaves with the social relations of science and technology, the urgency of a socialist-feminist politics addressed to science and technology is **plain**. There is much now being done, and the grounds for political work are rich. For example, the efforts to develop forms of collective struggle for women in paid work, like SEIU's District 925, should be a high priority for all of us. These efforts are profoundly tied to technical restructuring of labor processes and reformations of working classes. These efforts also are providing understanding of a more comprehensive kind of labor organization, involving community, sexuality, and family issues never privileged in the largely white male industrial unions.

The structural rearrangements related to the social relations of science and technology evoke strong ambivalence. But it is not necessary to be ultimately depressed by the implications of latetwentieth-century women's relation to all aspects of work, culture, production of knowledge, sexuality, and reproduction. For excellent reasons, most Marxisms see domination best and have trouble understanding what can only look like **false consciousness and people's complicity** in their own domination in late capitalism. It is crucial to remember that what is lost, perhaps especially from women's points of view, is often **virulent forms of oppression**, nostalgically naturalized in the face of current violation. Ambivalence toward the disrupted unities mediated by high-tech culture requires **not sorting** **consciousness** into categories of 'clear-sighted critique grounding a solid political epistemology' versus 'manipulated false consciousness', but subtle understanding of emerging pleasures, experiences, and powers with serious potential for changing the rules of the game.

There are grounds for hope in the emerging bases for new kinds of unity across race, gender, and class, as these elementary units of socialist-feminist analysis themselves suffer protean transformations. Intensifications of hardship experienced worldwide in connection with the social relations of science and technology are severe. But what people are experiencing is not transparently clear, and we lack sufficiently subtle connections for collectively building effective theories of experience. Present efforts — Marxist, psychoanalytic, feminist, anthropological — to clarify even 'our' experience are **rudimentary**.

I am conscious of the odd perspective provided by my historical position — a Ph.D. in biology for an Irish Catholic girl was made possible by Sputnik's impact on U.S. national science-education policy. I have a body and mind as much constructed by the postWorld War II arms race and cold war as by the women's movements. There are more grounds for hope by focusing on the contradictory effects of politics designed to produce loyal American technocrats, which as well produced large numbers of dissidents, rather than by focusing on the present defeats.

The permanent partiality of feminist points of view has consequences for our expectations of forms of political organization and participation. **We do not need a totality in order to work well**. The feminist dream of a common language, like all dreams for a perfectly true language, of perfectly faithful naming of experience, **is a totalizing and imperialist one**. In that sense, dialectics too is a dream language, longing to resolve contradiction. Perhaps, ironically, we can learn from our fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western logos. From the point of view of pleasure in these potent and taboo fusions, made inevitable by the social relations of science and technology, there might indeed be a feminist science.

## Silence K

### **1NC---Shell**

#### We endorse subversive silence as a counter-act to their loud politics – that’s the only way to create a true aesthetic revolution

Kaura-aho 21 (Katariina Kaura-aho - doctoral candidate in the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki, “The aesthetics of political resistance: On silent politics”, Thesis Eleven 65, 2021, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/07255136211035154>, MG)

Silent protests, such as the two refugees’ protest in Finland, can be described as expressions of a certain kind of **political ‘spirit’**. This spirit can be defined in many ways. It can be named, for example, the spirit of autonomy, the spirit of freedom or the spirit of equality. In On Revolution (1963), Hannah Arendt discusses the idea of the revolutionary spirit, which is the spirit of actualising something new politically. In Arendtian theory, this spirit appears as the urge and courage for miraculous political action that initiates something new in the world (Arendt, 1958, 1963).

An alternative way of describing the spirit of politics would be to call it a ‘**revolting spirit’**. This definition would perhaps capture something of the Zapatista conception of political refusal as an expression of that something that in us intuitively says **no to domination** (Holloway and Pel´aez, 1998: 184–5). Expressions of a revolting spirit can be politically meaningful. We must here argue against, for example, Slavoj Zizek, who attacks as a basic weakness of many contemporary political protests the fact that they remain mere expressions of rage and, as such, cannot result in positive programs of socio-political change. The problem, Zizek argues, is that ‘(t)hey express a spirit of revolt without revolution’ (Zizek, 2012: 78). As the spirit of political subversion, however, and of the active representation of autonomous definitions of the world, the revolting spirit can be politically meaningful. This spirit can materialise in acts of resistance that powerfully bring into view the oppressiveness of the prevailing aesthetic political order and point toward the possibility of realising a more egalitarian one. The revolting spirit can thus indeed be just another name for the revolutionary spirit: the spirit of actualising something new politically. Refugee protests are examples of the emergence of the revolting, revolutionary spirit in contemporary political contexts.

Refugee protests expressing this spirit undermine the aesthetic sensibility of prevailing aesthetic refugee regimes. The persistent reoccurrence of protests led by this spirit holds the potential for bringing about continual aesthetic revolutions in the sensibility of law and politics.

Especially silent protests can initiate such **aesthetic revolutions**. Against the backdrop of what could be described as frameworks of **loud representative vocalisation** and the noise pollution of statist rhetoric, they emerge as a radical, subversive form of political communication. The refugees’ protest in Finland, for example, as a verbally silent, **embodied act of political communication**, appeared as a potentially subversive act. In the statist context of citizen-centred politics and a representative speech system privileging loud extrovert modes of verbal speech, its silent reaching out had a **special quieting effect**.

Silent protest acts by politically marginalised people can sometimes succeed in making their audience speechless as well. A silent act can cause a pause in the midst of a loud message-filled reality and it can be experienced as something meaningful. In these moments of silence, the logic of prevailing **aesthetic orders of politics can be sensed anew**. When many such silences take place simultaneously, a broader, common subversion in the aesthetic orders can start to evolve. The silent political act that brought about these many silences can then be understood as an aesthetically revolutionary act.

### 2NC---Solves

#### It’s aesthetic and they exclude refugees from their method otherwise

Kaura-aho 21 (Katariina Kaura-aho - doctoral candidate in the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki, “The aesthetics of political resistance: On silent politics”, Thesis Eleven 65, 2021, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/07255136211035154>, MG)

The refugees’ protest evokes many pressing political questions calling for theoretical analysis. One key question the protest evokes is to what extent the human right to sexuality is in practice recognised as a ground for asylum and protected in contemporary political contexts (see, for example, Spijkerboer, 2013).2 In this article, however, I will not focus on the question of the right to sexuality as such, but specifically on the mode of the political action through which the refugees resisted their denial of this right. In the article, I focus especially on the silent character of the refugees’ protest.

The central problem the article attempts to address is the **marginalisation of refugees from political speech** in contemporary liberal, statist political contexts. Refugees often **cannot participate in verbal political speech** in a way that their speech would be recognised as politically meaningful in these contexts (see Arendt, 1951). In frameworks where verbal political speech has been mainly privatised to citizen subjects, often the only possibility for refugees to communicate politically is through acts of resistance. Such acts can convey the political messages that would otherwise remain unheard and unrecognised in statist settings. One mode in which refugees’ acts of resistance can then emerge is **silent resistance**. In silent resistance, silence speaks or **enables the body to speak in visually strong ways.**

In the article, by applying radical democratic theory as well as somewhat phenomenological insights, I analyse how silent resistance can be a politically emancipatory mode of politics for refugees as well as, more generally, a **politically subversive mode of political action** in prevailing ‘Western’, liberal, statist political contexts of representative democracy. I interpret how silent refugee protests, such as the two refugees’ protest in Finland, can disrupt the prevailing logic and ‘sense’ of politics and instead introduce an **alternative sensibility on politics** and common life. The subversive effect that silent resistance can have, I argue, can be understood as an **aesthetic effect**. I analyse silent resistance from this aesthetic perspective. By focusing on the aesthetic, politically subversive potential in silent refugee activism, my attempt is to introduce a new perspective for theoretical discussions on refugee politics.

## Antiblackness K

### L – Cybernationalism

#### The will to technology came to pass as a digital “scramble for Africa” – sadly for them, Black bodies were able to win the race through the utilization of said will and create African unity and Diasporic Cybernationalism. Now, they want to dismantle the will to technology because they lost the race, isn’t that crazy?

Everett 2 (Anna Everett - associate professor of film, TV history and theory, and new media studies at the University of California, “Afrocentricity and the Digital Public Sphere”, Social Text 20.2, Summer 2002, <https://monoskop.org/images/0/0e/Nelson_Alondra_ed_Afrofuturism_Social_Text.pdf>, MG)

Geopolitics in the Digital Age

The hyperbolic rhetoric designating the Internet and the World Wide Web as “super information highways” and as the gateway or on-ramp to the information age did not go unnoticed by the African diasporic community. While some remained skeptical of the discursive onslaught of utopic claims for the revolutionary digital democracy, many were affected by the **gold rush mentality** that seems to have triggered a bout of global **cyberfever**. It is important to understand that the current scramble for domination and domestication of the Internet and the World Wide Web is not unlike that unleashed on the African continent by the West in the nineteenth century. This “scramble for Africa” analogy as a narrative frame for contextualizing the stakes involved in the Internet revolution was dually inspired. One inspiration was the spate of newspaper articles covering the speed with which African Americans were entering the fast lanes of the global infobahn discussed earlier. Another suggested itself as news surfaced of the global media corporations’ scramble to colonize the Internet through their highly publicized strategies of merger mania and media convergence rhetoric. And while print reports detailing an unanticipated surge in black on-line connectivity only hint at what any netizen (virtual citizen of the Internet) or Net novice today who types in the keywords “black” and “African” as any portion of a keyword search quickly discovers: these search commands yield hundreds to hundreds of thousands of “results,” “hits,” or “category matches” (in the argot of Internet search engines Lycos, Yahoo, and many others). This study reveals that since 1991, black people throughout the African diaspora have mounted their **own scramble for a secure share** of the Internet spoils in the intensifying **global grab for Internet dominance**.

As one of history’s most profound and far-reaching cycles of corporate expansion and domination since the industrial age’s robber barons and corporate trusts, today’s megamedia mergers threaten to obliterate any remaining optimism about preserving the last vestiges of a viable and unsponsored public sphere.12 Indeed, the political engine of deregulation responsible for powering the economic force of the ascendant global media behemoths has the capacity and intent now to **rock our worlds**. No sooner had the centripetal forces of technological innovation produced newer, democratizing models of mass media diversity such as cable, satellite, Internet, wireless, and other wide-ranging digital communications systems, than the older media concerns set in motion a centrifugal countermodel of mass media monopolizing and reconsolidation, better known as convergence. Because these newer media were poised to undermine what Ben Bagdikian calls the media monopoly, many believed the decentralized nature and transnational reach of these new media industries signaled a new age of participatory democracy and by extension progressive social equity and creative cultural rejuvenation. It seemed that finally new multimedia forms might function to serve and **promote the diverse communicative needs of a changing, multicultural world.** The arrival and rapid diffusion of the Internet and the World Wide Web were central to this vision of inevitable global transformation, as the Internet’s role in prodemocracy movements in several developing nations attest. One contemporary critic, who underscores the connection between the Internet and geopolitical change, is Ingrid Volkmer. In Volkmer’s estimation:

the Internet can be regarded as an icon of a globalized media world that has **shifted global communication to a new level**. Whereas television was a harbinger of this new era of global communication by reaching a worldwide audience with worldwide distribution and innovative global programming (such as that of CNN and MTV), the Internet reveals the full vision of a global community. . . . the implications are obvious: national borders are increasingly **disappearing** within cyberspace. (1997, 48)

Not only do national borders increasingly disappear in cyberspace, they are replaced by new kinship structures now predicated on the **fluidity of cybernetic virtual communities and homelands**.

In his influential work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1993) reminds us that “nationality, or . . . [the] world’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind” (4). It is essential to Anderson that we understand how “nation-ness” is often historically determined and its meanings subject to change over time (4). And yet for Anderson it is crucial to recognize the profound emotional legitimacy of nationalisms despite the challenge of subnationalisms within many tenuous nationalist borders, as the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the bloody coups responsible for reconfiguring many “Third World” nations clearly attest. “Nation, nationality, nationalism,” as Anderson points out, “all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse” (3). Clearly then, the historical changes and technological innovations responsible for the Internet threaten to exacerbate the slippery and increasingly fragile traditional nationalisms while simultaneously strengthening the affective dimensions of a newer virtual or cybernationalism now unbound by traditional ideological, political, economic, geographical, and even temporal boundaries and limitations. Moreover, we must now work to proffer new definitions and analyses of these **new brands of African diasporic cybernationalisms** as they existed in the early years of the Internet’s global formation.

As early as 1992 the African diaspora was willfully and optimistically dispersed into the transnational ether of the Internet by many tech-savvy African nationals and expatriates living and working abroad. For these black geeks the **lure of cyberspace represents “the possibility of vast, unexplored territory**” (Balsamo 1996, 116) capable of sustaining **new modes of postcolonial African unity,** of sorts, often untenable on the continent given the political and military economies of “real” space. Among African early adopters of the Internet and the World Wide Web were those visionary tech-evangelists—or cyberwitchdoctors, if you will—who conjured such new Africanities on-line as Naijanet, the Association of Nigerians Abroad, the Buganda Home Page, the African National Congress Home Page, and others. By 1997 more black diasporic Web sites began appearing, including ones for the Republic of Ghana, the AfroCaribbean Chamber of Commerce, Camden (UK) Black Parents’ and Teachers’ Association, Canadian Artists’ Network: Black Artists In Action, Egypt’s Information Highway Project, and Africa Online, among others too numerous to consider here.

## FW Supplement

### at: schnurer

#### “Debate-as-potlatch” is meaningless and devolves into a forensic reenactment of bygone revolutions that takes flaunting the rules as an endpoint and becomes complacent in the same sterilizing practices they criticize. Our framework doesn’t mold debaters in any particular way—it breeds the skills to make trained and tested actions through a ritualized policy debate-game that looks a lot like a potlatch!

Snider, 3—former director of debate at the University of Vermont (Alfred, “Paris Nocturne,” CAD 24 (2003): 16-101)

First, Schnurer offers what appears to me to be a major contradiction. He savages the game concept. He then introduces us to the game of “Potlatch,” and sings its praises as a way to tear down consumerist society and as a model for inspiring exchange of ideas. He finishes with an exhortation to “find games that fulfill our revolutionary potential, take whatever moments we can for ourselves to try and push for as much change as we possibly can.” How “Potlatch” avoids his earlier criticisms or how his search for “game to fulfill our revolutionary potential” can avoid them is not explained. He simply cannot have it both ways absent a substantial explanation of how this contradiction is bridged.

Second, I believe that Schnurer misunderstands the concept of “paradigm” as used in these discussions. He states that debate “paradigms are boundaries drawn to include and exclude certain types of behavior. At their most mundane, debate paradigms establish the ‘rules’ that encircle the activity of debating.” He offers no supporting documentation for this claim. Thomas Kuhn (1962, p. viii) has noted that paradigms set the stage for discussions, but are not controlling, in that they are “sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined practitioners to solve.” I have found the work of Masterman (1970, p. 68) to be very useful. She notes that there are three sorts of paradigms, being philosophical, sociological, and construct paradigms. A debate paradigm would seem to be a construct paradigm. The construct paradigm is an instrument or tool for learning. The focus is what a paradigm can do to guide our actions (p. 71). A construct paradigm is a “way of seeing” and helps guide us in how we understand a given situation or organize a set of data. She sees the Kuhnian construct paradigm as a starting point or “research vehicle” (p. 78). It is a beginning for theory, an analogy we can employ in understanding a process such as academic debate. It is not an iron set of rules, but a perspective. A paradigm is a beginning for theory, an analogy we can employ in understanding a process such as academic debate. These understandings are quite different from those of Schnurer.

Third, Schnurer seems to glorify the flaunting and breaking of rules. He wants to “agitate the gamers, and push them to look beyond the game and consider breaking even the most solid rules.” He longs for a world and a debate activity more like the revolution in Paris of May 1968 than a standard debate tournament. It is clear that in debate the “rules” (about which there can be no argument) are few, including the time limits, the wording of the topic, and the identity of the speakers. Which of these rules would he have us throw aside? All of the rest resides in the world of “procedures,” common practices that are still open for debate and disputation.

The “rules” of debate are not so constricting, and the relevance of procedures (common understandings that can be challenged at any time, such as the role of the topic in the debate) teaches students to question major guidelines, not to obey them [unquestioningly] ~~blindly~~. I would defend a game with limited rules and debatable procedures, not an activity in which all rules should be boldly disregarded and violated. Just as Schnurer probably has limits to what is acceptable in his classroom, there should be some limits in a debate.

Fourth, Schnurer seems fascinated by the strategies and approaches of the Situationists embodied in the “revolution” that took place in Paris in May 1968. I find this to be an entertaining and romantic vision, but not necessarily a valid one. If Paris in May 1968 is his “paradigm” for revolutionary potential in debate, I am not a supporter.

This sort of revolution is neither “real” nor productive and is guilty of many of the same errors that Schnurer attaches to “debating” as opposed to “acting.” Dirk Jan van Baar (1998) wrote:

May, 1968 was not a “real” revolution. The students “played” revolution. It was the last attempt of Paris to justify itself as the ‘revolutionary centre’ of the world. But the French were lagging behind, the ‘counter-culture’ commercialized and globalized, and were not really interested in leftist ideology. Playing the revolution was fun, not serious stuff. The generation of 1968 contributed — contrary to its own aims — to the further Americanization of Europe (France). Today's revolutions that really matter — such as the imaginative revolutions in Information Technology — are more virtual, and can do without Paris.

It is not the “riots in Paris, with upended cars” that have the most real impact for change, but the “virtual” revolutions that take place inside the minds of individuals, something that happens regularly through debate participation.

Fifth, Schnurer ignores the realities that can emerge from what we do here on the “playing fields of earth.” It seems clear to me that real social change comes from skilled, thoughtful, and practiced human agents. Student debaters do not hover endlessly in the game of debate. They graduate and move on to lives and careers outside of the game. Yet, they take with them the skills they have learned. By demanding that the game of debate also become direct action, Schnurer denies them the training in a safe place that can facilitate later success.

Sixth, “Potlatch” may have more in common with the game of debate than Schnurer realizes. The game of debate is a process by which participants offer their lofty ideas, goals, and proposals for exchange and mutual analysis. Borrowing the rhetoric of Hussey used by Schnurer, academic debate is also a “living moment of poetry” that “breaks down and reverses conventional chronological patterns.” Academic debate offers arguments as “gifts,” often lofty and sometimes utopian. These gifts can easily be seen as a “catalyst of the future in the form of a crystallization of desire.” The rhetoric of Debord also makes this point, that the game “is able to distribute” our “novel desires and problems” and creates a process where “only the further elaboration of these by others can constitute the corresponding return gift.” Both Hussey and Debord are describing “Potlatch,” but it seems to me to be very much like the game of debate I have been describing for over twenty years.

Maxwell Schnurer is a gifted, insightful, and inspiring debate professional. His thesis, however, that gaming as a concept strips debating of its revolutionary potential, is incomplete. The game of debate is a training ground for future action for social change, first and foremost. His vision of a revolutionary debate where all rules are gleefully violated in a forensic reenactment of Paris in May, 1968 would damage the ultimate potential debate training has for real citizenship, social evolution and change. We need trained and tested actions and decisions, not spontaneous revolution.

### at: ssd bad

#### switch-side debate is good and any alternative links worse to their criticism of debate

**Stannard 2006** – Director of Forensics and Associate Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming (4/18, Matt, The Underview, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, “Deliberation, Debate, and Democracy in the Academy and Beyond”, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html, 3NR)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

We can read such criticisms in two ways. The first way is as a warning: That we ought to remain cautious of how academic debate will be represented and deployed outside of the academy, in the ruthless political realm, by those who use it to dodge truthful assertions, by underrepresented groups, of instances of material injustice. In this sense, the fear is one of a “legalistic” evasion of substantive injustice by those privileging procedure over substance, a trained style over the primordial truth of marginalized groups.

I prefer that interpretation to the second one: That the switch-side, research-driven “game” of debate is politically bankrupt and should give way to several simultaneous zones of speech activism, where speakers can and should only fight for their own beliefs. As Gordon Mitchell has pointed out, such balkanized speech will break down into several enclaves of speaking, each with its own political criteria for entry. In such a collection of impassable and unpermeable communities, those power relations, those material power entities, that evade political speech will remain unaccountable, will be given a “free pass” by the speech community, who will be so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resources and true believers in the service of continued material domination. Habermas’s defense of the unfinished Enlightenment is my defense of academic debate: Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, seek to expand this method of deliberation to those who will use it to liberate themselves, confront power, and create ethical, nonviolent patterns of problem resolution. If capitalism corrupts debate, well, then I say we save debate.

### at: grammar bad

#### Grammar allows language and communication to be possible, it’s necessary for all understanding

Praise and Meenakshi, 14, Professors at VIT University ( Samuel and K. , “Importance of grammar in communication”, International Journal of Research Studies in Language Learning 2015 January, Volume 4 Number 1, http://www.consortiacademia.org/index.php/ijrsll/article/view/789/365)

The relationship between grammar to language is not simply a regulatory device but even something more than that. When grammar is prioritized over communication in the context of language, the term grammar is not used in the sense of a textbook, or in the sense of anything as specific as a set of rules of a language, such as gender, number, person, subject-verb or object-verb agreement, word order, subordinating devices and so on. In generative grammar the set of such highly abstract principles is called Universal grammar. The nature of this grammar which is the reality of language is not given but is to be hypostatized. Its reality is the fact that speakers have an internal knowledge about it although they are unable to externalize that knowledge. In this sense, then, language as it is known exists only as an epiphenomenon, as used by Chomsky. From such a perspective, it is easy to see how grammar is the real thing and language an appearance. Thus, what is called as grammar in this abstract sense is to be seen as a set of boundary conditions under which language becomes possible. Within the boundaries however various further possibilities exist, giving rise to a whole range of multiplicities and variations. Internal choices are also responsible for language change in course of time. Languages change because of many factors, sometimes accidentally but often due to contact situations. This is not denied when it is said that ‘grammar’ is a priori; for whatever roles these forces play, they do not change the basic shape of language. Grammar is also the pursuit of an activity as much the way Collingwood says what art is. In trying to arrive at an understanding of any activity, one must begin with a mass of experience related to that activity; and this experience cannot be acquired by philosophical thinking, or by scientific experiments, or by observation of the activity in other people, but only by a long and specialized pursuit of activity itself. Only after this experience has been acquired is it possible to reflect upon it and to bring to light the principles underlying it (Collingwood, 1925, pp. 8-9). From this it is clear, that one cannot reflect on grammar without actually doing grammar. These remarks of Collingwood, made in respect of the philosophy of art, underscore the importance of doing something well before venturing to talk about it, and that applies to the field of grammar without doubt. It is liked to be said by us that doing grammar and thinking about it are simultaneous and mutually supportive activities. In the end of history, does each speaker decide his or her own grammar? Many people believe that that is how it is going to be. If so then grammar gradually loses its authenticity and we will have only a naïve theory of language. But grammar has been continuously resisting that end, and in that resistance, history too may have some hopes of survival! 4. Different perspectives on competence According to Chomsky, Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance (Chomsky, 1965, p. 3). Chomsky clearly distinguished the description of language form (competence) and language use (performance) and established that the speaker-listener’s internal grammar that judges the grammaticality of sentences should be the main object of investigation for linguists. ￼100 Consortia Academia Publishing According to Dell Hymes communicative competence is “appropriateness of sociocultural significance of utterance” (Canale & Swain, 1980). Hymes (1974), retaining the idea of Chomsky’s underlying grammatical competence, looks at contextual relevance as one of the crucial aspects of one’s knowledge of language and claims that meaning in communication is determined by its speech community and actual communicative event in question, which consists of the following components he calls SPEAKING (a mnemonic code word): Setting, Participants, Ends, Act sequence, Key, Instrumentalities, Norms of interaction and interpretation and Genre (Hymes, 1974). These are broadly considered speech contexts in which real verbal interactions takes place. 5. Conclusion From what has been read before it is realized that without rules there is chaos. Grammar is merely a set of rules to preserve the written word. Without these standards there would be no continuity of language and over time communication of ideas would suffer. As people from different parts of the world try to talk in English which is influenced by their own mother tongue, there are errors in grammar and sentence pattern. If one can master grammar, He or She can unlock ideas and thoughts that were written across time and place. Proper grammar is very important. Correct grammar keeps from being misunderstood and lets us effectively express our thoughts and ideas. The way we communicate is extremely important in our profession and society. While modern technology and social media have less formal forms of communication, we are expected to produce perfect grammar in professional settings. Glaring errors in spellings and punctuation are judged before the content of the work. Grammar gives language users the control of expression and communication in everyday life. Mastery over the words help speakers communicate their emotions and purpose more effectively. Even though changes in grammar are made from old to contemporary, grammar can change its shape according to the trend but the importance or the role played by grammar still remains the same.

### at: truth is violent

#### Making truth claims is inevitable, vital to solve either team’s impacts, and unrelated to “imposing” truths violently

**Eagleton ‘3** [Terry; 2003; Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University; *After Theory*, Basic Books: New York, NY, p. 105-9]

If it is true that a situation is racist, then it is absolutely true. It is not just my opinion, or yours. But of course it may not be true. Or it may be partially true - in which case it absolutely is partially true, as opposed to being completely true or not true at all. Defenders of absolute truth are not necessarily dogmatists. In any case, dogmatism does just not mean thumping the table with one hand and clutching your opponent by the throat with the other. It means refusing to give grounds for your beliefs, appealing instead simply to authority. There are plenty of courteous, soft-spoken dogmatists. Holding something to be absolutely true does not mean affirming it against all conceivable evidence and argument, and refusing in any circumstances to concede that you are mistaken. Those who believe in absolute truth may well be the kind of people who are pathologically cautious about accepting anything as true unless it seems plainly undeniable. They may stumble through life in a haze of scepticism and a miasma of doubt. It is just that when they do, perhaps once every decade or so, come grudgingly to accept a proposition such as ‘The head gardener has just shot himself through the foot’ as true, they recognize that its opposite cannot also be true, and that its being true for them means its being true for everyone else as well. Nor does ‘absolutely true’ mean true independently of any context. We can only judge the world from within some kind of framework. But this does not necessarily mean that what is true from one viewpoint is false from another. Elephants may be sacred for you but not for me, if this represents a difference between our ways of signifying them. But it cannot be true that elephants really are sacred, in the same way that they really have four legs, and that they are in the same sense not sacred. Cultures make sense of the world in different ways, and what some see as a fact others do not; but if truth simply means truth-for-us, then there can be no conflict between us and other cultures, since truth is equally just truth-for-them. This is tolerable enough when it comes to the sacred status of elephants, as well as being extremely convenient for us if we hold that forcing sexual relations on toddlers contributes to their emotional well-being and psychological stability in later years, and the culture next door does not. Since their view is entirely relative to their own way of life, it can naturally have no effect on our behaviour. In any case, if each cultural framework constructs the world differently enough, it is hard to see how they could share the same proposition in common. A different world yields a different meaning. Absolute truth has nothing to do with fanaticism. It does not necessarily mean the kind of truth to which you are fervently committed. ‘Erlangen is in Germany’ is absolutely true, but one would not go to one’s death for it. It is not the kind of truth which sets the blood coursing and quickens the heartbeat. It does not have the same emotional force as ‘You strangled my great-aunt, you despicable bastard!’ Most absolute truths are pretty trivial. Much the same goes for the word ‘absolute’ when used in some moral discourse. For Thomas Aquinas, ‘absolutely wrong’ does not necessarily mean ‘very, very wrong’. The word ‘absolute’ here is not an intensifier. It just means ‘shouldn’t be done under any circumstances’. Aquinas thought rather strangely that lying was absolutely wrong, but not killing; but he did not of course believe that lying was always more grievous an offence than killing. Being of reasonable intelligence, he appreciated well enough that lying is sometimes pretty harmless. It was just that for him it was absolutely wrong. Absolute truth is not truth removed from time and change. Things that are true at one time can cease to be true at another, or new truths can emerge. The claim that some truth is absolute is a claim about what it means to call something true, not a denial that there are different truths at different times. Absolute truth does not mean non-historical truth: it does not mean the kind of truths which drop from the sky, or which are vouchsafed to us by some bogus prophet from Utah. On the contrary, they are truths which are discovered by argument, evidence, experiment, investigation. A lot of what is taken as (absolutely) true at any given time will no doubt turn out to be false. Most apparently watertight scientific hypotheses have turned out to be full of holes. Not everything which is considered to be true is actually true. But it remains the case that it cannot just be raining from my viewpoint. Why does any of this matter? It matters, for one thing, because it belongs to our dignity as moderately rational creatures to know the truth. And that includes knowing the truth about truth. It is best not to be deceived if we can possibly help it. But it also matters because a ludicrous bugbear has been made of the word 'absolute' in this context; and because if the relativist is right, then truth is emptied of much of its value. As Bernard Williams points out, relativism is really a way of explaining away conflict.2 If you maintain that democracy means everyone being allowed to vote, while I maintain it means that only those people may vote who have passed a set of fiendishly complicated intelligence tests, there will always be a liberal on hand to claim that we are both right from our different points of view. If true loses its force, then political radicals can stop talking as though it is unequivocally true that women are oppressed or that the planet is being gradually poisoned by corporate greed. They may still want to insist that logic is a ruling-class conspiracy, but they cannot logically expect anyone to believe them. The champions of Enlightenment are right: truth indeed exists. But so are their counter-Enlightenment critics: there is indeed truth, but it is monstrous.

### 2nc mcgee / support for creative tva

#### Debate is a game played by students who want to win. Debating about utopian imaginaries of plans enacted by the USFG effectively positions debaters and judges as budding social critics—without positioning debate as anything more than a game.

McGee and Romanelli, 97—Assistant Professor in Communication Studies at Texas Tech AND Director of Debate at Loyola University of Chicago (Brian and David, “Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 18 (1997) 23-35, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address “something we can ACTUALLY DO” as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT” (“Fantasy as Reality” 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible.

Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position, nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of Beavis and Butthead, social criticism is what good citizens do.

Debate differs from other species of social criticism because debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit. Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly deconstructive. Instead, such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change, whether that criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

One way to understand the distinction between debate as policy-making and debate as social criticism is to examine Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder’s agenda-building theory.5 Cobb and Elder are well known for their analytic split of the formal agenda for policy change, which includes legislation or other action proposed by policy makers with formal power (e.g., government bureaucrats, U.S. Senators), from the public agenda for policy change, which is composed of all those who work outside formal policy-making circles to exert influence on the formal agenda. Social movements, lobbyists, political action committees, mass media outlets, and public opinion polls all constitute the public agenda, which, in turn, has an effect on what issues come to the forefront on the formal agenda. From the agenda-building perspective, one cannot understand the making of public policy in the United States without comprehending the confluence of the formal and public agenda.

In intercollegiate debate, the policy-making metaphor has given primacy to formal agenda functions at the expense of the public agenda. Debaters are encouraged to bypass thinking about the public agenda in outlining policy alternatives; appeals for policy change frequently are made by debaters under the strange pretense that they and/or their judges are members of the formal agenda elite. Even arguments about the role of the public in framing public policy are typically issued by debaters as if those debaters were working within the confines of the formal agenda for their own, instrumental advantage. (For example, one thinks of various social movement “backlash” disadvantage arguments, which advocate a temporary policy paralysis in order to stir up public outrage and mobilize social movements whose leaders will demand the formal adoption of a presumably superior policy alternative.) The policy-making metaphor concentrates on the formal agenda to the near exclusion of the public agenda, as the focus of a Katsulas or a Dempsey on the “real-world” limitations for making policy indicates.

Debate as social criticism does not entail exclusion of formal agenda concerns from intercollegiate debate. The specified agent of action in typical policy resolutions makes ignoring the formal agenda of the United States government an impossibility. However, one need not be able to influence the formal agenda directly in order to discuss what it is that the United States government should do. Undergraduate debaters and their judges usually are far removed—both physically and functionally—from the arena of formal-agenda deliberation. What the disputation of student debaters most closely resembles, to the extent that it resembles any real-world analog, is public-agenda social criticism. What students are doing is something they really CAN do as students and ordinary citizens; they are working in their own modest way to shape the public agenda.

While “social criticism” is the best explanation for what debaters do, this essay goes a step further. The mode of criticism in which debaters operate is the production of utopian literature. Strictly speaking, debaters engage in the creation of fictions and the comparison of fictions to one another. How else does one explain the affirmative advocacy of a plan, a counterfactual world that, by definition, does not exist? Indeed, traditional inherency burdens demand that such plans be utopian, in the sense that current attitudes or structures make the immediate enactments of such plans unlikely in the “real world” of the formal agenda. Intercollegiate debate is utopian because plan and/or counterplan enactment is improbable. While one can distinguish between incremental and radical policy change proposals, the distinction makes no difference in the utopian practice of intercollegiate debate.

More importantly, intercollegiate debate is utopian in another sense. Policy change is considered because such change, it is hoped, will facilitate the pursuit of the good life. For decades, intercollegiate debaters have used fiat or the authority of the word “should” to propose radical changes in the social order, in addition to advocacy of the incremental policy changes typical of the U.S. formal agenda. This wide range of policy alternatives discussed in contemporary intercollegiate debate is the sign of a healthy public sphere, where thorough consideration of all policy alternatives is a possibility. Utopian fiction, in which the good place that is no place is envisioned, makes possible the instantiation of a rhetorical vision prerequisite to building that good place in our tiny corner of the universe. Even Lewis Mumford, a critic of utopian thought, concedes that we “can never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in utopia; but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all” (Mumford 24-25).

An objection to this guiding metaphor is that it encourages debaters to do precisely that to which Snider would object, which is to “make believe” that utopia is possible. This objection misunderstands the argument. These students already are writers of utopian fiction from the moment they construct their first plan or counterplan text. Debaters who advocate policy change announce their commitment to changing the organization of society in pursuit of the good life, even though they have no formal power to call this counterfactual world into being. Any proposed change, no matter how small, is a repudiation of policy paralysis [limitations] and the maintenance of the status quo. As already practiced, debate revolves around utopian proposals, at least in the sense that debaters and judges lack the formal authority to enact their proposals. Even those negatives who defend the current social order frequently do so by pointing to the potential dystopic consequences of accepting such proposals for change.

Understanding debate as utopian literature would not eliminate references to the vagaries of making public policy, including debates over the advantageousness of plans and counterplans. As noted above, talking about public policy is not making public policy, and a retreat from the policy-making metaphor would have relatively little effect on the contemporary practice of intercollegiate debate.6 For example, while space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of this point, the utopian literature metaphor would not necessitate the removal of all constraints on fiat, although some utopian proposals will tax the imagination where formal-agenda policy change is concerned.

The utopian literature metaphor does not ineluctably divorce debate from the problems and concerns of ordinary people and everyday life. There will continue to be debates focused on incremental policy changes as steps along the path to utopia. What the utopian literature metaphor does is to position debaters, coaches, and judges as the unapologetic social critics that they are and have always been, without the confining influence of a guiding metaphor that limits their ability to search for the good life. Further, this metaphor does not encourage the debaters to carry the utopian literature metaphor to extremes by imagining that they are sitting in a corner and penning the next great American novel. The metaphor is useful because it orients debaters to their role as social critics, without the suggestion that debate is anything other than an educational game played by undergraduate students.

### 2nc limits k/t creativity

#### Constraints actually fuel innovation and creativity

David Intrator, President of The Creative Organization, October 21, 2010, “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

### ssd (harrigan)

#### Our framework preserves switch side debate, which is key to critical thinking

**Harrigan 8** (Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp. 6-9)

Additionally, there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when compared to all available alternatives. Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, "with such learning, we Americans could prepare...not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet" (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called "the highest educational goal of the activity" (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate's critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches "conceptual flexibility," where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p,290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p.82).

### limits (grossberg)

#### Their interpretation unlimits debate to the point of meaninglessness – it makes engagement impossible and eliminates all educational value of the 1ac and foregoes a genuine conversation with difference

Grossberg, 15 **-** Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence, We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)//DH

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced.

This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 **[insert footnote 9]** For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. **[Footnote 9 ends]** And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

### fairness/monologues (dascal and knoll)

#### FAIRNESS---post-facto revision of the topic unlimits and produces incentives to avoid due to lack of a stable agent or mechanism. Overstretch makes clash impossible and renders neg ground concessionary. Fairness is a precondition to actualize benefits.

Dascal and Knoll ’11 [Marcelo and Amnon; May 18th; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University, B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Sao Paulo; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University; Argumentation: Cognition and Community, "'Cognitive systemic dichotomization' in public argumentation and controversies," p. 20-25]

He opposes positions whose ‘exclusionist’ outlook rejects the normative approach to the political sphere on the grounds that “normative statements can never be subjected to a reasonable discussion” (ibid.: 2), because—he argues—the discussion of politics “is an area of vital interest to all of us and should clearly not be excluded from argumentative reasonableness” (ibid.: 3)—a view with which we are prone to agree. Nevertheless, he admits that in the present situation critical discussion is far from being systematically and successfully applied to that vital area: “In representative democracies, however, the out-comes of the political process tend to be predominantly the product of negotiations be-tween political leaders rather than the result of a universal and mutual process of deliberative disputation” (ibid.). Political debates, therefore, are ‘quasi-discussions’, i.e., “monologues calculated only to win the audience’s consent to one’s own views”, rather than ‘genuine discussions’, i.e., serious attempts to have an intellectual exchange, which is typical of critical discussions (ibid.). In order to overcome this situation, “democracy should always have promoted such a critical discussion of standpoints as a central aim. Only if this is the case can stimulating participation in political discourse enhance the quality of democracy" (ibid.). This can be achieved, however, only by following “the dialectical rules for argumentative discourse that make up a code of conduct for political discourse [and] are therefore of crucial importance to giving substance to the ideal of participatory democracy” (ibid.: 4); thereby fully acknowledging that “education in processing argumentation in a critical discussion is indispensable for a democratic society (van Eemeren 1995: 145-146).

The reasons provided for the failure of the adoption of the critical discussion model in reality ranges from a general allusion to human nature (“in real-life contexts, it has to be taken into account that human interaction is not always automatically 'naturally' and fully oriented toward the ideal of dialectical reasonableness "; van Eemeren 2010: 4) to specific political sphere argumentation handicaps (unwillingness of people “to subject their thinking to critical scrutiny”; “vested interest in particular outcome”; “inequality in power and resources; “different levels of critical skills”; and “a practical demand for an immediate settlement”; van Eemeren 2010: 4). Although these causes may have some explanatory value in some cases, in our opinion their modus operandi is not accounted for and, what is more important, they do not cover the full spectrum of challenges that the successful use of critical discussion in the public and political spheres must face, as we have seen (cf. sections 2 and 3).

No wonder that van Eemeren himself raises the question “whether maintaining the dialectical ideal of critical discussion in political and other real-life contexts is not utopian” (ibid.), to which he replies by admitting that "[t]he ideal of a critical discussion is by definition not a description of any kind of reality but sets a theoretical standard that can be used for heuristic, analytic and evaluative purpose” (ibid.). This ideal seems to be so inspiring that it remains valid as a pure theoretical ideal, “even if the argumentative discourse falls short of the dialectical ideal” (ibid.).

In the light of the substantial gap between the normative ideal and the actual practices of public and political argumentation that PD’s description and explanation provides, a number of doubts arise: Are there structural, rather than merely contingent obstacles in idealized critical discussion that prevents even its approximate use in the public sphere? Can a theory that claims to be a praxis based normative system fulfill its promise if it sets up a threshold that no one who tries to apply it to the public sphere can reach? Doesn’t the very fact that argumentation is excessively idealized in the model PD proposes cause the gap by distancing people concerned by public issues from argumentation at all? All these doubts suggest that a powerful structural phenomenon like the existence of CSDs in the public sphere is perhaps overlooked by PD and requires, for its overcoming, a radically different approach.

4.2 Discrepancies between the PD approach and reasonable argumentation in the public sphere

The discrepancies in question have to do with basic parameters relevant to every argumentative process, namely:

(A) The discussants’ goals and targets: what do they expect to achieve through the argumentation process and what is it capable of providing.

(B) The preconditions for initiating a critical discussion: what are the discussants presumed to know and accept of these preconditions.

(C) The argumentative process that is supposed to lead to the achievement of the discussants’ goals.

(D) The influence of context and agents on the argumentative process.

4.2.1 Goals

Assuming that argumentation is a voluntary endeavor, the parties are presumed to engage in it if and only if: (i) the process will serve their goals; (ii) these goals cannot be achieved by different, better means.

PD describes as follows the aim of engaging in an argumentative process:

Argumentation is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint by making an appeal to the other party's reasonableness. (van Eemeren 2010: 1, with reference to van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 11-18)

The difference of opinion is resolved when the antagonist accepts the protagonist's viewpoint on the basis of the arguments advanced or when the protagonist abandons his viewpoint as a result of the critical responses of the antagonist. (van Eemeren 2010: 33)

Simply put, the basic assumption is that a critical discussion’s aim consists in putting forth a certain position by one of the parties for the critical examination of the other, who calls it into question. The latter undertakes to refute the former’s position, while its proponent is committed to defend it. Four stages (see below) are supposed to ensure a valid performance of the refutation and defense tasks. The essential point is that at the end of the four stages the parties clearly agree whether the proponent’s position has been refuted or not and, accordingly, change their position (either retracting it or withdrawing from his questioning). In ‘mixed’ disagreements, in which the antagonist not only questions but also puts forth an opposed position, the same process takes place sequentially, i.e., at first one side (A) attacks trying to refute the other’s (B) position, and after this stage is concluded, they switch roles and the second side (B) proceeds to attack the first (A) in the same fashion.

Regardless of whether the described process is indeed capable to yield a conclusive decision about the refutation of a position, and of whether the linearity of the refutation process makes sense, it is obvious that debates in the public sphere are for the most part ‘mixed’. Furthermore, in so far as these debates involve dichotomous positions (rather than just opposed ones), it is necessary that at the end of the PD process one of the parties accept the position of the other.

It is also worth noticing that, contrary to deliberative democracy approaches, which in some cases approve the attempt to reach agreement in a (public) debate as a form of justification of political systems, PD claims that it is not a consensus theory at all. Instead, it conceives itself as a theory based on Popper’s critical rationality, i.e., as having as its principal goal to provide each party with the means—i.e., refutation attempts—to test critically its position:

[T]he conception of reasonableness upheld in pragma-dialectics insights from critical rationalist epistemology and utilitarian ethics conjoin … The intersubjective acceptability we attribute to the procedure, which is eventually expected to lend conventional validity to the procedure, is primarily based on its instrumentality in doing the job it is intended to do: re-solving a difference of opinion. … This means that, philosophically speaking, the rationale for accepting the pragma-dialectical procedure is pragmatic—more precisely, utilitarian [italics in quoted text]. … However, based on Popper's falsification idea, this is a ‘negative’ and not ‘positive’, utilitarianism. … Rather than maximization of agreement, minimization of disagreement is to be aimed for. (van Eemeren 2010: 34)

The distinction between maximization of agreement and minimization of disagreement purports to stress that PD doesn’t view agreement as the suitable end of the process, but just as “an intermediate step on the way to new, and more advanced, disagreements” (van Eemeren 2010: 26n). Nevertheless, no explanation is given of how these “more advanced disagreements” are engendered as a part of the dynamics of the critical process, nor what is the role or value of such disagreements in the public sphere or elsewhere. This may be due to the fact that PD’s ‘critical discussion’ is not tuned to the generation of new positions or ideas but only to the testing of extant ones, thus echoing once again Popper, now in his focus on the justification rather than on the discovery of theories (see sections 4.2.4 and 5).

In any case, it is quite clear that the only practical result of the critical discussion à la PD of opposed positions on a public issue is to determine whether one discussant succeeded in refuting the other’s position, thus obtaining the adversary’s agreement, who will then share his/her position, at least for some time. In this respect, PD’s critical discussion is close to Habermas’s ‘reasonable argumentation’, whose aim is to reach consensus.15 In spite of the apparent difference between a critical examination of a position aiming at its refutation or at its acceptance, even van Eemeren admits, to some extent, their similarity. He points out that “the pragma-dialectical procedure deals only with ‘first order’ conditions for resolving differences of opinion on the merits by means of critical discussion” (van Eemeren 2010: 34), and stresses that there are ‘higher order’ conditions, ‘internal’ and ‘external’, that are “beyond the agent’s control”, conditions that are similar to Habermas’s “ideal speech conditions” (van Eemeren 2010: 35n). Anyhow, whether according to PD the main goal of the critical discussion process in the public alliance is to create the opportunity for refutation or for agreement (meaning that one of the discussants acknowledges that his position is wrong), the essential assumption of this process is that the participants in it in the public sphere (or elsewhere) must be aware that one of them holds a wrong position and will have to explicitly acknowledge this.

Is such a goal, especially when conceived as the ultimate aim of the proposed argumentative process, feasible and acceptable in the public sphere?

In our opinion, there are at least four reasons for arguing that it is a utopian, hence unacceptable goal, if one takes seriously what should be expected from argumentative practice and theory in the public sphere. First, because PD deserves a critique similar to the one leveled against the Popperian version of critical rationalism it espouses,16 which defends a theory of knowledge “without a knowing subject” (Popper 1972); obviously, such a-contextual position becomes even more problematic if applied to the public and political spheres, where it must operate in a context essentially involved with practical rationality. Second, due to its analogy with theories such as Habermas’s that were discussed in this section as well as in 2.2—an analogy that deserves additional criticism because, unlike Habermasianism, PD overlooks the relationship between the political and public context and argumentative practice. Third, because of PD’s total overlooking of the role of CSDs in public argumentation (cf. 4.2.2). And fourth, due to unilateral value judgments of positions in the public sphere, which lead to simplistic criteria of refutation or acceptance in a domain where complexity is the rule (cf. 2.1.1 and 4.2.3).

(ii) Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that the refutation goal as claimed by PD is central, feasible, acceptable, and useful in public argumentation. Aren’t there better ways to achieve this goal?

The refutation and defense moves stipulated by the PD critical discussion model include, on the one side, the antagonist’s critical remarks or demands and on the other, the proponent’s replies. We believe that it must be assumed that neither the critique nor the replies are previously known to the contenders, which is why they have an interest in engage in the argumentation process: presumably, the expression of both, counter-arguments and defensive-arguments, is good to both sides. In spite of its usefulness in certain situations, this kind of exchange does not amount to the full manifestation of the dialectical critical process, wherein the context and co-text of the dialectical exchange, as well as the cognitive interaction that takes place and evolves throughout the exchange, play a decisive role in the design and ‘inner’ justification of each of the participants’ moves. Argumentation strategies that take into account these resources and make full use of their potential are no doubt setting up another, broader span of goals for the argumentative process, and are more likely to achieve these goals more effectively than they certainly would achieve their PD more limited counterparts (cf. 4.2.4 and 5).

4.2.2 Preconditions

The ideal PD critical discussion can only be realized if some preconditions are satisfied. The most important ones are a) a clear-cut identification of the standpoint that provokes the disagreement, b) the decision of the parties to engage in a discussion, and c) the participants’ commitment to obey the procedural rules. As we shall see, these preconditions share a common assumption, which calls into question the feasibility of using critical discussion in the public sphere.

(A) This precondition assumes that it is possible to isolate rigorously the subject matter of a critical discussion, so as to conduct a focused discussion that makes use only of relevant arguments. This precondition is quite strict, for whenever both discussants defend contrary standpoints, their disagreement should be treated as two separate fully fledged discussions: “… if another discussion begins, it must go through the same stages again—from confrontation stage to concluding stage” (van Eemeren 2010: 10n).

(B) This precondition subordinates the decision to engage in the discussion to the evaluation that the discussants share enough common ground to pursue it adequately: “After the parties have decided that there is enough common ground to conduct a discussion …” (van Eemeren 2010: 33).

(C) This precondition stresses the ‘contractual’ character of a critical discussion, which requires explicit mutual commitments by the discussants. Its rationale is that without such commitments the aim of the critical discussion, i.e. the resolution of the difference of opinions, will not be achieved, which makes engaging in the discussion pointless: “There is no point in venturing to resolve a difference … if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point, which may include procedural commitments as well as substantive agreement” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 60).

These ‘first order’ preconditions, as they are labeled in PD (cf. van Eemeren 2010: 33), are the conditions that candidates to participate in a critical discussion must fulfill if they intend to do so and can afford it personally (a ‘second order’ condition) and politically (a ‘third order’ condition).17 In addition, the first order conditions demand from the prospective discussants a clear, distinct, and detailed picture of the scope of the discussion that they are about to engage in. This means not mixing up the various differences of opinion that the discussion may involve, and being able to separate them properly as the subject matter for independent discussions; a further requirement is the anticipated identification of the pieces of the ‘substantive agreement’ forming the starting point in order to ensure that they are sufficient for conducting the discussion up to a satisfactory closure.

### iterative testing (iverson)

#### ITERATIVE TESTING---research over points of difference enables refinement and sharpens advocacy. Competitive motivations are key.

Iverson ’9 [Joel; 2009; Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Montana, Ph.D in Communication from Arizona State University Relations at the University of Sydney; Debate Central, “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy,” https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html]

Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges that debate provides preparation for participation in democracy, limiting debate to a laboratory where students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends:

For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45)

Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "argumentative agency [which] involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the research conducted for competition is a major catalyst to propel their action, change their opinions, and to provide a greater depth of understanding of the issues involved.

The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world.

Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.

Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere.

The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.

Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. Even if students are not compelled to take direct action, research still changes opinions and attitudes.

Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was,

Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea.

This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support ofvarious movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.

In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs.

The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects.

Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'" (NPDA Homepage,<http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html>). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team.

Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues.

### role experimentation (connolly)

#### Role experimentation should orient our politics. the lens of a policymaker can alter our perception in ways that catalyze micro and macro political action. Investigating politics can expose faults in the system in order to foster broader forms of resistance

Connolly 13. William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism, Duke University Press, 2013, 186

There is no zone of complete neutrality in a world of role performances. Obedient performances in cumulative effect tend to support the existing regime as they insinuate its dictates into our collective habits of perception, judgment, and action. Unless a dissident group of workers meticulously “works according to rule” to disrupt production through excruciating obedience in a way that discloses how tangled formal rules can become. Or a group creatively improvises on the performance of Bartleby the Scrivener, posing endless questions about the orders given to it until the machine overflows itself or is jammed. These indeed are creative role experimentations. So was the practice in Eastern Europe during the late stages of Soviet rule to clap endlessly when a Soviet stooge spoke, until the bewildered speaker was moved to sit down amid the roar around him. I recently attended a faculty meeting with the president of my university at which the entire faculty remained silent after his Ceo-style talk ended and he departed slowly up the aisle. Sometimes silence sends a message to power.

Our lives are messages.5 Role experimentation can disrupt and redirect the flow of authority, habit, institutional regularity, and future projection. It can also encourage others to look more closely at their own performances in this or that domain. Such experiments can also set the stage for more adventurous and larger scale actions. My examples will be limited to con- stituencies who are the most apt to read this book, though they could easily be adjusted to a broader array.

Suppose a constellation of students, studying to enter professional life, forms study groups to explore more closely how those professions presuppose and enforce a set of practices that contribute to the fragility of things as they simultaneously draw attention away from that contribution. The students may pose untimely questions in their political science, economics, engineering, medical, business, legal, and biology classes. If in a secular institution, they may seek out courses that complicate the assumptions of secularism. If in a religious school, they may organize a group to explore the history of atheism or of minority faiths that eschew the theme of a per- sonal God. They can engage experimental artistic work that stretches their habitual patterns of perception and judgment. The nature- and soundscape compositions of John Luther Adams have salutary effects on many in this respect. Such activities can also prime you to experiment with other role performances once you enter professional life. If a lawyer, you may organize to rethink your connections to the ugly prison system and to adjust your practice to protest its ugliness. Or you may give a portion of your time to challenge corporations, localities, and states that defile the environment. If a doctor, you may organize voluntary medical care for the poor and publicize what you are doing. In both cases these experimentations make a modest difference on their own, prime our capacities for more sensitive perception in other domains of life, and may prepare us to participate with others in yet more adventurous activities. These are minor moments, but an accumulation of minor moments can jostle settled habits of perception; they can encourage a readiness to become more exploratory; and they can extend the time horizon within which we think and act.

Suppose, now, you are middle- or upper-middle-class citizens in a polity that has competitive elections. You have become increasingly dissatisfied with the course your society is taking. Voting, while pertinent, seems radically insufficient to the issues involved. Its time horizon is too short and the strategic place of ill-informed undecided voters in electoral politics skews campaigns too sharply. Inequality has been extended. The lower reaches of society are left out in the cold and often blamed for the suffering they undergo. The news media are organized around scandal and a brief time horizon. Racial differences are exploited to break up potential coalitions on the left. A large slice of the population is periodically suscep- tible to war fever. Climate change is widely subjected to deferral, denial, or formal acceptance disconnected from action. And the right wing actively promotes filibusters and legislative stalemates to encourage more and more people to withdraw from citizenship and to tolerate the privatization of more and more of life.

The sciences and professions with which you are familiar are often too narrowly defined. Too many churches either provide refuges from the world or serve as sites of aggressive attack on ecological concerns, homosexu- ality, carriers of alternative faiths, or poor minorities. You know what po- litical party you support; you vote regularly; and you give time and money to your party. But you also find it difficult to connect the sentiments you profess to the role expectations sedimented into your practices of work, church, consumption, neighborhood association, investment portfolio, children’s school, artistic pursuits, and local news reporting. Now is the time to join others in becoming role experimentalists.

You may actively support the farm-to-table movement in the restaurants you visit; you may support the slow food movement; you may frequent stores that offer food based on sustainable processes; you may buy a hybrid or, if feasible, join an urban zip-car collective, explaining to friends, family, and neighbors what effect such choices could have on late modern ecology if a majority of the populace did one or the other; you may press your neighborhood association and workplace to buy solar panels and install them yourself; you may use writing and media skills developed in school to write for a blog; you may shift a large portion of your retirement account into investments that support sustainable energy; you may withdraw from aggressive investments that presuppose an unsustainable growth pattern, threaten economic collapse, and/or undermine the collec- tive future; you may bring new issues and visitors to your church, temple, or mosque to support rethinking about interdenominational issues and the contemporary fragility of things; you may found, join, or frequent a repair club, at which volunteers collect and repair old appliances, furni- ture, and vehicles to cut back on urban waste and increase the longevity of these items; you may probe and publicize the multimodal tactics by which twenty-four-hour news stations work on the visceral register of their viewers, as you explore ways to counter those techniques; you may travel to places where unconscious American assumptions about world entitlement are challenged on a regular basis; you may augment your pattern of films and artistic exhibits attended to stretch your habitual powers of perception and to challenge some affect-imbued prejudgments embedded in them; you may seek out new friends who are also moving in these directions. You may regularly relay pregnant essays you encounter to friends, colleagues, and relatives. A series of minor role experiments.

As we proceed our aspirational selves may now begin to exceed our operational selves, and the shame we feel about the discrepancy between these two aspects of the self may generate energy to enter into yet new modes of role experimentation.6 We thus begin to make ourselves and our engagements more experimental rather than simply falling into a ready- made set of role expectations. We have begun to become what Nietzsche calls “our own guinea pigs” rather than merely being the guinea pigs of those in charge of these institutions.

As such experiments accumulate, the ice in and around us begins to crack. First, the shaky perceptions, feelings, and beliefs with which we started these experimentations now become more refined and more entrenched. Second, we are now better situated to forge connections with yet larger constituencies engaging in similar experiments. Third, as these connections accumulate we may be more inspired to join macropolitical movements that speak to the issues. Fourth, as we now join protests, slowdowns, and confrontational meetings with corporate managers, church leaders, union officials, university officials, and neighborhood leaders, we may now become more alert to the institutional pressures that propel these constituencies forward too. They are also both enmeshed in a web of roles that en- able and constrain them and often more than mere role bearers. These roles too exhibit varying degrees of pressure and slack as they link the details of daily conduct to the strategic practices of the larger political economy.

One advantage of role experimentation by several constituencies at multiple sites is that it speaks to a time in which the drive to significant change must today be mobilized by a large, pluralist assemblage rather than by a single class or other core constituency. Such an assemblage must be primed and loaded by several constituencies at many sites. Role experimentations and the shape of a pluralist assemblage thus inflect one another.

We must condense some of the steps involved. But perhaps the multidimensional pluralist assemblage in which you have now begun to participate approaches a tipping point—crystallized, say, by movement back and forth between role experiments, shifts in the priorities of some strategic in- stitutions, and a change in the contours of electoral politics. Now a surprising event may occur, allowing these emergent energies to be crystallized. At this point some will enter the scene to say that no kind of “reformism,” no matter how extensive, is acceptable. We must wait for a bigger, more total transformation, they will say. Such an account will be offered at precisely this tipping point as the only sophisticated reading of the world. But it is not. Yes, roles, institutions, events, constitutive acts, and larger structures are interinvolved, with each enabling and limiting others. Yes, we do inhabit a world of multiple entanglements and interconnections. Yes, the primacy of capitalist markets and private ownership does give owners and high-rolling investors key advantages in setting the agenda of the state. Yes, states subject to public elections are also limited by systemic relations to corporate structures and the threat of capital strikes. Yes, extreme inequality, combined with legislative and court decisions inspired by neo- liberal ideology, do disenfranchise many as they release billions of dollars to right-wing electoral campaigns. Yes, private ownership of the media does give great advantages to the corporate establishment. Yes, dependent workers do face uphill battles in limiting capital through labor organiza- tion. Yes, the limited reach of semisovereign states in the global economy exerts corporate pressure on them, just as, inside the United States at least, the right-wing Supreme Court’s devolution of authority to states in a fed- eral system forces states to compete with each other for corporate favors. Yes, elected representatives are dependent on campaign money and their desires to find jobs as lobbyists after they leave office. Yes, there are pressures on many in the lower middle class to identify with the vision of the future publicized by those above them. It may therefore appear that there are no cracks and fissures in these interconnected processes. It may seem that you must either embrace the system with fervor, withdraw as much as possible from it, or wait for an explosion that changes everything rapidly.

The hegemony of neoliberal ideology reinforces such a reading of the alternatives, in its way, even as it otherwise emphasizes our inability to have a bird’s-eye view of the system. It offers a bird’s-eye view of the whole whenever it insists that market self-organization means impersonal market rationality. But repeated experience belies such an equation. There are numerous examples of surprising economic meltdowns, often ushered into being by submission to that very ideology. And periodically critical movements emerge, as if from nowhere, to challenge existing priorities at vulnerable sites. There is, for starters, the surprise of the Arab Spring, with its ambivalent possibilities; the emergence of a New Left in Euro-American countries in the 1960s and 1970s; the birth of feminist and gay rights movements in those same countries that have probed soft spots in churches, the media, corporate benefit packages, universities, state policy, and families; there is the “slut walk” by which young women challenged the idea that how they dress determines whether they deserve sexual assault; there is Tiananmen Square, which revealed currents of energy and protest in China that are still festering; there is the Occupy movement, springing as if from nowhere, to galvanize previously isolated pockets of dissatisfaction and unrest; there is the civil rights movement, which has reenergized itself several times; there are several ecological movements, mobilizing diffuse dissatisfactions with the direction neoliberal regimes have taken. Each of these events and movements exposes soft spots, cracks, uneven edges, and leakages in “the system,” through which new lines of creative activity can form and pass.

While under way, these become creative forays with differing degrees of self-organization built into them. If and as their success grows, they may expose yet more seams and cracks in a system that is far more replete with rough edges between its subsystems than either its most ardent ideologues or some of its structural critics may acknowledge. The cracks, edges, fissures, noise, and renegade flows in these processes, hidden by this or that streamlined view, are often rendered visible by such experimental actions. One creative thing about that slut walk is how it incited erotic energy and recruited that energy for critical politics. More such experiments of this sort are needed in other domains. There is no reason in the world to allow sensual desire to flow into the advertisement, sale, and purchase of cars, clothing, perfume, vacations, and jewelry but yet to purge it from areas in which it could help to instigate and mobilize productive political activism. Except a self-denying Puritanism within radicalism itself.

### ir framework

#### We should debate international relations as a normative sphere for developing prescriptive frameworks that are exportable – but, it’s only effective if debates are structured and positions are known in advance, which allows abstracting hypothetical scenarios from individual experience to develop universal principles

Lantis 4 [Jeffrey S. Lantis is Chair of the International Relations Program and Associate Professor of Political Science at The College of Wooster. He is author of Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements, and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective. Ethics and Foreign Policy: Structured Debates for the International Studies Classroom. International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2004). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44218873.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3276219e5a7f3bad3e332f8cbe491fd8>]

Structured debates for international relations courses represent a synthesis of the active teaching methods described here. They draw on the role-playing dynamics of simulations, the narrative foundation of the case method, and a system for debate and critical analysis grounded in the argumentation literature.

Structured debates force students to define and defend policy positions that are assigned in advance. In this way, debates demand a level of personal engagement in the process, a measure of group collaboration on debate points, and a willingness to participate in a critical dialogue with the larger group about theoretically significant policy questions. Classroom debates are built on the foundation of a common narrative or background material similar to the case method. For example, students who are assigned to support the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have reviewed similar materials and issues as have those who must oppose it. Furthermore, they are encouraged to define the issue, interpret it through theory frameworks, and prescribe policy options to address specific, real-world problems.

These exercises are structured according to guidelines found in the argumentation literature. Students are sometimes assigned roles for debates in advance, and other times they are forced to defend a position assigned minutes earlier. Debates run according to the systematized format of some forensics programs, and discourse is structured in a way to achieve educational objectives. Students may be motivated by “winning” some of these debates, but they achieve important educational objectives in the process (Wood and Rowland-Morin, 1989). Argumentation in this form can serve as a medium for both engaged citizenship and critical thinking about potential solutions to contemporary challenges. But Cox rightly cautions that political argumentation should be seen as a “normative sphere” where there is less absolute truth than issues subject to interpretation (1981:127).

The literature on active teaching and learning stresses that exercises should be designed and implemented to fulfill a set of educational goals. While objectives may vary, these techniques are generally designed to help students move from theoretical discussions in the classroom to real-world experience. The incorporation of active teaching and learning exercises into international relations courses should also take into account the time requirement and intensity of the exercise, the amount of student preparation needed, and related resource concerns. Finally, most successful active teaching approaches include a period for reflection on theory applications and lessons learned from the experience. In Kolb’s experiential learning preference model, for example, particular attention is devoted to the importance of reflective observation about the exercise (Kolb, 1976, 1984; Fox and Ronkowski, 1997; Brock and Cameron, 1999). On a more practical level, debriefing can provide necessary closure and encourage students toward further discoveries.

The study of ethical dilemmas in foreign policy can achieve important educational objectives in courses on international relations. First, ethical dilemmas can be used to illustrate the complexities of contemporary global politics. Perennial themes like the struggle for state sovereignty, identity, and globalization may be viewed through the optic of ethical debates. Second, collaborative learning projects with defined objectives allow students to explore many avenues in relating theories to case studies in a highly systematic format. Debates with assigned roles also provide students with greater understanding of diverse perspectives on major issues. They learn more about the background and orientation of key players involved in political discourse, and this may promote a widening of their worldviews. Finally, students can increase their communications skills through interactions with their peers in the context of structured debates. These and other objectives are described in practical application below.

#### Interpersonal and international conflicts are analogous – they share structure and mechanisms for resolution because they are both defined by pursuit of incompatible goals – debate’s key to resolving those disputes

Woodhouse et al 8 [Professor Tom Woodhouse, Bradford University, UK. Dr. Tamara Duffey Bradford University, UK. PEACEKEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION. 2008. tigurl.org/images/tiged/docs/activities/1185.pdf]

Conflict is experienced at all levels of human activity. Despite the diversity in level (from interpersonal to international) and intensity (from minor disagreements to major armed and violent wars), there are common insights and approaches to understanding the nature of conflict and managing it peacefully.

In its simplest form, conflict refers to the pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals or groups. In other words, conflict situations arise when individuals or groups identify a goal they want to secure in order to satisfy material interests, needs or values. When these perceptions lead to actions that come up against the interests, needs and values of others, a conflict dynamic occurs. This definition suggests a broader span of time and a wider class of struggle than just armed conflict. The use of such a broad definition allows for the consideration of any conflict, whether it is interpersonal or international, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force.

Armed conflict is a narrower category, denoting conflicts whereby parties on both sides resort to the use of force. It is difficult to define, as it includes situations ranging from a military overflight, an attack on a civilian by a single soldier, or an all-out war with massive casualties. Violent conflict or deadly conflict is similar to armed conflict, but it also includes one-sided violence, for example, genocide against unarmed civilians. It also encompasses the broader peace research concept of violence that includes exploitative social relations that cause unnecessary suffering (that is, structural violence). Contemporary conflict refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflicts in the post-Cold War world, while contemporary armed conflict refers to those that involve the use of force.

3. Conflict Structure and Dynamics

Conflicts are complex processes. However, all conflict situations have certain basic elements in common. One way of conceptualising the relationship between these elements is a “conflict triangle” (illustrated in Diagram 2-2), with structures, attitudes, and behaviours at the points. Galtung first proposed this model for understanding conflict.

Diagram, shape

Description automatically generated

* Structures refer to the political mechanisms, processes, and institutions that influence the satisfaction of security, welfare, recognition and identity needs.
* Attitudes include the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These may be positive or negative, but in violent conflict parties tend to develop increasingly negative stereotypes of the other and an increasingly positive selfgroup identity. Attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred.
* Behaviours are actions undertaken by one party in conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that party abandon or change its goals. It includes cooperation and coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterised by threats, coercion and destructive attacks.

Conflict is a dynamic process in which structures, attitudes and behaviours are constantly changing and influencing one another. A conflict emerges as parties’ interests come into conflict or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then begin to develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. The conflict formation starts to grow and develop. As it does so, the conflict may widen (drawing in other parties), deepen (becoming more protracted and possibly violent), and spread (generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders). This complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. Eventually, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic, interdependent changes that involve de-escalation of conflict behaviour, change in attitudes, and transformation of relationships or structures.

#### This is exemplified by the security dilemma, which is born out of the inevitable uncertainty in all human relations

Booth and Wheeler 8 [Ken Booth FBA is a British international relations theorist, and the former E H Carr Professor of the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University. Nicholas J. Wheeler is professor of international politics at the University of Birmingham and co-editor of the Cambridge Studies in International Relations book series, published by Cambridge University Press and the British International Studies Association. Rethinking the Security Dilemma. 2008. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0505/37a6a9815cee8576c05fd83d13e77dcba32c.pdf]

The term ‘security dilemma’ describes a familiar predicament experienced by decision-makers in a world already overflowing with dilemmas. Despite its ubiquity, our claim is that the concept has been invariably misconceived by academic theorists, yet - properly understood - it should be regarded as the most fundamental concept of all in security studies, and as such should be at the centre of a reformed agenda of this field.1 The security dilemma is a foundational concept because, above all, it engages with the existential condition of uncertainty that characterizes all human relations, not least those interactions on the biggest and most violent stage of all - international politics. That its significance has not been properly recognized has been the result of orthodox thinking failing to give due credit to the work and insights of its major early theorists (John H. Herz and Herbert Butterfield, and later Robert Jervis) and at the same time missing the opportunity (as a result of paradigm blinkers) to appreciate the extent of the theoretical and practical horizons it opens up. Our claim is that an understanding of the dynamics and potentialities involved in thinking about the security dilemma gets to the heart of the central questions of security studies more profoundly than do even the traditional canon of concepts such as ‘war’, ‘strategy’, ‘conflict’ and the rest.

The house of uncertainty

By describing uncertainty as the ‘existential’ condition of human relations we mean that it is not an occasional and passing phenomenon, but rather an everyday part of the existence of individuals and groups. It is uneven in its significance and how it is felt, but it is ultimately inescapable. Insecurity, however, cannot be simply correlated with uncertainty, since uncertainty is a house in which there are many rooms, and in some life is much less insecure than in others. It is preferable to live with the uncertainties of what Kenneth Boulding (1979) called ‘stable peace’ than with the insecurities of Stanley Hoffmann’s (1965) condition of‘state of war’. When states practise cooperation, or societies even embed trust in security communities, significant degrees of security are attained, even within the house of uncertainty.

In the context of International Relations, the existential condition of uncertainty means that governments (their decision-makers, military planners, foreign policy analysts) can never be 100 per cent certain about the current and future motives and intentions of those able to harm them in a military sense. We call this situation one of unresolvable uncertainty, and see it as the core of the predicaments that make up the security dilemma.

The drivers of unresolvable uncertainty are multiple, but they can be reduced to the combination of material and psychological phenomena, and primarily the ambiguous symbolism of weapons and the psychological dynamic philosophers call the other minds problem. Together, these create the conditions for the concept first theorized by Herz (1951) and Butterfield (1951). Students of disarmament are familiar with the strategic meaning of the idea of the ambiguous symbolism of weapons, if not this actual label. The term refers to the difficulty (many would say the impossibility) of safely distinguishing between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ weapons. As the old adage has it, whether you regard a gun as defensive or offensive depends on whether or not you have your finger on the trigger. This subjective interpretation, in principle, is the same in international politics, though in practice it is more complex. If, for example, it is argued that it is possible to distinguish between what is clearly offensive (a sword) from what is clearly defensive (a shield) with respect to individual weapons, strategists are likely to reply, unanimously, that such distinctions are operationally meaningless when interpreted as a whole, because a shield can be a vital part of an offensive move when used in combination with a sword.

Such an understanding has informed Russian, Chinese and other strategic planners in their interpretation of various plans for US ballistic missile ‘shields’ over the years. In the early twenty-first century, the Administration of George W. Bush attempted to justify deploying missile defence systems with the argument that they would help protect the US homeland against limited missile attack from ‘rogue states’ in general, and crucially Iran and North Korea in particular. Washington’s critics (in potential target countries and elsewhere)claimed to the contrary that the shield of missile defence can potentially be used in combination with the sword of US offensive nuclear missiles in a disarming strike against their enemies at some point in the future. The domestic critics of such a deployment in the USA for this reason see the move as destabilizing. ‘What is not a weapon in the wrong hands?’ is the question delegates at the World Disarmament Conference asked themselves in the early 1930s.

The closely related second dimension of unresolvable uncertainty is the other minds problem. This refers to the inability of the decision-makers of one state ever to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states, and so fully understand their motives and intentions, hopes and fears, and emotions and feelings. Obviously, some degree of understanding, sympathy, and (even) empathy is usually possible, but when it comes to matters of national security, the degree of confidence required by national security planners has to be very high, since the cost of getting it wrong is never trivial. A serious misjudgement could result in a waste of money and loss of prestige through the pursuit of bad policies; ultimately, defeat in war and foreign occupation might be the outcome.

#### Even abstract concepts like negotiating between the US and Russia provides a template for studying human interactions and negotiating self-interest – even if it doesn’t solve conflict, studying IR helps break down the impulse for rightness vs. transgression dichotomies which characterized both interpersonal hostility and global war

Earle 86 [Professor of Psychology, The Ohio State University. International Relations and the Psychology of Control: Alternative Control Strategies and Their Consequences. Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jun.,1986), pp. 369-375. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3791131.pdf]

Research into the psychology of control has revealed that control needs are key elements of individual psychological functioning. This paper argues that a “need for control’’ framework is also useful for understanding actions and ideologies at the national and international levels. It critically analyzes prevalent strategies for exerting control in this domain and proposes alternative strategies which permit greater fulfillment of control needs. These alternatives emerge from an examination of potential similarities between satisfaction of control needs within the separate but parallel domains of international relations and interpersonal relations.

Political psychology has the potential to translate issues of international relations into the terms of human interpersonal encounter. In my view, such a translation enhances our ability to think creatively about the current world situation.

The students in my freshman psychology course recently surprised me by adopting this approach for an in-class assignment. I had asked them to role-play a negotiating session between the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of arms control. My assumption had been that they would act out the roles of political leaders on both sides, and would proceed by exchanging official positions on arms control issues. Instead, they took the viewpoint of ordinary Ameri-can and Soviet citizens and exchanged candid remarks concerning their feelings about the nuclear danger.

Their tone of earnest sincerity was in stark contrast to the kind of elaborate posturing, deceitfulness, and strategic “positioning” that usually characterizes this kind of endeavor at the diplomatic level. Having translated the arms race into its smallest constituent parts—the feelings of individual Soviet and American citizens—they had stripped away the layers of pretense and revealed the rigidly arbitrary nature of their country’s “party line.” After the role-play had ended, the students pressed me to admit that, if the political and military leaders on both sides were removed from the picture, much of the current conflict between the two countries could be settled by a consensus of common citizens from both sides.

It only occurred to me later that, regardless of the practicality of their solution, my class had arrived at it by a highly unusual means: They had asserted that the problems were amenable to human control by acknowledging their own individual human reactions to the dangers of continued international confrontation. I choose to focus here not on the solution my students proposed but on the impulse behind their proposal. The need expressed by these students to render these issues “controllable” in some fashion is a basic one. Perhaps an examination of this need, and the more vs. less healthy ways it can be satisfied, holds the key to a novel approach to international relations.

The concept of a “need for control” has recently received much attention within the field of psychology. The belief that one can exercise control over one’s outcomes is said to be critical to psychological well-being (Glass and Singer, 1972; Langer, 1983; Seligman, 1975; Wortman and Brehm, 1975). Research has shown that the negative consequences of a stressful event on physical and mental health can be overcome by a sense of control—i.e., a belief in one’s ability to cope with (respond effectively to) the event (Anderson, 1982; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Perlmuter and Monty, 1979; Weiss, 1972). The accumulating body of research in this area has promising applications for the restoration and maintenance of psychological health in a wide range of human environmental settings.

To date, feelings of control have been studied as an attribute of individual psychological functioning. However, the recent work of Fred Rothbaum and John Weisz and their colleagues (Rothbaum et al., 1982; Weisz et al., 1984) suggests that a “need for control” analysis may also be useful for understanding the functioning of individual nations within the international arena. Rothbaum et al. distinguish between primary and secondary forms of control. Primary control is the ability to enhance one’s rewards by doing something to influence existing realities (e.g., other people, circumstances). In secondary control, rewards are obtained by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction with things as they are.

In other words, people attempt to gain control not only by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) but also by bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Weisz et al. argue that cultures differ in the extent to which they emphasize primary vs. secondary forms of control. They conclude that the proper relation between the two forms of control involves a dynamic interplay between them, and warn that too heavy an emphasis on either primary or secondary control may be maladaptive for cultures as well as individuals.

Extending the logic of Weisz et al. to the realm of international relations, it can be assumed that citizens and policymakers alike define the requirements of national self-interest in somewhat the same terms they use to evaluate their own individual sense of well-being. For example, there is widespread agreement that a key element of a “healthy” American psyche is a sense of national potency (“primary control,” in our terms) in the international arena. Ronald Reagan’s Presidency has been lauded by both supporters and detractors for its “restoration” of this sense of control after the “humiliating” decade of the 1970s—a legacy of Vietnam, the oil embargo, and the Iranian hostage crisis (cf. Yankelovich, 1982). Whether or not such a felt sense of control (or lack of same) would be sustained by an objective appraisal, it is nonetheless real if it has real consequences for domestic political priorities and foreign policy actions.

Given the present context of international relations, is an enhanced sense of control by one nation purchased at the expense of diminished control by other nations? [The Weisz et al. analysis does not attempt to address this key issue.] Under what conditions can this zero-sum notion of control be overcome? If the attainment of a sense of control is indeed an important objective within the world community, then these questions are critical.

The answer may lie in exploring alternative strategies for attaining primary control. For example, the prevailing strategy requires nations to maximize their power vis a vis potential adversaries. Yet the sense of control thus attained is always tenuous, because (a) the technological basis for maintaining such relative power may be eclipsed by breakthroughs on the other side, (b) such technology is subject to dissemination to third parties, thus diluting the power of its former owners, and (c) power that involves the domination of one nation by another (either directly or through surrogates) is bound to be resisted by those subject peoples whose own needs for control have been thwarted. Numerous examples attest to the existence of these needs (under the guise of “nationalism” and “self-determination” or “revolution” and “rebellion”—depending on the orientation of the describer) as a continued source of frustration for the great powers in their attempts to maintain the stability of client states.

Faced with these difficulties of asserting primary control, both the United States and the Soviet Union have come to rely heavily on a form of secondary control that Weisz et al. refer to as interpretive control. This is the attempt to interpret events so as to derive a sense of meaning and purpose from them. In the current great power struggle, this assumes the form of rigidly ideological beliefs about the nature of the “other side’’ and the necessity of continued struggle. It allows individual persons and actions to be subsumed under a “grand scheme” of impersonal global forces (e.g., “good” vs. “evil”). The interpretive route to control works to the extent that it provides a reassuring sense of order and predictability. However, this unifying vision is purchased at the expense of an empirically based analysis of what the rest of the world is doing and why. Reality is distorted to fit the dichotomy of rightness (on one’s own behalf) vs. transgression.

The selective “management” of information about foreign policy successes vs. failures is essential to this enterprise [the U.S. invasion of Grenada provides a recent example; see e.g., Middleton (1984) and Nelson (1983)]. Unfortunately, such selective information-gathering seriously impairs foreign policy. Numerous authors have described occasions on which great powers have become the captives of their own over-simplified world views (e.g., Didion, 1983; Tuchman, 1984; Sick, 1985).

Extended use of this secondary control strategy requires a blurring of the distinction between international politics and fiction. The Soviet Union does not enjoy a monopoly in this regard. Within the last year, the Vietnam War veteran has been resurrected as an American hero, and American audiences have eagerly imbibed his cinematic revenge against the North Vietnamese in “Rambo,” “Missing in Action,” and their television counterparts.

A related phenomenon is the president’s identification with the on-screen personas of fellow actors Clint Eastwood and Sylvester Stallone, whose adherence to simplified credos belie the gnawing complexities of value choices in the real world. Such reactions are likely not unique to Americans or to their current president. Instead, they are symptomatic of the frustrations incurred by nations who have failed in their attempts to exert active control over world events.

The control needs themselves are legitimate; the strategies that are currently employed for satisfying those needs are not. Use of such measures guarantees that the cycle will repeat itself—i.e., that unrealistic thinking and erroneous judgment will serve as the basis for future foreign policy actions.

The question remains: If the nations of the world cannot afford continued reliance on such an ineffective (and unbalanced) “mix” of control strategies, what are the alternatives? As suggested above, the answer lies in exploring alternative conceptions of “control.” Rather than conceiving of control as a subject-object relationship, in which the “object” is a fixed quantity (of land, resources, subject populations) to be apportioned among contending powers, one could instead consider it in the context of a subject-subject relationship, a dy-namic system in which control needs are realized by the exercise of mutual influence.

An analogy between the realms of international relations and interpersonal relations may serve to illustrate this distinction. In a personal relationship that is subject-object-based, each party has a mutually exclusive sphere of self-interest (“turf”) to be protected; the relationship must be negotiated on the basis of how much turf each party will cede to the other in exchange for similar consideration. A failure of negotiation may lead to unilateral attempts by either/both parties to grab some of the other’s turf. “Compromise” and “confrontation” thus define the parameters of this type of relationship.

Alternatively, a personal relationship may be subject-subject-based, to the extent that the relationship is not primarily directed toward the issue of sharing vs. hoarding (of a separate domain of self-interest) but rather toward a redefinition of self and self-interest in terms of the relationship. Satisfaction in such a relationship is not derived from the amount of turf seized from, or conceded by, the other party. Instead it obtains from the opportunity to exert positive influence over the other’s outcomes, and in turn to be the beneficiary of the other’s positive consideration and favorable regard (cf. Kelley, 1979; Kelley and Thi-baut, 1978).

### issue specialization (herbert)

#### Modern society over-emphasizes debates over value systems that prioritize bluster over thoroughness and lock in cycles of dogma---the necessary corrective is in-depth debates over concrete, imperfect policies

Wray Herbert 12 {Wray Herbert is the author of the book On Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind's Hard-Wired Habits. He is an award-winning journalist who has been writing about psychological science for more than 25 years. He’s citing Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado. 9/26/2012. “Extremist Politics: Debating the Nuts and Bolts.” <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/extremist-politics-debating-the-nuts-and-bolts_b_1914307>}//JM

Starting next week and through October, President Barack Obama and Gov. Mitt Romney will face off in a series of four televised debates, designed to clarify the candidates’ positions on the most pressing public policy issues confronting the nation today. In place of the ideals and elegant rhetoric of the campaign trail, the leaders of the two major parties will have an opportunity to describe the nitty-gritty of governing: how they will deal with complex matters like affordable health care, foreign policy in the Middle East, job creation, equitable taxation, and more.

But the unfortunate reality is that Americans won’t get much in the way of detail and explanation. If history is any guide, the debate moderators will not press very hard for nuts and bolts, instead allowing the candidates to evade and attack and talk in unhelpful generalities. They will preach in pre-tested catch phrases to the already converted rather than really explaining the difficult day-to-day realities of decision making in a democracy.

Cynics will say that it doesn’t matter, that voters’ minds are made up anyway. But if national debates aren’t the venue for challenging citizens’ thinking, then what is? Voters need to understand the prosaic details of complex policies. Most have staked out positions on these issues, but they are not often reasoned positions, which take hard intellectual work. Most citizens opt instead for simplistic explanations, assuming wrongly that they comprehend the nuances of issues.

Psychological scientists have a name for this easy, automatic, simplistic thinking: the illusion of explanatory depth. We strongly believe that we understand complex matters, when in fact we are clueless, and these false and extreme beliefs shape our preferences, judgments, and actions — including our votes.

Is it possible to shake such deep-rooted convictions? That’s the question that Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado’s Leeds School of Business, wanted to explore. Fernbach and his colleagues wondered if forcing people to explain complex policies in detail — not cheerleading for a position but really considering the mechanics of implementation — might force them to confront their ignorance and thus weaken their extremist stands on issues. They ran a series of lab experiments to test this idea.

They started by recruiting a group of volunteers in their 30s — Democrats, Republicans, and Independents — and asking them to state their positions on a variety of issues, from a national flat tax to a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions. They indicated how strongly the felt about each issue and also rated their own understanding of the issues. Then the volunteers were instructed to write elaborate explanations of two issues. If the issue was cap and trade, for example, they would first explain precisely what cap and trade means, how it is implemented, whom it benefits and whom it could hurt, the sources of carbon emissions, and so forth. They were not asked for value judgments about the policy or about the environment or business, but only for a highly detailed description of the mechanics of the policy in action.

Let’s be honest: Most of us never do this. Fernbach’s idea was that such an exercise would force many to realize just how little they really know about cap and trade, and confronted with their own ignorance, they would dampen their own enthusiasm. They would be humbled and as a result take less extreme positions. And that’s just what happened. Trying — and failing — to explain complex policies undermined the extremists’ illusions about being well-informed. They became more moderate in their views as a result.

Being forced to articulate the nuts and bolts of a policy is not the same as trying to sell that policy. In fact, talking about one’s views can often strengthen them. Fernbach believes it’s the slow, cognitive work — the deliberate analysis — that changes people’s judgments, but he wanted to check this in another experiment. This one was very similar to the first, but some volunteers, instead of explaining a policy, merely listed reasons for liking it. Consider universal health care, for example: It’s highly complex and challenging to explain, but much easier to label it “compassionate” or, alternatively, “European” or “socialist.” So some volunteers were assigned to do the hard explaining and others the simplistic labeling.

The results were clear. As described in a forthcoming issue of the journal Psychological Science, those who simply listed reasons for their positions — articulating their values — were less shaken in their views. They continued to think they understood the policies in their complexity, and, notably, they remained extreme in their passion for their positions. In a final version of the study, volunteers who were forced to confront their inadequate knowledge actually gave less money to the cause, suggesting that with their extremism attenuated, they actually acted more moderately.

Americans in 2012 are about as polarized and partisan as they’ve ever been, and such polarization tends to reinforce itself. People are unaware of their own ignorance, and they seek out information that bolsters their views, often without knowing it. They also process new information in biased ways, and they hang out with people like themselves. All of these psychological forces increase political extremism, and no simple measure will change that. But forcing the candidates to provide concrete and elaborate plans might be a start; it gives citizens a starting place. As former presidential hopeful Ross Perot famously stated, “The devil is in the details.”

#### Predictable limits are critical to issue specialization---opening discussion to every important issue simultaneously causes cognitive overstretch and undermines the educational potential of debate to loosen elites monopoly on expertise

Kevin J. Elliott 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Murray State University, 11/14/19, “Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance,” American Journal of Political Science, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12486>

In this article, I present an underappreciated mechanism of collective wisdom—by which cognitively average individuals can, taken as a group, make better decisions than even the smartest and most informed citizens, individually or in small groups1—based on issue specialization through deliberative enclaves called “issue publics.” Though this epistemic mechanism does not entirely answer the epistemic challenge, it responds to it in the same instrumental terms in which it is put and avoids appeals to democracy's intrinsic worth, which critics might view as evading the question. I hope that issue specialization enters the debate over the wisdom of democracy alongside promising epistemic mechanisms like diversity. I also aim to show that issue specialization is a promising subject for renewed empirical investigation since topics discussed here, such as the specialization of citizens’ political knowledge, need more study.2

It must be emphasized, however, that this mechanism is broadly Hayekian in its operation, rather than Condorcetian; it does not promise right answers but rather helps inform decisions by gathering information widely dispersed in society. My modest claim is therefore that issue specialization makes democratic choices more informed, not that it makes democracy “truth tracking” or leads to optimal decisions. At best, it may eliminate some of the worst options by defining a broad top set among which informed citizens disagree. Like diversity, issue specialization does not render bad policy impossible but merely less likely.

Because this article engages deeply with empirical evidence, I must clarify the status of the claims I make. One might wonder, for instance, whether I use the evidence to contend that issue specialization through issue publics is something that currently happens in democracies or whether it is an aspiration that could improve democratic performance after reform. My response is both. It is generally agreed that issue publics (which instantiate issue specialization) exist at least to some degree, but not necessarily to the extent required to generate the epistemic performance I suggest. This makes issue specialization both something that can potentially explain the excellent performance of many democracies today, as well as a realistic ideal toward which we might aspire. I therefore highlight how existing evidence is consistent with or positively supports issue publics, with the main purpose of illustrating the conditional claim that if we made issue specialization more central to our expectations of citizenship and democracy, the potential exists for it to do good epistemic work.

The Cognitive Division of Labor in Democracy

In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith claims that the specialization of tasks in an economic division of labor allows for great advances in productivity and the alleviation of scarcity (Smith 2008). In this section, I analogize Smith's claims to issue specialization in a division of the cognitive labor involved in making democratic decisions and argue that issue specialization generates an epistemic advantage for large groups over smaller ones, even if the latter are made up of the smartest or most competent individuals.

Consider the task facing citizens trying to make democratic decisions—that is, decisions about what policies to enact or who should have political power. This is conventionally understood to require citizens to consider and learn about every possible issue, figure out what the best policy is regarding each issue, and then trade off those policies against each other to construct an optimal political program (Beerbohm 2012). Then, in representative democracies, citizens must further consider which party or candidate most closely matches that program, bearing in mind that further trade‐offs are often necessary since none are likely to be a perfect match.

This presents citizens with an immensely complex task, akin to an individual manufacturing, say, a modern car. But, like making a car, the difficulty of the task can be alleviated by breaking it up into smaller pieces, just as in Smith's pin factory. Democracy's pin factory, I argue, is found in breaking up and specializing the task of democratic choice through issue specialization and, to a lesser extent, by functional differentiation.

Issue specialization is the first and most powerful element of this division of labor (Beerbohm 2012, 180–81; Elkins 1993).3 If we use a spatial metaphor and think of all the potential issues on the political agenda as occupying space on a landscape, then issue specialization operates by dividing that space into limited parcels corresponding to specific issues and having particular groups attend to each area. This vastly simplifies the task of coming to informed decisions (Lupia 2006, 227). Instead of becoming informed about every possible issue and trading off between them, members of each specialized group need only become informed about a single area and make their decisions on the merits of that issue.

This specialization also allows members of these groups to develop a kind of issue expertise through surveillance of news and familiarity with the facts, organizations, and coalitions surrounding it.4 This is analogous to the dexterity Smith argues workers develop through the economic division of labor. In particular, specialized citizens are likely to have identified trustworthy groups or individuals from whom to take informational cues, reducing the costs of staying informed (Lupia 1994). This expertise enables them to do a better job than others at judging the performance or promises of candidates on that issue.

Likewise, by concentrating on limited issue areas, citizens gain issue focus, which eliminates the costs of following every twist and turn of political events and learning about entirely new issues every few weeks. This is analogous to the elimination of changeover costs from one task to another highlighted by Smith. Issue focus also alleviates worries of activist fatigue arising from being pulled in several directions at once by a fragmented political agenda. Finally, by specializing and focusing, citizens are able to make maximally efficient use of the limited time, attention, and resources they can devote to politics, improving the “productivity” of their “citizenship time.”

The complexity of the task is further simplified by another division of cognitive labor: functional differentiation. This is familiar in democratic theory and consists in dividing labor between individuals with different but complementary roles in a democratic system, in the way that the functions of representatives, activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens mutually complement each other (Christiano 2015; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). In this way, the task facing ordinary citizens is made even more tractable. Not only do they focus their attention on a limited share of the overall issue space, but they also share the burdens of surveilling and making decisions about that space with others fulfilling different roles.

The two dimensions of divided labor work together, yet issue specialization is primary. We can see this by imagining the functional division of labor replicating itself within each of the specialized issue areas, as activists, journalists, and citizens specialize by issue, along with civil society. It may seem that functional differentiation is doing the work, but it must be remembered that it only comes into play on a field that has already been differentiated by issue. Issue specialization easily falls out of notice because it defines the ground over which first‐order political contestation occurs. It tends to disappear into the background because we take it for granted in any particular political debate. Though both kinds of division of labor are at work, the main source of epistemic merit is the topical division of labor that divides the decision task into limited parcels of issues.

One question arising from the analogy between the economic and democratic division of labor is this: What mechanism aggregates the specialized work of these groups? In factories, aggregation happens spontaneously because the output of each specialized worker serves as input for the next step in production. But there is no obvious analogue among groups attending to different issues. In this account, the main agents of aggregation are representatives and political parties. As discussed below, in seeking election and building coalitions, these actors look to issue‐specialized groups for electoral support and for information about the sorts of policies they should advocate. Thus, aggregation mainly occurs through governing and competing to do so (e.g., constructing electoral platforms).

If this account is correct, it creates a scalable advantage for mass publics over individuals and small groups because they cannot specialize in an analogous way. Individuals must decide using only the scarce attention and limited ability they individually possess. Small groups can, of course, specialize—there are, after all, Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Education, and so on—but this specialization is severely limited by numbers and the broad diversity of issues. No matter how informed or sophisticated an individual or small group is, they will be importantly blinkered by their inherent cognitive limits. They can only admit a finite number of issues as important enough to command their direct attention. As a result, they will neglect many other important issues. A democratic public specialized by issue faces no such limits. Mass publics can be endlessly subdivided such that every issue has its specialists. Within this group of relative specialists, moreover, there is a further division of labor along the axis of functional complementarity, between ordinary citizens, activists, experts, and so forth. Democracy thereby reaps epistemic gains from specialization at a scale no individual or small group can match.

One might ask what is specifically democratic about this mechanism since it might seem to be primarily about expertise and interest groups. The answer is that ordinary citizens—not just elites—are cultivating issue expertise and that it is the openness of democratic processes of aggregation and deliberation that mobilizes this distributed expertise, whereas nondemocratic or epistocratic institutions more closed to popular input cannot.

#### The terminal impact is objectivity---the value of critical social inquiry doesn’t come from flashy labels or superficial inclusion, but from the hard work of providing correct explanations of the world---reclaiming critical objectivity is crucial to undermine elite-driven ossification of social relations

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The ‘common-sense’ view pervading recent discussions of epistemology, ontology and methodology in IR asserts that objectivity implies value-free neutrality. However, objective social inquiry has an inherent tendency to be critical, in various senses. To the extent that objective knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than other ideas, such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly) of those ideas. 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only) manifest its ‘criticalness’ through self-claimed labels of being critical or siding with the oppressed, but through the substantive critique of prevailing ideas. Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of criticism: explanatory critique. The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the world, and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology. This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies, thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and particular ideological conceptions.

In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests, the reproduction of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful, whereas transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak. Because ideas inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social practice), or in informing social action aimed at transforming social relations. This is why ideas cannot be ‘neutral’. Ideas which provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society, the causes of unequal social conditions, and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful, will tend to help secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations produce concrete conditions of inequality and exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. In this sense, ideas which are false are ideological and, in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and avoid attempts at radical change, are in the interests of the powerful. An account which is objective will contradict ideological ideas, implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. The criticism here arises not, or not only, from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful, nor from a prior normative stance of solidarity with the oppressed, but from exposing the flaws in dominant ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of social conditions 31.

A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to truth and objectivity, because true ideas are in the interest of the oppressed, false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors. In other words, the best way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare one’s commitment to objective inquiry 32 . As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it:

It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the dominant groups, who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society works, or from the standpoint of ordinary people, who have nothing to lose from truthful analyses of their predicament.

The philosophical realist theory of science, objectivity and explanatory critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between knowledge and power. Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory social change, we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of which provides a better account of objective social reality. This will inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which, by virtue of their flawed account of the social world, serve the interests of the powerful.

Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui, James Gathii, Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Jacques Depelchin, Hilbourne Watson, Robert Vitalis, Sankaran Krishna, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . Their work provides critiques of central categories, theories and discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history, including assumptions about sovereignty, international society, international law, global governance, the nature of the state. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples, and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local social conditions. Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa, the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World, both past and present – during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. Their work reveals how racism, violence, exploitation and dispossession, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and contemporary doctrines of international law, sovereignty and rights, and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations and international history.

Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object, not its subject. As Collier argues, “The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one, not a social one.” (Collier 1979: 60). So, for example, in the work of Grovogui, Gathii and Depelchin, the general perspective and knowledge of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins of the authors. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African, but on the greater adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. The criteria for choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about), not from the relation between the ideas and their subjects (who produced them). It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about the world lies in what they say about the world, not whose ideas they are.

A fundamental problem which underlies the origin and reproduction of IR’s eurocentricity is the overwhelming dominance of ideas produced in and by the west, and the wilful and determined silencing of the voices and histories of the colonised. But the result of this fundamental problem is flawed knowledge about the world. Eurocentricity is therefore a dual problem concerning both the authors and the content of knowledge, and cannot be resolved through normative commitments alone. It is not only the voices of the colonised, but the histories of colonialism, which have been glaring in their absence from the discipline of International Relations.

Overcoming eurocentricity therefore requires not only concerted effort from the centre to create space and listen to hitherto marginalised voices, but also commitment to correcting the flaws in prevailing knowledge – and it is not only ‘the Other’ who can and should elaborate this critique. A vitally important implication of objectivity is that it is the responsibility of European and American, just as much as non-American or non-European scholars, to decolonise IR. The importance of objectivity in social inquiry defended here can perhaps be seen as a form of epistemological internationalism. It is not necessary to be African to attempt to tell a more accurate account of the history of Europe’s role in the making of the contemporary Africa and the rest of the world, for example, or to write counter-histories of ‘the expansion of international society’ which detail the systematic barbarity of so-called Western civilisation. It is not necessary to have been colonised to recognise and document the violence, racism, genocide and dispossession which have characterised European expansion over five hundred years.

#### It turns case---the state intentionally creates seemingly radical, but politically bankrup leftist positions to discredit and undermine their positions---being able to effectively analyse policies is key to prevent it

Emily Schepers 17, Veteran civil and immigrant rights activist, doctorate in cultural anthropology from Northwestern University, September 18, 2017. “Agents provocateurs and the manipulation of the radical left.” <https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/agents-provocateurs-and-the-manipulation-of-the-radical-left/>

History teaches us is that the ruling class, the state and non-state institutions it controls, as well as the right have learned the political judo whereby the left’s actions may be turned around and used to strengthen the right and weaken the left. Specifically, we should learn from the history of the agent provocateur, a specialist in manipulating conflict so as to benefit our enemies. Agents provocateurs are not merely enemy spies within the people’s movement. The provocateur has an even more sinister mission, which sometimes has deadly results. What the provocateur frequently provokes is actions that either discredit the left or the people’s movement in the eyes of large numbers of people, or which entrap the unwary into acts that will allow police to pounce, accuse activists of plotting violent or other anti-social acts, and then lock them up. Agents provocateurs have been known for well over a century, in many countries; the breed was especially rife in tsarist Russia in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In the United States, agents provocateurs often targeted labor union organizing efforts. Since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, there are many accounts of the FBI, other police bodies, the military, and private right-wing vigilante groups sending agents provocateurs into people’s organizations with the purpose of dividing, disrupting, and discrediting them and then laying them open to arrest and prosecution, or worse.

More radical than thou

In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a great outpouring of grassroots rejection of the policies, domestic and international, of the Cold War. The Civil Rights Movement, plus the movement against the Vietnam War, brought millions into the streets protesting courageously against the many injustices of our society. The Cold Warriors and the ruling class did not like this, as they saw their interests threatened. So they developed open and covert strategies for undermining the new radicalism as well as the “old left” (communists and socialists). The idea was to make sure that the left did not continue to win over the support of the mass of the people of the United States to progressive and ultimately, revolutionary, socialist ideas. The “new left” tendencies that arose at this time included many positive features but had some dangerous flaws also. One flaw was that too often, a fetish was made of the absolute right of anybody involved in an organization to express his or her opinion no matter how divergent from the main goals of the organization, or to engage in any activity which was “radical” regardless of whether it helped or harmed the cause. This extreme liberalism laid many organizations open to manipulation of some of their weakest elements by agents provocateurs. There was also a tendency to compete to see who was most radical. The competition for revolutionary “cred” was a godsend for agents provocateurs, who actively encouraged such competition. The lack of connections, especially among campus-based white radicals, to the working class and its politics exacerbated this trend by eliminating an important reality check.

Picking off leaders and undermining public support

There also tended to be a cult of leadership within many radical organizations which put their leaders into a vulnerable position in which they could be targeted for neutralization so as to undermine the whole movement. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, for instance, put a huge amount of effort into neutralizing leaders. The agents provocateurs were deployed in such a way as to discredit the leaders and their organizations, to create splits in the movement, and in some cases to provoke violence which would lead to physical elimination of leaders plus a societal repudiation of the movement. The 1960s campus-based movement against the Vietnam War was a top target for agents provocateurs. There were several at work, but one, known as “[Tommy the Traveler](https://jeffsharletandvietnamgi.blogspot.com/2011/04/tommy-traveler.html)” was particularly memorable. He, too, concentrated on enticing impressionable young would-be “revolutionaries” to commit acts that would divide the movement while landing them in jail. Hoover, a crusading anti-communist and paranoid racist, paid particular attention to disrupting the [highly-effective](http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/want-to-punch-a-nazi-think-twice/) African American people’s movement, often employing agents provocateurs to create friction within and between liberation organizations. This led to several murders. In 1967, for example, agents provocateurs, especially a certain [William O’Neal](https://www.thenation.com/article/was-fred-hampton-executed/), described in a Nation article as “infatuated with weapons,” played a role in the police murder of Illinois Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. Hampton had been suspicious of O’Neal because of his violent talk, but others did not see through him, with tragic results. O’Neal’s promotion of crackpot violent schemes should have been a giveaway. When O’Neal set up Hampton and Clark for a brutal murder by police acting under the orders of Cook County State’s Attorney Ed Hanrahan, the perpetrators were able to convince sectors of the public that the Panthers were prone to violence and shot first, which was untrue. Another example was the crime of Cerro Maravilla, in Puerto Rico, on July 25, 1978. An agent provocateur, [Alejandro González Malavé](https://nacla.org/article/cerro-maravilla-deaths-police-cover-rock-puerto-rico), working undercover for the Puerto Rican police, enticed two idealistic young supporters of independence for Puerto Rico into a reckless act that cost them their lives. One was Carlos Enrique Soto Areví, the son of one of Puerto Rico’s most important literary figures, the novelist Pedro Juan Soto. The second was a self-taught worker, Arnaldo Dario Rosado. Both were on fire with indignation at the colonialist treatment that Puerto Rico received at the hands of the United States (treatment which continues today). They wanted to demonstrate this indignation in some dramatic way. Their lack of practical political experience made them easy prey for González Malavé. He persuaded them that a noble act for their homeland would be to destroy some communications towers on the top of a hill called “Cerro Maravilla.” This was supposed to express solidarity with some imprisoned Puerto Rican independence fighters. The three kidnapped a taxi driver and forced him to drive them up to Cerro Maravilla. But when they arrived, they found they had been led into a police ambush. As the armed police approached, González Malavé identified himself as an agent, but Soto and Rosado were killed, and the “official” story was put out that they had been shot in a firefight with the cops. The right-wing, pro-statehood governor at the time, Carlos Romero Barceló, hailed the police as heroes, and the FBI helpfully pitched in to support the Puerto Rican Justice Department with the cover-up. However, the police had left a “loose end,” namely the taxi driver, who spoke to the press and revealed that in fact González Malavé was a police agent and that the two young men were still alive when he left the place. The police had entrapped the two men, then murdered them after they surrendered. This became a big scandal, and eventually led to prosecutions and the defeat of Romero Barceló’s party in the next elections. But the use of agents provocateurs to divide and isolate the Puerto Rican left has been unrelenting, both before and after that incident.

Disrupting today’s movements

Such agent provocateur tactics surfaced again during the protests against the Iraq War, and in the “Occupy” movement. In each case, glib charismatic strangers wormed their way into protest organizations, and then entrapped inexperienced young radicals to get involved in plans, which were sometimes really just talk, to engage in violence. A typical case is that of the “[Cleveland bomb plot](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/02/nation/la-na-nn-fbi-stings-20120502)” of 2012. Another is the San Francisco [Mission District riot](https://missionlocal.org/2012/05/occupysf-reacts-to-monday-nights-destruction-of-valencia/) of May 2012, when a mysterious black-clad contingent hijacked part of a peaceful “Occupy” demonstration and turned it toward random violence. In both cases, the purpose of the provocateurs was to discredit the movement in the eyes of the public, which otherwise might have been receptive to Occupy’s “99 percent versus one percent” message. This kind of manipulation still continues by all accounts. As before, the purpose is to discredit the movement, divide it, deprive it of allies, and set up leaders and organizations for repressive action while making sure that this repression will not produce a wave of public indignation, as happened with the Cerro Maravilla case. The right and the ruling class always try to portray these people’s movements as violent, because this is the alchemy best suited to turn public opinion against them. This is the main lesson to be learned from the agent provocateur experiences of the past. In the conditions of our country today, injecting violent tactics into the mass movement of protest undermines that movement and plays the enemy’s game. Loose talk about violence can be just as dangerous. This danger is multiplied by the development of online communications and social media—there are no secrets now. Hijacking other people’s protest actions to “move them to a higher level,” meaning toward violent confrontations, is really a dirty kind of pseudo-left politics. What is needed now is to build the movement into a great wave of rejection against the reactionary policies of the ruling class, the right, and the Trump administration and its allies. Let us work on that basis and avoid tactics that undermine it.

#### Even though issue specialization means that not every issue will be discussed directly every year, the skills and habits inculcated by our model are broadly transferable to issues of structural exclusion

Kevin J. Elliott 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Murray State University, 11/14/19, “Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance,” American Journal of Political Science, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12486>

Perhaps the biggest problem with this hopeful vision of specialization's epistemic power is that not every issue will receive the attention of an issue public (Somin 2013, 106). This is because issue publics are an emergent phenomenon in the mass public and are thus constituted through self‐selection. This could bias their composition due to inequalities in civic skills and motivation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Self‐selection is exacerbated by the inclusion of associations and civil society groups within the issue public matrix, since such groups have a well‐known socioeconomic bias (Schattschneider 1960). Moreover, issue publics are endogenous to issue salience, or the public attention paid to an issue, since media coverage often plays a decisive role in directing public attention to certain issues. Media coverage can also be biased toward conflictual stories and insubstantial soft news (Shapiro 1998). This means not only that abstruse or technical issues may receive less attention in favor of the trivial yet telegenic, but also that those issues affecting marginalized groups might attract smaller issue publics than their objective importance11 demands. These biases create a serious problem for an epistemic account of issue specialization since it suggests there are pathologies of attention that can prevent issue publics from bringing their powers to bear on important issues.

These biases necessitate focused, institutional efforts to cultivate an interest in politics among disadvantaged citizens so they can help constitute new or less biased issue publics. For instance, Lisa García Bedolla and Melissa Michelson (2012) argue that campaigns’ efforts to bolster turnout among marginalized groups cause these groups to become durably politicized beyond a specific election, suggesting lasting prodemocratic changes in their cognitive and motivational orientation to politics. Such efforts should be systematically encouraged.

A more ambitious approach can be found in the online deliberative forums piloted by Neblo, Esterling, and Lazer (2018) involving elected representatives and randomly invited constituents. Three features of these forums make them well suited to addressing bias in issue publics. First, they reverse the usual direction of participatory bias, disproportionately engaging poorer and politically disconnected citizens (Neblo, Esterling, and Lazer 2018, 65). Second, by focusing on single issues, they concentrate citizen attention on issues that may not receive media coverage and offer disengaged citizens a manageable—because issue limited—entry point into politics. Lastly, unlike most blue‐sky reforms cooked up by political scientists, these forums incentivize their own adoption because representatives who participate enjoy a several‐point electoral advantage from satisfied constituents (Neblo, Esterling, and Lazer 2018, 109). Due to their electoral incentives, representatives want to participate and so need not be motivated by any special prodemocratic reform attitudes. Thus, there are ways to build complementary institutions to stem the biases inherent in issue publics.

Two considerations further lessen concerns about bias. First, issue specialization highlights the importance of the less organized part of issue publics—reversing the pluralist's error of emphasizing organized groups in the mistaken belief they are approximately representative—by emphasizing electoral incentives and information shortcuts, which operate in the mass public. Second, issue publics largely reflect inequalities in the political system rather than originate them. To the extent biases in issue salience and attention are corrected, biases in issue publics will also subside. This is important because it illustrates the neutrality of specialization; whatever issues attract public attention gain epistemically via this mechanism. In conditions of participatory inequality, this may lead to important pathologies. Yet examples like the civil rights movement and Black Lives Matter suggest that injustice can often attract as much attention as the latest shiny bit of political ephemera.

### ethos of humility (andreotti)

#### Debate’s not about finding the perfect solution, it’s about learning from the failures of our imperfect ones—the belief that any one debate can translate to material outcomes is naïve at best and complicit in the systems they critique at worst—topical advocacy encourages an ethos of humility and interconnectedness which can engender ontological shifts in society and confront the crises of modernity—but that requires a willingness to be wrong

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Andreotti: When I talk about humility, it is about sitting at the edge, understanding the limits of knowing, not only of our own knowledge, the limits of knowing itself, the limits of making sense of the world — understanding that it’s possible to reason with other senses. Although we see ourselves as individuated or as individuals, we are interwoven with everything else. If we are going to engage with the world in change-making, it would be important to both understand the contradictions and paradoxes of our own ways of knowing, but also to sit at the edge of the way of being that engendered this way of knowing so that we can engage with the world without trying to project our delusions onto the world itself, without trying to over-determine both the direction and how the relationship should happen. So, starting from a place of not knowing and engaging with the world as if we are not individuals, as we inhibit each other in multiple temporalities, and taking responsibility for this form of engagement, I think, for me, is what humility entails.

If we are able to be humble and accept that we exist as a part of a much larger society and ecosystem, how do we then go about creating systems change?

Andreotti: A system rises, peaks, and starts its decline. And, generally, when a system is in decline, a lot of people want to walk out from that system. This is the work of Debra Friesen. But one important thing to remember when we are walking out is that we can’t create a different system from the hot ashes of the system that hasn’t yet cooled down. In many alternative movements, people want results straight away. They want to substitute the system that they had before for something that they already know that they can control. This is just again a replacement of the securities that were promised by the system, the other system, and now these promises are perceived as broken. But what if we understand the promises of the systems as unrealistic from the outset and start to look for other securities? In that sense, what we need is not to replace it straight away, because we can’t, basically. We will end up reproducing the old system whether we like it or not. But what if what we need to do is experimentation? If we want to experiment, we need to start from a place of not knowing, because otherwise it’s not an experiment, it’s you trying to engineer something. But if it is an experiment, you are kind of doing it, you are designing something that you know is going to fail, and the learning from this failure is the most important thing.

How do you go about making sure that you fail in the right way?

Andreotti: The same way that a new system cannot be built on the hot ashes of the old, the role of improvisation here is that the difficulties that we face — this sitting at the limits of what is perceived as possible of what we know, the learning that can take place in that space, through failure — becomes a fertilizer for something else that happens when these ashes cool down, the ashes of the old system. What I think is important here is not to see failure as failure. Failure is also success. It’s success in terms of the learning that it generates — for the possibility that it opens, in terms of the new world that it can create. As a researcher, for example, in an experiment, if I keep doing the same experiment, with the same results, it becomes not only a waste of energy, but, because I’m not deriving any learning out of it, also boring! There is a sense of it in this experimentation and improvisation, that in order for it to be fulfilling, and rewarding, and exciting, and fun even, it needs to be learning. And it needs to be learning from failure. And it needs to make mistakes too! It’s part of the process.

### confirmation bias (manin)

#### Debate is distinct from discussion due to its adversarial nature—we control uniqueness and the internal link is linear, multiple factors predispose us to avoiding clash, so you should seek to guarantee it as much as possible—the mere presence of limits or concessionary ground lapse into confirmation bias at best and mutual ignorance at worst. Centering debate on the instrumental consequences of the 1AC’s proposal solves.

Manin, 17—Professor of Politics, NYU (Bernard, “Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle,” Daedalus, Volume 146, Issue 3, Summer 2017, p.39-50, dml)

The idea of organizing collective deliberation as an adversarial debate, a debate for and against a position, is not new. It has its origins, or at least one of its early illustrations, in classical antiquity. Recent conceptions of deliberative democracy and the practices they have inspired (such as Deliberative Polls, citizens' juries, and consensus conferences) have led us to forget an older idea of political deliberation, formulated by Greek and Roman historians and theorists of rhetoric, from Herodotus to Quintilian via Thucydides, Aristotle, and Cicero. Today's conceptions of deliberative democracy put the emphasis on discussion, making it essential that the members of the deliberating group discuss among themselves, engage in dialogue, and exchange arguments with one another. The opposition of points of view, if mentioned, occupies a secondary place. It is viewed either as a precondition to deliberation proper or simply as a natural consequence of pluralistic societies in which the expression of opinions is free. Yet in the ancient idea of deliberation, the opposition of points of view occupied a central place. To simplify, in the ancient conception, orators advocating opposed policies each presented arguments in favor of their position and against their opponent's. These arguments were presented before an assembly that subsequently decided on the policy. It seems reasonable to assume that members of the assembly also discussed the arguments among themselves. But the opposition of points of view – not mutual discussion – constituted the motor and chief element of deliberation.

It is in this way, for example, that Thucydides presents the major scenes of deliberation in The Peloponnesian War: the debate at Sparta about the decision to enter the war, the Athenian debate over the punishment to inflict on the inhabitants of Mytilene between Cleon and Diodotus, and the debate in the Athenian assembly over the Sicilian expedition where Nicias and Alcibiades confronted one another.1 In these scenes, the orators who advance opposing points of view do not discuss among themselves and do not seek to persuade their opposition. Rather, they seek to convince the assembly to whom they address their speeches. Thucydides presents these scenes as deliberations of the assembly. At various points in his account of the debate over Mytilene, he refers to it as “deliberation.”2 In such deliberation, the driving element is the hearing of opposed persuasive speeches. Similarly, on several occasions in Politics, Aristotle indicates that the task of the assembly is to deliberate on common affairs.3 In Rhetoric, we find a more precise description of the assembly's deliberative activity: orators arguing for and against the decisions being contemplated.4 Here, as well, the orators speak, offering opposed opinions and arguments, but the citizens deliberate. In a scene of deliberation among the Persians recounted in The Histories, Herodotus reflects on the benefits expected from the method of opposed speeches. “If opinions contrary to one another have not been expressed,” he has Artabanus explain, “it is not possible to choose the one which it is best to adopt.”5 Note that this argument is purely epistemic: to hear contrary opinions is necessary for discovering the right answer. No consideration of fairness enters. The importance of the adversarial principle in the ancients appears not only in theoretical writings; we also find its reflection in institutional practices. To wit, after the oligarchical revolutions and the restoration of democracy at the start of the fourth century bce, the Athenians adopted two institutions that mandated a for-and-against debate: the graphè paranomon and the nomothetai.6 The graphè paranomon authorized a decision already voted on by the assembly to be brought before the courts (in which the judges were ordinary citizens selected by lot) on the grounds that the decision was contrary to the law or simply harmful to the Athenian people. The plaintiff and the citizen who had proposed the contested decree would then plead their cases before the courts. The decree was annulled if the verdict went in favor of the accusation. Any of the assembly's decisions could thereby be submitted to a sort of second reading before the courts. However, this second reading, which possessed greater authority than the first, needed to include an adversarial debate, while the first examination by the assembly might have proceeded without oppositions. The institution of the nomothetai illustrates even more clearly the benefits expected from the use of the adversarial method in the political realm. Here, the action did not unfold before the courts, and there was neither plaintiff nor defendant. The adversarial form, nevertheless, was maintained. Whenever it seemed desirable to abrogate and replace certain laws, proposals for new laws were put forth and announced in public venues in advance. These proposals were then defended before the nomothetai by their initiators. At the same time, five citizens were elected for the purpose of defending the existing laws whose abrogation had been proposed. The institutions of the nomothetai and the graphè paranomon were adopted as means for protecting the newly restored democracy from the impassioned and hasty decisions from which the city had suffered, especially during the Peloponnesian War. To protect against this outcome, Athenian democrats turned to institutions that conferred the most authoritative decisions on groups of citizens who would necessarily have heard the arguments for and against the measures under consideration. Just because the ancients conceived of political deliberation as a confrontation between opposing views is not, in itself, a reason for adopting their models. All that history can do is open us to perspectives we perhaps would not have otherwise thought of. We must now ask ourselves why it might be desirable to organize political deliberation according to the principle of hearing both sides. I see four principal reasons for doing so: 1) Improving the quality of collective decisions 2) Counteracting the fragmentation of the public sphere 3) Facilitating the comprehension of choices 4) Treating the minority with respect.

Let us begin with improving the quality of collective decisions. A long tradition of thought, including, in particular, the reflections of John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, has highlighted what we can call the epistemic virtues of criticism. Several arguments have shown that to submit an idea to criticism constitutes one of the best means of testing its validity. This holds for practical ideas. A decision is more likely to be of a high quality – whether in factual and technical terms, or in terms of values – if the proposals for action have been submitted to criticism beforehand. Criticism permits the elimination, or at least the reduction, of proposals involving false factual beliefs, logical errors, or objectionable moral choices. We do not need to repeat here the arguments establishing the epistemic merits of criticism. No one today would deny that criticism is one of the best means at our disposal to test the quality, technical and moral, of practical proposals.

Nevertheless, the conclusion that we generally draw from these arguments is that it is enough simply to establish the freedom to express criticism to produce its benefits. This is without doubt how Mill reasoned. We find an even more striking expression of this position in the famous free-speech dissent of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Men, he wrote, will eventually realize “that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”7 Yet the conclusion that the free exchange of ideas is a sufficient guarantee is not justified. Freedom of speech on its own does not ensure that the right to criticize will be exercised. Furthermore, as we shall see, the fact that criticisms are put forward does not guarantee that they will receive proper consideration.

Several mechanisms can prevent the ability to criticize freely from leading to its exercise. I group these together here under the label of conformism. Social psychology has long told us (with elaboration in Rousseau) that people want to be liked. Being esteemed and approved of by others also provides a gratifying image of one's self. It follows that when people perceive that, in a given social environment, others' opinions lean in a certain direction, they tend to bend their own expressions in the same direction to gain the approval of their peers. They avoid expressing dissenting or critical views, reinforcing the mechanism of the “spiral of silence.”8 Even in the context of discussion, we observe the disposition to conform to what is perceived as the norm within the group. This phenomenon is at the heart of what has been named, since the works of psychologist Serge Moscovici, the polarizing effect of group discussions.9 Thus, even if criticism is formally free, a powerful social force works to marginalize, or even to stifle, its expression.

Contrary to what liberal theorists often affirm, social or cultural diversity within a group does not suffice to assure a confrontation of opinions critically opposed to one another. Suppose, for example, a deliberating body whose members, while being diverse with regard to social position, education, and beliefs, also share a fear of some danger. Let us imagine, furthermore, that this assembly discusses a measure that would contribute to the reduction of this danger; for example, strengthening the powers of the police. In this context, it is unlikely that collective deliberation will bring forth many arguments against the adoption of this measure, however much social or cultural diversity there may be in the group. Rather, the discussion will produce an accumulation of reasons in favor of increased police power, with various members finding, from within their own particular perspectives, diverse reasons for adopting this course of action that others, differently situated, may not have seen on their own. Yet even if increasing the prerogatives of the police did, in fact, contribute to the realization of the desired end, the measure might also present undesirable effects or features in other ways. Collective deliberation should precisely bring to light these potential negative effects and weigh them in the balance against the benefits of the measure. But in our case, the assembly will systematically underestimate these possible negative features even though members of the assembly have the liberty to oppose the measure and criticize one another.

It appears, then, that if one wants to obtain from political deliberation the favorable epistemic effects of criticism, the expression of opposing opinions must be encouraged, not merely permitted.

But there is another reason to ensure that the participants in a deliberation are actually confronted with opposing points of view; it concerns the reception of arguments, rather than their production. Studies in social and cognitive psychology show that, confronted with new information or evidence, people have a systematic propensity to see in it a confirmation of their previous beliefs. In a now-classic experiment, psychologists presented the same ensemble of documents and studies concerning the death penalty and its effects to two groups of subjects selected on the basis of their antecedent opinions: one group composed of subjects favorable to the death penalty, the other subjects who are rather hostile to it. After being confronted with these documents, the group that was favorable to the death penalty became more favorable to it, and the group hostile to it became still more hostile.10 This phenomenon is particularly marked when the documents presented to the subjects were ambiguous and called for interpretation. The propensity to find support for one's antecedent beliefs is known as “confirmation bias.”11 Research has also shown that group discussion reinforces the effects of confirmation bias. Groups interpret information with more bias than do individuals; and they privilege information that supports their antecedent beliefs to an even greater degree than do individuals.12 Two mechanisms explain this tendency. First, as noted earlier, group settings accentuate tendencies that predominate among individuals. If privileging information supportive of prior beliefs is already the dominant tendency among individuals, it is not surprising that this tendency should be amplified in group discussion. But a second, and more surprising, mechanism is also at work. It seems that groups tend to discuss principally the information that was already known to all the members before the beginning of the discussion. Within groups, it turns out, discussion turns essentially on shared knowledge. Members of the group are reluctant to discuss those bits of information that are known only to one or a few other members prior to the discussion.13 Shared information appears to have more weight in the eyes of the group members, and has a greater chance of being mentioned during the discussion, and thus remembered later.14 Finally, information supporting the position preferred by the greatest number of group members has a greater likelihood of becoming the object of discussion than information supporting the contrary position.15 Collective discussion thus tends to produce a disproportionate volume of information and arguments in favor of the already-dominant belief in the group.

If one wishes to check the effects of confirmation bias – a phenomenon to which groups are particularly vulnerable – one must take proactive measures. One can, for example, call special attention to arguments contrary to prior beliefs by highlighting them (literally) or by making them cognitively more salient. Not only is the free expression of a multiplicity of voices not sufficient to assure the confrontation of opposing views, but the mere expression of contrary arguments is not sufficient for others to understand those arguments or consider them objectively.

In the absence of measures that actively induce individuals to pay particular attention to evidence and points of view opposed to their own, collective deliberation will have the greatest likelihood of simply reinforcing antecedent opinions. In a political deliberation, in short, we cannot expect that the gathering of diverse points of view will spontaneously produce a clash of arguments pro and contra, nor that it will bring about a balanced consideration of views. Mill was wrong to assume that, in a society or an assembly composed of diverse members, opposing opinions would already be there, waiting to be set against one another once they were allowed to be uttered. Mill wrote: “The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a ‘devil's advocate.'”16 He failed to see that the presence of a devil's advocate was required, not merely admitted. And through the requirement, the Church secured that objections to the canonization of a given person were aired and considered, even if no individual would otherwise have spontaneously offered them.17

The confrontation of opposing opinions also has merit beyond eliciting unshared perspectives. It unifies the field in which opinions are formed and expressed, counteracting the fragmentation of the public sphere. In order to be opposed to an opinion and to contest it, it is necessary that one be cognizant of that opinion and take it into consideration. In a society in which points of view are objectively diverse, the open and explicit clash of opposing ideas is neither the natural state nor the sole possible condition. Another configuration is just as likely: mutual ignorance. The German sociologist Georg Simmel therefore argued that conflict between social groups paradoxically served the cause of social integration: first, by placing the conflicting groups into a relationship with one another and, second, by exerting a pressure for unity among the secondary divisions within each group. We can advance a similar argument in matters of opinion. The clash of opinions unifies the field in which beliefs confront one another, creating a space in which those beliefs are addressed to and respond to one another. This task of mutual addressing is harder when the space of opinions is fragmented into a multitude of islets, homogenous within themselves but formed in conditions of little communication with outsiders.

Several factors – some older, some of more recent origin – now trend in the direction of this sort of fragmentation. First, we have long known that people are selective in their choice of contacts and social relations. They tend disproportionately to be in contact with people who share their political opinions.18 Psychologically, many fear the face-to-face expression of political disagreement and want to avoid it as much as possible.

More recent factors also work in the direction of fragmentation: the development of cable television and its thematic stations, the spread of the Internet, and finally the movement toward residential and territorial segregation. Although the effects of these transformations are still difficult to estimate, they all present an analogous structure: people are now offered, in multiple ways, greater opportunities for communicating and coming into contact only with other individuals like themselves.

Cable television and the rise of opinion-based television stations (a phenomenon currently more pronounced in the United States than in Europe) provide viewers with the possibility of receiving a high proportion of their information only from a channel to which they feel ideologically close. Worse still, cable TV allows individuals with little interest in politics to avoid political news altogether and watch only entertainment programs.19 For its part, the Internet has dramatically increased the number and types of people with whom one can enter into contact. But studies on the usage of the Web suggest that contacts and links are established primarily through personal affinities, and in particular through ideological affinities within the political domain. Progressive blogs and forums link to other progressive sites but not to conservative sites, and vice versa. From these islets and networks of like-minded individuals we can expect the increased effects of reinforcement and polarization, because, in general, interacting with people of similar beliefs pushes one more toward the extreme positions of the views common to the group.20 Finally, the movement toward residential segregation, which has already progressed in the United States and is at work today in Europe, further contributes to the fragmentation of the public space of communication. If it is true that opinions are strongly correlated with sociocultural and ethnic factors, then in a neighborhood whose inhabitants share the same sociocultural or ethnic profile, each person is likely, for the most part, to encounter neighbors who share the same opinions. A selective exposure to similar opinions emerges de facto.

Faced with these forces of fragmentation, only intentional collective action can be expected to produce a degree of unification of the public political sphere. This second justification for the deliberate encouragement of adversarial political debates is particularly salient today.

True, adversarial debate is by nature reductive. Faced with some political problem, the polity usually has a multitude of possible courses of action, not all of which will be mutually exclusive. Yet the reductive character of the adversarial method is also one of its merits. It simplifies complexity, making the choices easier to grasp. There is no doubt, for example, that the current economic situation in Europe and the United States calls for a range of measures that are more or less intermingled and complementary to one another. To obtain a synoptic view of these measures and their relations and to choose among them would require considerable cognitive effort. There are cognitive advantages to presenting the policy response as a choice between reducing public deficits now and maintaining or increasing these deficits in the short term to prevent further decline until the economy has regained its normal growth rate. As democrats, we cannot discount the value of such cognitive simplicity. Groups of experts may be able to deliberate without using the adversarial method. But if we want ordinary (or even well-informed) citizens to participate ably in collective deliberation, the simplification achieved by the adversary system is an almost indispensable instrument.

The fourth principle in support of the adversarial method is the value of treating the minority with respect. No matter how conscientiously citizens deliberate, it is likely that disagreement will remain at the end of the process. Decisions will therefore be taken by the majority. The majority of people will get to live with the decision they desired; a minority of people will have to live under a decision they did not support. To be sure, the decision itself formed the minority: it did not exist per se before the vote. But the manner of conducting the deliberation before the vote entails consequences for the treatment of those who, after the vote, will make up the minority.

If the deliberation has been conducted as a debate between opposed positions, with each camp presenting its reasons in favor of its position and criticizing those advanced by the opposition, two consequences follow. After a vote has been taken, the minority must obey the decision, but at least the reasons aiming to justify this decision will have been formulated and made public. The minority might still refuse to listen to these reasons seriously and in good faith, but it was given the chance to consider them. The minority members were therefore treated with the respect owed to autonomous beings. Once children have reached the age of autonomy, parents must justify the orders they give them. When they are not yet autonomous, children must obey orders simply because they are orders. So, too, if the minority members have not had the possibility of hearing the reasons for the decision they must obey against their wishes, they are placed in a situation of having to obey the order simply because it is an order, or simply because it obtained the most votes. I do not mean to imply that the members of the minority will consequently be more disposed to obey the decision. Sometimes justifications exacerbate the opposition. But justifying orders shows greater respect for the autonomy of those receiving them.

On the flip side, the reasons for not taking the decision that ultimately triumphed would also have been put forward. These criticisms and objections did not prevail, but they were at least articulated and made public. From the majority's perspective, because it won, it will naturally think that it was right; but in the process, it had to listen to the opposition explaining their justification. The members of the majority were at minimum forced to see that there were reasons supporting the other side. It seems reasonable to think that, as a result, the majority will be less inclined to consider the minority as unintelligent or ill-intentioned.

Before I proceed to the practical consequences that we can draw from my argument, I must first respond to an objection: that rendering obligatory the presentation of opposing points of view in the public sphere would require constraints on public discourse and encroachments on freedom of speech. In response to this objection I would first suggest turning to an institution that in the relatively recent past followed just this path: the fairness doctrine in effect in the United States from 1927 to 1987. The fairness doctrine, implemented by the Federal Communications Commission, made it obligatory for radio and television stations to give an evenly balanced presentation of “opposing viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.” The fairness doctrine not only imposed equality in airtime; it also required the presentation of viewpoints opposed to one another. The doctrine did not apply to airtime during electoral campaigns, which was regulated on other terms. It applied instead to any question that became the object of public controversy outside of electoral periods. The constitutionality of this doctrine was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous 1969 decision of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.21 The central argument that the Court invoked in support of the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was that, in regard to liberty of expression on the airwaves, it is “the right of the viewing and listening public, and not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” The Court thus held that listeners and viewers had the right to hear conflicting viewpoints in order to make up their mind on the issues: “Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”22 The fairness doctrine was abandoned for two reasons. First, the doctrine led radio and television stations to avoid controversial subjects for the sake of not exposing themselves to lawsuits claiming they had violated the law. Second, the question of what exactly constituted the opposition of one point of view against another became the subject of repeated litigation, and the fcc proved unable to reduce the insecurity and juridical uncertainty that arose on this front. Despite its eventual abandonment, however, the Red Lion decision shows that the obligation for the media to present conflicting viewpoints is compatible with a certain interpretation of freedom of speech in the public sphere, an interpretation that focuses on the rights of the receiving public. That the U.S. Supreme Court has since rejected this interpretation does not mean that the arguments advanced in Red Lion were objectively weak. They are, in any case, consistent with the claims of this essay. What, then, should we do in practice to foster the confrontation of opposing arguments in today's democracies? Without claiming to provide a complete and detailed response to this question, I will conclude by suggesting two concrete means for promoting the adversarial principle in politics. The first is a practice yet to be invented, which would be implemented outside of electoral periods. The second consists of reinforcing a practice already used in electoral campaigns. First, my suggestion for the future. Outside of electoral periods, civil-society actors (such as foundations or think tanks) could organize adversarial debates on subjects of public interest. These debates would not be regularly scheduled, but would be organized only when a question sparked significant interest from the public (as with such topics as nuclear energy, assisted suicide, or, in certain countries, the wearing of the hijab) or when a large number of citizens mobilized in favor of a cause. More generally, these public debates would not aim to replace any existing democratic practices (such as electoral campaigns or parliamentary debates), but would complement them.

Neither the exposition of conflicting viewpoints nor communication across ideological divides can be made mandatory. This does not mean that it is useless to try to facilitate them. Indeed, the probability of being confronted with opposing points of view matters: it tends to make one's thoughts more anticipatory, careful, and subtle.23 In contemporary circumstances, this probability tends to diminish. The active promotion of adversarial debates aims to counteract this pernicious tendency.

Given that the goal of these debates would be to further the formulation and diffusion of arguments for and against a given public decision, they should be guided by the following principle: speakers should defend or criticize a given policy or position only with reference to its own merits, and not in response to reasons external to the policy or position. The arguments advanced in these debates should concern the advantages or disadvantages – whether technical or moral – inherent in the decision. I call this the principle of relevant reasons. This principle has two implications: the first concerns simplifying the debate to one issue; the second concerns choosing the right participants.

In order to encourage citizens to take account of and weigh the reasons for and against a given decision, each question that can be defined objectively and independent from other questions should be debated separately. Multidimensionality and the bundling of different questions undermine the coherence of the arguments.

To be sure, at election time, the voter will vote for a candidate or party that has bundled questions without an objective connection between them. Such grouping may be desirable, because it permits negotiations between different strands of the party. Nevertheless, to understand the bundling and negotiation well enough to cast an informed vote, the voter needs to have thought through the different issues separately, aided by adversarial debate.

It is probably too difficult to completely exclude nonrelevant reasons – that is, reasons not substantively linked to the policy in question – at the moment of organizing a deliberative debate. But the principle remains valid: nonrelevant arguments should be sidelined as much as possible. As a consequence, each debate should focus on a specific theme, rather than on platforms comprising multiple dimensions.

The other implication of the principle of relevant reasons concerns the choice of participants. Speakers should be permitted to defend policies that promote their own interests, but only on the condition that their interests be both publicly declared and linked to the substance of the policy they recommend – not to external interests like advancing their careers or promoting objectives that have no connection with the policy under debate. Speakers should thus mainly be experts, representatives of associations, activists, and persons enjoying a recognized moral authority. Politicians might participate so long as that participation satisfies the principle of relevant reasons: namely, that they address themselves solely to the question under debate, to the exclusion of other themes in the platform of their party. Their professional and career prospects should play no role in these debates.

### intellectual humility (resnick)

#### Putting our positions up for debate and studying their flaws best breaks down our neural bias towards intellectual arrogance, and fosters a culture of better scholarship---our brains are terrible at knowing when we’re wrong and updating our beliefs. The impact is intellectual humility---rewards bluster instead of thoroughness that trends us and society towards extreme, unvetted positions where we criticize without accepting criticism

Resnick 19 [Brian Resnick is a science reporter at Vox.com, covering social and behavioral sciences, space, medicine, the environment, and anything that makes you think "whoa that's cool." Before Vox, he was a staff correspondent at National Journal where he wrote two cover stories for the (now defunct) weekly print magazine, and reported on breaking news and politics. Intellectual humility: the importance of knowing you might be wrong. January 4, 2019. https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology-replication]

I’ve come to appreciate what a crucial tool it is for learning, especially in an increasingly interconnected and complicated world. As technology makes it easier to lie and spread false information incredibly quickly, we need intellectually humble, curious people.

I’ve also realized how difficult it is to foster intellectual humility. In my reporting on this, I’ve learned there are three main challenges on the path to humility:

1. In order for us to acquire more intellectual humility, we all, even the smartest among us, need to better appreciate our cognitive blind spots. Our minds are more imperfect and imprecise than we’d often like to admit. Our ignorance can be invisible.

2. Even when we overcome that immense challenge and figure out our errors, we need to remember we won’t necessarily be punished for saying, “I was wrong.” And we need to be braver about saying it. We need a culture that celebrates those words.

3. We’ll never achieve perfect intellectual humility. So we need to choose our convictions thoughtfully.

This is all to say: Intellectual humility isn’t easy. But damn, it’s a virtue worth striving for, and failing for, in this new year.

Intellectual humility, explained

Intellectual humility is simply “the recognition that the things you believe in might in fact be wrong,” as Mark Leary, a social and personality psychologist at Duke University, tells me.

But don’t confuse it with overall humility or bashfulness. It’s not about being a pushover; it’s not about lacking confidence, or self-esteem. The intellectually humble don’t cave every time their thoughts are challenged.

Instead, it’s a method of thinking. It’s about entertaining the possibility that you may be wrong and being open to learning from the experience of others. Intellectual humility is about being actively curious about your blind spots. One illustration is in the ideal of the scientific method, where a scientist actively works against her own hypothesis, attempting to rule out any other alternative explanations for a phenomenon before settling on a conclusion. It’s about asking: What am I missing here?

It doesn’t require a high IQ or a particular skill set. It does, however, require making a habit of thinking about your limits, which can be painful. “It’s a process of monitoring your own confidence,” Leary says.

This idea is older than social psychology. Philosophers from the earliest days have grappled with the limits of human knowledge. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th-century French philosopher credited with inventing the essay, wrote that “the plague of man is boasting of his knowledge.”

Social psychologists have learned that humility is associated with other valuable character traits: People who score higher on intellectual humility questionnaires are more open to hearing opposing views. They more readily seek out information that conflicts with their worldview. They pay more attention to evidence and have a stronger self-awareness when they answer a question incorrectly.

When you ask the intellectually arrogant if they’ve heard of bogus historical events like “Hamrick’s Rebellion,” they’ll say, “Sure.” The intellectually humble are less likely to do so. Studies have found that cognitive reflection — i.e., analytic thinking — is correlated with being better able to discern fake news stories from real ones. These studies haven’t looked at intellectual humility per se, but it’s plausible there’s an overlap.

Most important of all, the intellectually humble are more likely to admit it when they are wrong. When we admit we’re wrong, we can grow closer to the truth.

One reason I’ve been thinking about the virtue of humility recently is because our president, Donald Trump, is one of the least humble people on the planet.

It was Trump who said on the night of his nomination, “I alone can fix it,” with the “it” being our entire political system. It was Trump who once said, “I have one of the great memories of all time.” More recently, Trump told the Associated Press, “I have a natural instinct for science,” in dodging a question on climate change.

A frustration I feel about Trump and the era of history he represents is that his pride and his success — he is among the most powerful people on earth — seem to be related. He exemplifies how our society rewards confidence and bluster, not truthfulness.

Yet we’ve also seen some very high-profile examples lately of how overconfident leadership can be ruinous for companies. Look at what happened to Theranos, a company that promised to change the way blood samples are drawn. It was all hype, all bluster, and it collapsed. Or consider Enron’s overconfident executives, who were often hailed for their intellectual brilliance — they ran the company into the ground with risky, suspect financial decisions.

The problem with arrogance is that the truth always catches up. Trump may be president and confident in his denials of climate change, but the changes to our environment will still ruin so many things in the future.

Why it’s so hard to see our blind spots: “Our ignorance is invisible to us”

As I’ve been reading the psychological research on intellectual humility and the character traits it correlates with, I can’t help but fume: Why can’t more people be like this?

We need more intellectual humility for two reasons. One is that our culture promotes and rewards overconfidence and arrogance (think Trump and Theranos, or the advice your career counselor gave you when going into job interviews). At the same time, when we are wrong — out of ignorance or error — and realize it, our culture doesn’t make it easy to admit it. Humbling moments too easily can turn into moments of humiliation.

So how can we promote intellectual humility for both of these conditions?

In asking that question of researchers and scholars, I’ve learned to appreciate how hard a challenge it is to foster intellectual humility.

First off, I think it’s helpful to remember how flawed the human brain can be and how prone we all are to intellectual blind spots. When you learn about how the brain actually works, how it actually perceives the world, it’s hard not to be a bit horrified, and a bit humbled.

We often can’t see — or even sense — what we don’t know. It helps to realize that it’s normal and human to be wrong.

It’s rare that a viral meme also provides a surprisingly deep lesson on the imperfect nature of the human mind. But believe it or not, the great “Yanny or Laurel” debate of 2018 fits the bill.

For the very few of you who didn’t catch it — I hope you’re recovering nicely from that coma — here’s what happened.

An audio clip (you can hear it below) says the name “Laurel” in a robotic voice. Or does it? Some people hear the clip and immediately hear “Yanny.” And both sets of people — Team Yanny and Team Laurel — are indeed hearing the same thing.

Hearing, the perception of sound, ought to be a simple thing for our brains to do. That so many people can listen to the same clip and hear such different things should give us humbling pause. Hearing “Yanny” or “Laurel” in any given moment ultimately depends on a whole host of factors: the quality of the speakers you’re using, whether you have hearing loss, your expectations.

Here’s the deep lesson to draw from all of this: Much as we might tell ourselves our experience of the world is the truth, our reality will always be an interpretation. Light enters our eyes, sound waves enter our ears, chemicals waft into our noses, and it’s up to our brains to make a guess about what it all is.

Perceptual tricks like this (“the dress” is another one) reveal that our perceptions are not the absolute truth, that the physical phenomena of the universe are indifferent to whether our feeble sensory organs can perceive them correctly. We’re just guessing. Yet these phenomena leave us indignant: How could it be that our perception of the world isn’t the only one?

That sense of indignation is called naive realism: the feeling that our perception of the world is the truth. “I think we sometimes confuse effortlessness with accuracy,” Chris Chabris, a psychological researcher who co-authored a book on the challenges of human perception, tells me. When something is so immediate and effortless to us — hearing the sound of “Yanny” — it just feels true. (Similarly, psychologists find when a lie is repeated, it’s more likely to be misremembered as being true, and for a similar reason: When you’re hearing something for the second or third time, your brain becomes faster to respond to it. And that fluency is confused with truth.)

Our interpretations of reality are often arbitrary, but we’re still stubborn about them. Nonetheless, the same observations can lead to wildly different conclusions.

(Here’s that same sentence in GIF form.)

For every sense and every component of human judgment, there are illusions and ambiguities we interpret arbitrarily.

Some are gravely serious. White people often perceive black men to be bigger, taller, and more muscular (and therefore more threatening) than they really are. That’s racial bias — but it’s also a socially constructed illusion. When we’re taught or learn to fear other people, our brains distort their potential threat. They seem more menacing, and we want to build walls around them. When we learn or are taught that other people are less than human, we’re less likely to look upon them kindly and more likely to be okay when violence is committed against them.

Not only are our interpretations of the world often arbitrary, but we’re often overconfident in them. “Our ignorance is invisible to us,” David Dunning, an expert on human blind spots, says.

You might recognize his name as half of the psychological phenomenon that bears his name: the Dunning-Kruger effect. That’s where people of low ability — let’s say, those who fail to understand logic puzzles — tend to unduly overestimate their abilities. Inexperience masquerades as expertise.

An irony of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that so many people misinterpret it, are overconfident in their understanding of it, and get it wrong.

When people talk or write about the Dunning-Kruger effect, it’s almost always in reference to other people. “The fact is this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later,” Dunning says. We’re all overconfident in our ignorance from time to time. (Perhaps related: Some 65 percent of Americans believe they’re more intelligent than average, which is wishful thinking.)

Similarly, we’re overconfident in our ability to remember. Human memory is extremely malleable, prone to small changes. When we remember, we don’t wind back our minds to a certain time and relive that exact moment, yet many of us think our memories work like a videotape.

Dunning hopes his work helps people understand that “not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition,” he says. “But the problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves. The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club.”

People are unlikely to judge you harshly for admitting you’re wrong

In 2012, psychologist Will Gervais scored an honor any PhD science student would covet: a co-authored paper in the journal Science, one of the top interdisciplinary scientific journals in the world. Publishing in Science doesn’t just help a researcher rise up in academic circles; it often gets them a lot of media attention too.

One of the experiments in the paper tried to see if getting people to think more rationally would make them less willing to report religious beliefs. They had people look at a picture of Rodin’s The Thinker or another statue. They thought The Thinker would nudge people to think harder, more analytically. In this more rational frame of mind, then, the participants would be less likely to endorse believing in something as faith-based and invisible as religion, and that’s what the study found. It was catnip for science journalists: one small trick to change the way we think.

But it was a tiny, small-sample study, the exact type that is prone to yielding false positives. Several years later, another lab attempted to replicate the findings with a much larger sample size, and failed to find any evidence for the effect.

And while Gervais knew that the original study wasn’t rigorous, he couldn’t help but feel a twinge of discomfort.

“Intellectually, I could say the original data weren’t strong,” he says. “That’s very different from the human, personal reaction to it. Which is like, ‘Oh, shit, there’s going to be a published failure to replicate my most cited finding that’s gotten the most media attention.’ You start worrying about stuff like, ‘Are there going to be career repercussions? Are people going to think less of my other work and stuff I’ve done?’”

Gervais’s story is familiar: Many of us fear we’ll be seen as less competent, less trustworthy, if we admit wrongness. Even when we can see our own errors — which, as outlined above, is not easy to do — we’re hesitant to admit it.

But turns out this assumption is false. As Adam Fetterman, a social psychologist at the University of Texas El Paso, has found in a few studies, wrongness admission isn’t usually judged harshly. “When we do see someone admit that they are wrong, the wrongness admitter is seen as more communal, more friendly,” he says. It’s almost never the case, in his studies, “that when you admit you’re wrong, people think you are less competent.”

Sure, there might be some people who will troll you for your mistakes. There might be a mob on Twitter that converges in order to shame you. Some moments of humility could be humiliating. But this fear must be vanquished if we are to become less intellectually arrogant and more intellectually humble.

Humility can’t just come from within — we need environments where it can thrive

But even if you’re motivated to be more intellectually humble, our culture doesn’t always reward it.

The field of psychology, overall, has been reckoning with a “replication crisis” where many classic findings in the science don’t hold up under rigorous scrutiny. Incredibly influential textbook findings in psychology — like the “ego depletion” theory of willpower or the “marshmallow test” — have been bending or breaking.

I’ve found it fascinating to watch the field of psychology deal with this. For some researchers, the reckoning has been personally unsettling. “I’m in a dark place,” Michael Inzlicht, a University of Toronto psychologist, wrote in a 2016 blog post after seeing the theory of ego depletion crumble before his eyes. “Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years?”

What I’ve learned from reporting on the “replication crisis” is that intellectual humility requires support from peers and institutions. And that environment is hard to build.

“What we teach undergrads is that scientists want to prove themselves wrong,” says Simine Vazire, a psychologist and journal editor who often writes and speaks about replication issues. “But, ‘How would I know if I was wrong?’ is actually a really, really hard question to answer. It involves things like having critics yell at you and telling you that you did things wrong and reanalyze your data.”

And that’s not fun. Again: Even among scientists — people who ought to question everything — intellectual humility is hard. In some cases, researchers have refused to concede their original conclusions despite the unveiling of new evidence. (One famous psychologist under fire recently told me angrily, “I will stand by that conclusion for the rest of my life, no matter what anyone says.”)

Psychologists are human. When they reach a conclusion, it becomes hard to see things another way. Plus, the incentives for a successful career in science push researchers to publish as many positive findings as possible.

There are two solutions — among many — to make psychological science more humble, and I think we can learn from them.

One is that humility needs to be built into the standard practices of the science. And that happens through transparency. It’s becoming more commonplace for scientists to preregister — i.e., commit to — a study design before even embarking on an experiment. That way, it’s harder for them to deviate from the plan and cherry-pick results. It also makes sure all data is open and accessible to anyone who wants to conduct a reanalysis.

That “sort of builds humility into the structure of the scientific enterprise,” Chabris says. “We’re not all-knowing and all-seeing and perfect at our jobs, so we put [the data] out there for other people to check out, to improve upon it, come up with new ideas from and so on.” To be more intellectually humble, we need to be more transparent about our knowledge. We need to show others what we know and what we don’t.

And two, there needs to be more celebration of failure, and a culture that accepts it. That includes building safe places for people to admit they were wrong, like the Loss of Confidence Project.

But it’s clear this cultural change won’t come easily.

“In the end,” Rohrer says, after getting a lot of positive feedback on the project, “we ended up with just a handful of statements.”

We need a balance between convictions and humility

There’s a personal cost to an intellectually humble outlook. For me, at least, it’s anxiety.

When I open myself up to the vastness of my own ignorance, I can’t help but feel a sudden suffocating feeling. I have just one small mind, a tiny, leaky boat upon which to go exploring knowledge in a vast and knotty sea of which I carry no clear map.

Why is it that some people never seem to wrestle with those waters? That they stand on the shore, squint their eyes, and transform that sea into a puddle in their minds and then get awarded for their false certainty? “I don’t know if I can tell you that humility will get you farther than arrogance,” says Tenelle Porter, a University of California Davis psychologist who has studied intellectual humility.

Of course, following humility to an extreme end isn’t enough. You don’t need to be humble about your belief that the world is round. I just think more humility, sprinkled here and there, would be quite nice.

“It’s bad to think of problems like this like a Rubik’s cube: a puzzle that has a neat and satisfying solution that you can put on your desk,” says Michael Lynch, a University of Connecticut philosophy professor. Instead, it’s a problem “you can make progress at a moment in time, and make things better. And that we can do — that we can definitely do.”

For a democracy to flourish, Lynch argues, we need a balance between convictions — our firmly held beliefs — and humility. We need convictions, because “an apathetic electorate is no electorate at all,” he says. And we need humility because we need to listen to one another. Those two things will always be in tension.

The Trump presidency suggests there’s too much conviction and not enough humility in our current culture.

“The personal question, the existential question that faces you and I and every thinking human being, is, ‘How do you maintain an open mind toward others and yet, at the same time, keep your strong moral convictions?’” Lynch says. “That’s an issue for all of us.”

To be intellectually humble doesn’t mean giving up on the ideas we love and believe in. It just means we need to be thoughtful in choosing our convictions, be open to adjusting them, seek out their flaws, and never stop being curious about why we believe what we believe. Again, that’s not easy.

#### It turns case---unlimited topics overstretch negative research burdens and undermines genuine understandings of the affirmatives position for both teams

Grossberg 15 **-** Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence, We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 **[insert footnote 9]** For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. **[Footnote 9 ends]** And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

### intellectual humility (2nc resnick)

#### 1---Probability of solvency---debate does not change the fundamental values of its participants, but it does trend them away from over-reliance on their initial, unvetted gut reactions in favor of deeper understandings of issues

Niemeyer 11 [Simon Niemeyer, Centre for Deliberative Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics. 2011. https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/files/2114/0533/6108/002.pdf]

The results of the two case studies in this article suggest that deliberation does not fundamentally change individuals or inculcate a sense of moral duty. The particular values that prevailed in both issues were always present (and measurable), even if they were latent in expressed preferences. Before deliberation, most participants believed they were acting in the public interest,69 but good intentions alone are not sufficient to formulate civic-minded preferences. Predeliberative preferences were more strongly influenced by discourses associated with symbolic politics. Following deliberation, symbolic cues reduced the “cost” of arriving at a decision,70 but the cognitive shortcut resulted in positions that did not properly reflect participants’ overall subjectivity.

Before deliberation, symbolic politics—or at least the mere presence of potent symbols—distorted participants’ preferences. This process may be manipulative and overt, as in the case of the Bloomfield Track, or incidental, as in the case of the Fremantle Bridge. Deliberation successfully corrected the influence of symbolic politics because it provided both the incentive and the means to develop positions on an intersubjective set of recognized issues that extended beyond the narrow set of unhelpful symbolic ones. The mechanism whereby this occurred did not so much involve changing incentive structures, as predicted by institutional rational choice.71 Rather, it changed the decision pathway from a casual understanding of emotionally appealing content to a deeper understanding that allowed participants to better express their own subjectivity. The change was as much a function of stripping away the impact of symbolic arguments as it was due to participants’ increased ability and willingness to deal with issue complexity. This suggests that the transformative effect might be more easily replicated in the wider public sphere than is ordinarily

#### 2---Scope---We’re predisposed to weigh the immediate gratification of voting aff higher than the long-term benefits of better decision-making

Princeton 4 [Princeton University Office of Communications. Study: Brain battles itself over short-term rewards, long-term goals. October 14, 2004. https://pr.princeton.edu/news/04/q4/1014-brain.htm]

Researchers at four universities found two areas of the brain that appear to compete for control over behavior when a person attempts to balance near-term rewards with long-term goals. The research involved imaging people's brains as they made choices between small but immediate rewards or larger awards that they would receive later. The study grew out of the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics, which investigates the mental and neural processes that drive economic decision-making.

The study was a collaboration between Jonathan Cohen and Samuel McClure at Princeton's Center for the Study of Brain, Mind and Behavior; David Laibson, professor of economics at Harvard University; and George Loewenstein, professor of economics and psychology at Carnegie Mellon University. Their study appears in the Oct. 15 issue of Science.

"This is part of a series of studies we've done that illustrate that we are rarely of one mind," said Cohen, also a faculty member at the University of Pittsburgh. "We have different neural systems that evolved to solve different types of problems, and our behavior is dictated by the competition or cooperation between them."

The researchers examined a much-studied economic dilemma in which consumers behave impatiently today but prefer or plan to act patiently in the future. For example, people who are offered the choice of $10 today or $11 tomorrow are likely to choose to receive the lesser amount immediately. But if given a choice between $10 in one year or $11 in a year and a day, people often choose the higher, delayed amount.

In classic economic theory, this choice is irrational because people are inconsistent in their treatment of the day-long time delay. Until now, the cause of this pattern was unclear: Some argued that the brain has a single decision-making process with a built-in inconsistency, and others -- including the authors of the Science paper -- argued that the pattern results from the competing influence of two brain systems.

The researchers studied 14 Princeton University students who were asked to consider delayed reward problems while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a procedure that shows what parts of the brain are active at all times. The students were offered choices between Amazon.com gift certificates ranging from $5 to $40 in value and larger amounts that could be obtained only by waiting some period, from two weeks to six weeks.

The study showed that decisions involving the possibility of immediate reward activated parts of the brain influenced heavily by neural systems associated with emotion. In contrast, all the decisions the students made -- whether short- or long-term -- activated brain systems that are associated with abstract reasoning.

Most important, when students had the choice of an immediate reward but chose the delayed option, the calculating regions of their brains were more strongly activated than their emotion systems. When they chose the immediate reward, the activity of the two areas was comparable, with a slight trend toward more activity in the emotion system.

The researchers concluded that impulsive choices or preferences for short-term rewards result from the emotion-related parts of the brain winning out over the abstract-reasoning parts. "There are two different brain systems, and one of them kicks in as you get really proximate to the reward," McClure said.

The finding supports the growing view among economists that psychological factors other than pure reasoning often drive people's decisions.

"Our emotional brain has a hard time imagining the future, even though our logical brain clearly sees the future consequences of our current actions," Laibson said. "Our emotional brain wants to max out the credit card, order dessert and smoke a cigarette. Our logical brain knows we should save for retirement, go for a jog and quit smoking. To understand why we feel internally conflicted, it will help to know how myopic and forward-looking brain systems value rewards and how these systems talk to one another."

The findings also may cast light on other forms of impulsive behavior and drug addiction.

"Our results help explain how and why a wide range of situations that produce emotional reactions, such as the sight, touch or smell of a desirable object, often cause people to take impulsive actions that they later regret," Loewenstein said. Such psychological cues are known to trigger dopamine-related circuits in the brain similar to the ones that responded to immediate rewards in the current study.

Concerning addiction, said Loewenstein, the findings help explain some aspects of the problem, such as why addicts become so focused on immediate gratification when they are craving a drug. The dopamine-related brain areas that dominated short-term choices among the study subjects also are known to be activated when addicts are craving drugs.

#### And it turns case---failure to effectively test the content of the aff undermines the depth of our understanding and makes us unable to determine whether it’s content is accurate, which also proves if we win our internal links, the 1AC should be viewed as presumptively false.

### at: science k

#### Their K is overly essentializing

Bagg 18 [Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on Constitutional Studies and the Political Science Department at McGill University, Beyond the Search for the Subject: An Anti-Essentialist Ontology for Liberal Democracy, https://philpapers.org/archive/BAGBTS.pdf]

Precisely because science is not a monolithic entity, however, condemning its oppressive moments hardly implies a wholesale rejection of its methods. After all, these methods have also given us particularly clear and systematic refutations of racist lies; refutations supported by troves of publicly available evidence (Marks, 2017). We should never invest science or scientists with unquestioned authority, therefore, and we should always look out for particular power formations which cast doubt on particular scientific results. This evaluation, however, must be made on a case-by-case basis. All scientific practice is structured by power, but as Foucault clearly acknowledged, not all scientific knowledge is therefore invalidated. Blanket skepticism is just as unwarranted as blanket trust.

#### Our 1nc evidence is a defense of rigor and vetting ideas---science isn’t a search for capital T truths, but if it is, only our interp solves through humility

Hilton 14 [Elise Hilton, Communications Specialist at Acton Institute. M.A. in World Religions. ‘Science:’ You Use The Word, But It Doesn’t Mean What You Think It Means. September 23, 2014. https://blog.acton.org/archives/72707-science-use-word-doesnt-mean-think-means.html]

Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry wants to clear a few things up regarding “science.” First, he wants to make sure that we have the definition correct.

Science is the process through which we derive reliable predictive rules through controlled experimentation. That’s the science that gives us airplanes and flu vaccines and the Internet. But what almost everyone means when he or she says “science” is something different.

If that is what “science” is, what is “almost everyone” else talking about?

To most people, capital-S Science is the pursuit of capital-T Truth. It is a thing engaged in by people wearing lab coats and/or doing fancy math that nobody else understands. The reason capital-S Science gives us airplanes and flu vaccines is not because it is an incremental engineering process but because scientists are really smart people.

In other words — and this is the key thing — when people say “science”, what they really mean is magic or truth.

Gobry explains that Aristotle is partially to blame (yes, that Aristotle.) Aristotle put the cart before the proverbial horse, when it comes to science.

Aristotle’s definition of science became famous in its Latin translation as: rerum cognoscere causas, or, “knowledge of the ultimate causes of things.” For this, you can often see in manuals Aristotle described as the Father of Science.

The problem with that is that it’s absolutely not true. Aristotelian “science” was a major setback for all of human civilization. For Aristotle, science started with empirical investigation and then used theoretical speculation to decide what things are caused by.

And it’s this view of science that many people hold until this day. Which is a problem. Because it’s backwards. Science means “Here’s an idea of how things work. Let’s test that idea. A lot. The outcome of those tests will tell us if that idea is true or not.” Instead, we have people who think science means, “This idea is True. Smart people believe it’s True. I think it’s True. Evidence not-withstanding, this is True.”

As Gobry points out, science is not interested in “Truth.” It’s interested in what it can prove, over and over again, in a controlled manner. It’s not a belief or an idea chiseled in stone or even something that everyone and their brother believes.

### at: neuro k

#### Prefer neuroscience---it refines social theories rather than rejecting them, but their dismissal forecloses causal analysis of biological variables

Serrat 10 [Olivier Serrat, Doctoral Student at The Chicago School of Professional Psychology at Washington DC. A Primer on Social Neuroscience. August 2010. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27625/primer-social-neuroscience.pdf]

Human history is not only social history but also neurobiological history. Throughout most of the 20th century, social and biological explanations were widely viewed as incompatible. However, from the 1990s, the emergence of social neuroscience6 vindicates Aristotle’s pioneering deductions. The young science accepts that the brain is a single, pivotal component of an undeniably social species and that it is orderly in its complexity. It treats the human brain as a social organ, whose physiological and neurological reactions are directly and profoundly shaped by social interaction. (To a mammal, being socially connected to caregivers is indispensable for survival: this, incidentally, suggests that Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs might need to be revised to ascribe more weight to social needs, e.g., love and belonging, and esteem, in relation to self-actualization.) Nondualistic and nonreductionistic, social neuroscience, through a multilevel and integrative approach, aims to understand the role of the central nervous system in the formation and maintenance of social behaviors and processes. Spanning the social and biological domains, e.g., molecular, cellular, system, person, relational, collective, and societal, it exploits biological concepts and neurobiological techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging7 —which measures patterns of blood oxygenation responses in the brain as a subject engages in a particular task, to inform and refine theories of social behavior. In short, it focuses on how the brain mediates social interaction.8 (Brain scans captured through functional magnetic resonance imaging show that the same areas are associated with distress, be that caused by social rejection or by physical pain.) Arguably, the potential benefits of social neuroscience are that it can inform debates in social psychology, provide tools for measuring brain–body activity directly and unobtrusively and provide information that would be impossible to assess using other techniques, and permit the examination of social processes by pointing to the importance of social variables (from context to culture) in altering processes within the brain and body.